



**United Nations Development Programme
Afghanistan**
**Enhancing Legal and Electoral Capacity for Tomorrow (ELECT)
3rd Quarter Project Progress Report – 2009**



A voter displays her inked finger after casting her vote on August 20, 2009

Project ID: 0050324

Duration: 50 Months (01/10/06 – 31/12/10)

Strategic Plan Component: Goal 2 / Service line 2.1

CPAP Component: Output 1 – Democratic assemblies and electoral institutions strengthened at national and sub-national levels

ANDS Component: Governance, rule of law & human rights

Total Budget: \$224,000,000

Responsible Agency: UNDP & Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) of Afghanistan

ELECT DONORS



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
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
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List of Acronyms

ACSF	Afghan Civil Society Forum
ACTD	Afghanistan Centre for Training and Development
AGE	Anti-Government Element
AIHRC	Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission
ALD	Appointment for Limited Duration
ANA	Afghan National Army
ANDS	Afghanistan National Development Strategy
ANP	Afghan National Police
ANSF	Afghan National Security Forces
AV	Armoured Vehicle
AWEC	Afghan Women's Educational Centre
CE	Civic Educator
CEA	Chief Electoral Advisor
CIDA	Canadian International Development Assistance
CPAP	Country Programme Action Plan
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
D&R	Demobilisation and Reintegration (Commission)
DFC	District Field Coordinator
DIAG	Demobilisation of Illegal Armed Groups
DoWA	Department of Women Affairs
DSRSG	Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General
ECC	Electoral Complaints Commission
ELECT	Enhancing Legal and Electoral Capacity for Tomorrow
ERL	External Relations Department
EUPOL	European Police Mission
FCCS	Foundation for Culture and Civil Society
FEFA	Federation of Free and Fair Elections
FTA	Fixed Term Appointment
HQ	Headquarters
HR	Human Resources
IAG	Illegal Armed Group
IFES	International Federation of Election Support
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
JEMB	Joint Election Management Board
JSPG	Joint Security Planning Group
LoA	Letter of Agreement
MoD	Ministry of Defence
MOI	Ministry of Interior
MOSS	Minimum Operating Security Standards
MoWA	Ministry of Women Affairs
MP	Member of Parliament
NDI	National Democratic Institute
NDS	National Department for Security (Intelligence Unit)
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation

NY	New York
OCC	Operational Coordination Centre
OCV	Out-of-Country Voting
OHR	Office of Human Resources
OSCE	Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PC	Polling Centre
PEO	Provincial Electoral Officer
PESG	Post-Election Strategy Group
ProDoc	Project Document
PSA	Public Service Announcement
REO	Regional Electoral Officer
SGF	Small Grants Fund
SMS	Short Message Service
SRSG	Special Representation of the Secretary General
TA	Temporary Appointment
TAF	The Asia Foundation
TV	Television
UN	United Nations
UNAMA	United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan
UNDAF	United Nations Development Assistance Framework
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNDSS	United Nations Department of Safety and Security
UNEAD	United Nations Electoral Assistance Division
VR	Voter Registration
VRC	Voter Registration Centre

Executive Summary

While this quarterly report was anticipated to include substantial commentary as to the election results and emerging recommendations from the electoral process, at the time of writing the electoral processes are not yet concluded. An announcement of the final results is expected within days.

The extended nature of the processes and the necessity of the IEC and UNDP/ELECT personnel to remain intensely engaged in audit procedures and preparations for a possible run-off has necessarily delayed intensive analysis of the processes to date.

Despite the ongoing demands for continued focus on delivery of election process support, significant reviews and discussion are underway with regards to future directions. The team conducting the independent external evaluation assessment of the project is still in Kabul concluding its inquiries and discussions and a report is anticipated before the end of October which will inform future planning. Discussions have taken place with many ELECT and UNDP staff, donors, the IEC and other implementing partners on issues ranging from strategies for greater IEC ownership to greater IEC oversight, through to structure, governance and activities. In addition the project is awaiting the report and recommendations in particular of the OSCE Election Support Mission which included six teams looking at thematic issues including capacity-building, civic education and domestic observation and voter registration. ELECT has participated in a number of conversations with stakeholders on aspects of review including a one-day session with the OSCE team and donors in informal conversation on key thematic areas of concern. It is also appreciated that donors have initiated thematic based deliberations which will contribute to overall thinking of future directions.

Output 5 of the Project Document provides for the 2009 and 2010 elections to be concluded by the IEC with minimal disruption and controversy. At the time of writing the decisions of the ECC are still under deliberation and the final results of the election not yet ready to announce. While the 2009 elections were concluded with minimal disruption in terms of security incidents and were efficiently delivered with regards to the operational aspects including procurement, materials delivery and retrieval and so on, the second qualifier – that of minimal controversy – cannot be said to hold at the time of writing. Controversy and political debate, however, is not within the control of UNDP/ELECT.

It is important to distinguish between processes and politics; between the operational procedures in place including the successful identifiers and triggers in the Tally Centre to isolate problems; the work of the ECC; the additional input from experts in audit processes brought in at the request of the SRSG to provide high level advice and support to the IEC and ECC in concluding extremely complex and sensitive processes, and the political debate that has ensued outside these processes. The political debate and related public discussion have shrouded the operational issues in a cloud of unjustified doubt.

UNDP/ELECT, the SRSG and the international community have all repeatedly emphasised the need to focus on processes and the need to allow the processes to be implemented without interruption to their proposer conclusion. At the time of writing, these processes are not yet concluded.

The report that follows focuses therefore on the delivery of electoral support.

Context

The ELECT project was formulated by UNDP in 2006 – based on recommendations made by both the Afghan Joint Electoral Management Board (JEMB) and the Post-Elections Strategy Group¹ (PESG) calling on the international community to support the newly established Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) to plan and conduct future elections.

ELECT's original focus was on IEC's institutional capacity building; strengthening legal and institutional environment within which IEC would execute its responsibilities; and conducting a joint voter and civil registration pilot project. However, in July 2008, the project underwent a major revision during which donors and other stakeholders agreed to support IEC conduct a national voter registration update exercise. A second substantive revision (December 2008) introduced four new overarching outputs namely:

- a) 2009 and 2010 elections concluded by the IEC and other responsible bodies with minimum disruption and controversy;
- b) IEC has a continuing mandate, an approved plan, access to financing, management structure staffing and inventory need to better maintain its electoral functions beyond 2010;
- c) Police, candidates' agents, domestic observers and the media each play a more positive role in the electoral process according to their mandates; and
- d) Informed participation of the Afghan electorate in the 2009 and 2010 elections

The strategic objective of UNDP/ELECT is aligned with the Government's overarching development goals for the well-being of the Afghan people as articulated in the Afghanistan Millennium Development Goals Country Report 2005 - Vision 2020, the Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS) benchmarks, and the core themes of The Afghanistan Compact.

ELECT operates within the pillar of Governance, Rule of Law and Human Rights; and its resources have been applied towards achievement of UNDAF's outcome 1 (By 2008, transparent, effective and efficient legislative and policy frameworks and processes are established and implemented). ELECT also directly contributes to the achievement of CPAP outcome 1 (State capacity enhanced to promote responsive governance and democratization), and CPAP output 1 (Democratic assemblies and electoral institutions strengthened at national and sub-national levels).

The mandate of ELECT is rooted within UN Security Council Resolution 1806 which calls for coordination of all international electoral assistance to Afghanistan under the political leadership of the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG). Within this coordination architecture, UNDP/ELECT is responsible for program design and management; mobilisation and management of donor funding; activity coordination and reporting.

Implementation Progress

Output 4: IEC's capacity to design and implement a sustainable national voter registration programme, inform and engage the Afghan public, and deliver a credible voter register in time for national elections in 2009 and 2010 is strengthened

¹ This comprised Afghan and international election experts. The group was tasked, after the 2005 elections, to develop a comprehensive post-election strategy for the Afghan electoral institution

The final mobile voter registration (VR) exercise which was being undertaken by two teams in three Helmand districts concluded on August 10. This was a complementary exercise in newly accessed districts; the main VR having been concluded before. More than five million eligible Afghans registered as voters during the nation-wide exercise that started in October 2008.

Data Centre: The Data Entry Staff number increased to 292 personnel. The majority of the newly recruited staff were assigned to the data entry of scanned forms. The total number of scanned forms is approximately 3.5 million, while the total number of data capture exceeded 1.5 million records.

The Biometrics Company finalised generation of templates for duplicate checking. This enabled scanned forms to be simultaneously checked for duplications before the forms were forwarded for data entry. The centre performed error filtration and duplicate scans. Basic principles of filtering discussed and agreed upon between the ICT and Biometrics Company enabled checking actual duplicates as opposed to "technical" duplicates generated by the system due to low quality pictures and fingerprints collected during the VR period.

IEC ceased all the Voter Registration Data processing operations at the Data Center on August 10, 2009. The data centre premises were refurbished and converted into the Tally Center a head of the August 20 Presidential and Parliamentary elections.

Evaluation and Future Directions for Voter Registration:

In looking ahead to 2010 in terms of operational and budget planning, there is a need to determine to what extent VR will take place. Issues range from whether an extensive VR exercise should be mobilised to consolidate into a complete register the work commenced in 2008; through to whether only a minor top-up exercise be conducted in 2010 for the parliamentary elections with a view to re-examining a combined civil and voter registry from 2011. A number of ministries are already engaged in positioning themselves to take control of various elements of these options. It is recognised that time is of the essence and is in effect already against a major exercise if a comparison with the scheduling from 2008 compared with the status of planning and preparations at the time of writing is taken into account. In addition the timing of the 2010 elections remains unclear with a similar debate as to postponed elections vis a vis the constitutional requirements yet to be clarified.

The OSCE Election Support Mission and the UNDP evaluation mission have both been examining this issue in some detail. The OSCE team was specifically mandated in agreements with UNAMA, UNDP and UN HQ to review, assess and make recommendations of the way forward for voter registration and we are awaiting the final formal reports. Preliminary and informal conversations were held with the OSCE at the Serena Hotel in a session with donors following the 20 August elections. The basis of this meeting was that the discussion was not formal and did not presume to represent the official view of the OSCE Mission as its report is yet to be finalised and published and for that reason formal minutes were not recorded. However useful input was provided from the VR expert from the OSCE team who put forward a number of informal propositions for consideration as reflect in the above paragraph. The ensuing discussion did not reach any definitive conclusions. The UNDP evaluation team concludes its field work on 18 October and a report is expected before the end of the month. In addition, preliminary discussions are taking place between ELECT and the IEC on operational and planning matters for 2010.

The assessment reports will be widely distributed in anticipation of a stakeholder conversation on this issue.

In summary, the evaluation and assessment reports of VR are imminent. Additionally, various stakeholders have views, as does the IEC, and capitals are also engaged in assessing needs and options. All of these perspectives need to be brought to the table for thorough deliberation once the reports are publicly available with a view to decision-making with regards to both operational

and budget aspects of programming for 2010. It is anticipated this will be able to be done in early November.

Output 5: 2009 and 2010 elections are concluded by the IEC with minimal disruption and controversy

At the time of writing the decisions of the ECC are still under deliberation and the final results of the election not yet ready to announce.

While the 2009 elections were concluded with minimal disruption in terms of security incidents and were efficiently delivered with regards to the operational aspects including procurement, materials delivery and retrieval and so on, the second qualifier – that of minimal controversy – cannot be said to hold at the time of writing.

Controversy and political debate, however, is not within the control of UNDP/ELECT.

It is important in this report to distinguish between processes and politics; between the operational procedures in place including the successful identifiers and triggers in the Tally Centre to isolate problems; the work of the ECC; the additional input from experts in audit processes brought in at the request of the SRSG to provide high level advice and support to the IEC and ECC in concluding extremely complex and sensitive processes, and the political debate that has ensued outside these processes. The political debate and related public discussion have shrouded the operational issues in a cloud of unjustified doubt.

UNDP/ELECT, the SRSG and the international community have all repeatedly emphasised the need to focus on processes and the need to allow the processes to be implemented without interruption to their proposer conclusion. At the time of writing, these processes are not yet concluded.

The final quarterly report will therefore be a more appropriate forum for analysis and reporting on what are continuing and unfinished issues.

It is also noted that the OSCE Observer Support Mission report which is expected to contain very specific thematic reviews and recommendations, and the UNDP evaluation mission report which will contain reflections on processes and so on, will inform future planning. The following are therefore reports on what has actually taken place.

The Presidential and Parliamentary elections were held on August 20, 2009. The IEC had prepared for an estimated 15 million eligible voters. The final turnout figures with a breakdown by gender and all other available data will be published when the final results are announced. UNDP/ELECT will report only on the final results as the preliminary figures will be affected by the final decisions and orders of the ECC and the application of the ECC orders to the database. At that stage, an analysis of the preliminary vs the final figures and an assessment of the impact of fraud as the ECC has determined it, will be produced.

Two of the 41 Presidential candidates were women; 333 women ran for seats on the provincial councils, constituting 10% of candidates.

Preliminary results were announced by the IEC and the final results will be published in the last quarterly report.

UNDP/ELECT had supported the media work of the IEC with establishment and support to management and operations of the Media Centre at the Intercontinental Hotel. However for

security reasons UNDP/ELCT pulled its staff from the Media Centre for the announcement of the final results and subsequent occasions. The security reasons were instigated by a change in policy by the IEC to include all results concluded after 6 September in the announced results, including those which would under previous IEC policy have been subject to review.

The preliminary results release showed incumbent President Hamid Karzai in the lead, followed by Dr. Abudullah Abdullah, Ramazan Bashardost, and Ashraf Ghani as show in table 1.

Table 1: Preliminary², uncertified election results – announced on 16th September 2009

Vote Order	Candidate's Name	Votes	%
1	Hamed Karzai	3,093,256	54.6%
2	Dr. Abdullah Abdullah	1,571,581	27.8%
3	Ramazan Bashardost	520,627	9.2%
4	Ashraf Ghani Ahmadzai	155,343	2.7%
*All other candidates got less than 1% of the valid votes cast			
Source: IEC			

On September 26, IEC announced provisional results of 30 provinces for the Provincial Council elections. Of the 3,339 candidates who ran for 420 total provincial council seats, 251 men and 106 women were successful.

Allegations of widespread electoral fraud were reported by candidates, poll agents, observers, and others since polling day. Since polling day, the ECC has received 2,384 electoral complaints/allegations, 751 of which were categorised as high priority with strong potential to alter the outcome of the elections.

On 8 September, ECC issued an order to the IEC for an audit and recount of all polling stations meeting specific criteria: where results show greater than 100% turn out and/or more than 95% votes cast were found to be for one candidate (provided that more than 100 votes were cast). The order emphasised that the recount takes place in the presence of observers, candidates' agents and ECC staff.

Expert advisors on audit procedures including highly regarded electoral statisticians provided advice and support to both the IEC and ECC for the audit and recount processes which at the time of writing are not yet concluded. For purposes of expediency, the IEC and ECC agreed to use a statistical sampling methodology to carry out the audit rather than look at each questionable ballot box. This would save time and allow the holding of a runoff, if required, before onset of winter. The IEC and ECC further agreed to bring the sample boxes to Kabul for the audit, to ensure consistency in the way they are audited and to allow broad participation of candidate agents.

An Electoral Expert was brought in by UNDP headquarters to advise on the procedure for conducting the audit, and to train IEC staff on audit procedures.

The audit of suspicious ballot boxes was conducted concurrently with the on-going adjudication of other electoral complaints by the ECC. By end of September 2009, ECC had issued a number of decisions invalidating presidential election results from 83 polling stations in Ghazni, Paktika and

² NB These preliminary results were subject to change, based ECC final decisions regarding electoral complaints arbitration. The IEC will announce the Final Results as soon as they have received and implemented the final decisions of the ECC

Kandahar provinces. Investigations by both HQ and Provincial Electoral Complaints Commission staff were nearing completion at several other locations.

Several election observation missions participated in the electoral process as observers. These included among others:

- Asian Network for Free Elections
- European Union
- Organization for Security Cooperation in Europe
- National Democratic Institute
- International Republican Institute
- Democracy International
- FEFA

Preliminary statements issued by election observer missions in general, were congratulatory, praising IEC for organizing the first ever Afghan-led electoral process, but expressed reservations and concern about possible fraud both during the voting and in the upcoming tally process.

The following specific activities were conducted to support IEC conduct the election:

5.1 Review/Formulate regulations and procedures that are consistent with the legal framework

Procedures for intake of sensitive and non sensitive materials including forms were finalised by IEC, translated into both Dari and Pashtu, and sent to Provinces for familiarisation. All IEC field staff received training on how to operationalise these procedures. The IEC also formulated plans, procedures, and checklists for election audits³, and conducted intensive briefing of the audit teams to members on how audits should be conducted.

Compliance with various regulations and procedures which IEC formulated to ensure proper conduct of the elections has not been properly assessed yet. However, preliminary views and impressions indicate that compliance levels differ for different regulations, procedures and locations.

For instance, counting of election results was done at polling station level for the first time in an Afghan election. From a technical point of view, the counting procedures were reasonably adhered to in many locations. However, Provincial Offices reported that in some instances, polling staff decided to consolidate results within the Polling Centre. This resulted in not having one result sheet per polling station but one for the Polling Centre. In other cases, pressing security threats necessitated the relocation of the counting centres to safe heavens such as district capitals, more secure Polling Centres, and provincial offices.

Whereas the intake of sensitive and non-sensitive material was done out at the provincial offices without major issues; there were, in some cases, problems in defining the exact number of polling centres and stations opened on Election Day.

Despite a lukewarm start, there was a fair attempt by Presidential candidates to comply with campaign finance regulation – requiring Presidential candidates to disclose the amount and source of their campaign finances (see table 2). IEC referred all cases of defaulting candidates to the ECC for arbitration. Defaulting candidates were mainly fined.

³ This should not be confused with the audit and recount ordered by ECC on September 8 in response to allegations of massive electoral fraud and irregularities. This particular one was pre-planned (well before the election) as part of IEC's anti-fraud and election safe-guard mechanism.

Table 2: Level of Compliance with Campaign Finance Regulation by Presidential Candidates

Financial Report No.	Reporting Period	Presidential candidates who submitted	Presidential candidates who failed to submit
1	Up to 29 th June	15	26
2	30 th June - 17 th July	33	8
3	18 th July – 1 st August	30	10
4	2 nd August - 17 th August	33	5

Source: IEC

5.2 Facilitate implementation of the IEC’s operational plan for 2009 and 2010 elections through procurement and installation of infrastructure and other logistical supplies

The distribution of election materials by air, road and donkey/horse back was completed in all provinces largely as per IEC movement plans with only minor disruptions. It ought to be noted that the extent of usage of air support was unprecedented in Afghan Elections and posed a huge challenge in terms of coordination with security forces, IEC staff on the ground, and transport companies which had to carry on with the furthest legs of distribution. Whereas procurement of the Dash 7 fixed wing by ELECT was cancelled due to on-going delays, charter flights were utilized to complement the UNDP/ELECT air assets comprising an AN26 and an IL76. The Afghan National Army, ISAF and PRTs also provided extensive air support to move materials from provincial capitals to Polling Centres. In all, 3039 trucks, various air missions, and 3,171 donkeys delivered the election materials by 19 August as per schedule. However, around 20 IEC convoys were attacked by AGEs using light arms fire, or rocket, or road-side explosive devices.

The retrieval of material took place in an efficient manner and beside some delays, all the material was retrieved to the Provincial Offices within a few days. Overall, retrieval of the Tamper Evident Bags from provinces to the National Tally Center was also conducted as per schedule. A limited number of Tamper Evident Bags remained in the provinces for almost a week after elections for operational, logistical, or security-related constraints. The (post-election) materials of 6 polling centres were either lost or destroyed due to security or other incidents (the materials did not reach the National Tally Centre).

The IEC Operations Centre was staffed by IEC, UNDP/ELECT and ISAF personnel working collaboratively. Observers were allowed access and many visitors attended. The Centre worked efficiently starting with tracking the convoys distributing election material, receiving information on the preparedness of the Polling Centres, opening of Polling Centres, security incidents and retrieval to the provincial centres as well as the retrieval of Tamper Evident Bags to the National Tally Center in Kabul. Prior to the elections, IEC, together with UNDP Security Cell, and with IFES financial support had installed a Radio Communications network in 26 provinces to alleviate all communications needs for the IEC offices.

Whereas the IEC originally planned to open 6969 polling centres and 26877 polling stations throughout the country on Polling Day, the number of polling centres was reduced to 6,519 following a joint security assessment. Of those polling centres and stations that had been security-cleared, 6210 polling centres (95.1%) with 24183 polling stations were announced as opened on Election Day. But due to polling day security threats, 760 polling centres and 2694 polling stations remained inactive or did not remain open for the mandatory polling period. These figures should be regarded as preliminary until finalisation of electoral statistics by the IEC which will be available for the final quarterly report.

Exclusively, 11,029 and 1756 polling stations served women and nomadic Kuchi voters respectively; and for the first time in the history of Afghan elections, there was a provision for special needs voting---allowing hospitalized citizens, army personnel and prisoners to cast their votes.

Given the possibility of a second round of elections, provincial offices were instructed to complete an inventory of the election material at the provincial warehouses. The instructions included sorting material for appropriate storage and re-use as well as retrieving blue boxes to Kabul IEC warehouse.

In anticipation of a run-off, donors at the Steering Committee of 15th September approved the purchase of both ballot papers and indelible ink, recognising that should a run-off not be required these materials would be discarded. The risk however of not being prepared was deemed to be greater than the risk of purchasing consumables that may not eventually be required. Purchase Orders were issued for indelible ink, polling station kits and counting forms. These materials are now in-country and packing has already commenced in preparation for a possible run-off. The Purchase Order for printing of training & Public Outreach, and assorted were also raised by pended – until a final decision is reached for a run-off to be conducted. Polling/counting centre kits as well as indelible ink would be used during the 2010 elections in case a run-off is not ordered.

In preparation for a possible run-off, IEC embarked on a review of Polling Centre lists to determine which will be used in the event of a run-off. This information will be collaborated with security as soon as tentative decision is made.

5.3 Enhance IEC human resources capacity by recruiting, training and managing temporary election staff

Of the temporary staff recruited, approximately 39% (47,056) were female. All the temporary staff were trained on polling and counting procedures through a cascade training system in which: 1) provincial staff trained DFCs, 2) DFCs trained senior polling staff (Polling Center Chairperson, Polling Station Manager, Inking Officer), and 3) Polling Station Managers briefed remaining polling staff prior to election day.

A Training of Trainers (ToT) program was conducted for Regional and Provincial trainers in two different phases in HQ Kabul. The first phase was conducted on 18-21 July where 88 Regional training coordinators (RTC) and provincial training officers (PTO) from 18 provinces were trained. The second phase was conducted on 22-25 July where 89 RTC & PTO from 16 provinces were trained. The training covered polling and counting procedures in 13 training modules and DFC roles and responsibilities.

IEC staff were general highly applauded by both international and domestic observers for courageously delivering the August 20 elections despite relentless threats and risks of kidnapping and targeted killings imposed on them by AGEs. However, the IEC has acknowledged problems of nepotism in staff recruitment and allegations of participation in wrongdoing have been made against a number of staff specifically and generally. The IEC has stated it will take the necessary disciplinary measures against staff found to be engaged in wrongdoing and will refer cases for legal proceedings as appropriate. It is important that through the Steering Committee and Project Boards monitoring of these actions will be required.

Payment of all temporary polling staff who worked in the 2009 elections was completed across the 34 provinces of Afghanistan in challenging circumstances where a great deal of cash for payment of short term staff was required to be handled by IEC officials. Procedures agreed between the IEC and UNDP were instituted to protect the integrity of this process. These payments are now being

reconciled and indications are that the process was handled responsibly with minimal difficulties emerging.

5.4 Plan, coordinate and ensure election security for electoral activities

In the lead up to elections, the Policy Action Group and ISAF revealed that security planning for the election continued to face serious challenges given the shortfall of ANP to secure all polling sites, IEC warehouses and offices and the fact that a large percentage of polling centres could not be assessed by ANSF due to outright insecurity.

Security planning was conducted within the IEC in relation to IEC-compound activities with strong support from USAID and Global Security both in terms of infrastructure improvements and administration of agreed security measures.

Overall election security planning was convened through the Joint Security Planning Group (JPSG) and a range of other bodies at departmental and ministerial level, supplemented by ongoing high level negotiations between the SRSF, relevant Ministers, the IEC and ISAF.

Overall, security planning was thorough and effective although burdened by late decision-making as to agreement on polling centres. The participation of the MoI, MoD and NDS in decisions as to which polling centres should and should not open is a matter for review and future recommendation.

Despite grim forecasts, the joint security mechanism worked better than projected. Based on recommendations of the joint security assessment, IEC had reduced the number of polling centers. Of those security-cleared to operate, 6,210 centres (95%) actually opened on Election Day but due to polling day security threats, about 12% of polling centres that had opened (760 polling centres with 2694 polling stations) remained inactive or closed prematurely. About 175 Polling Centres were directly attacked by AGEs around the country.

Despite the thorough security planning and the remarkable absence of major Election Day incidents, the number of security incidents reported on Election Day itself was as high as those for an entire week.

There were some election-related fatalities, injuries, and kidnappings sustained by IEC, ANP, ASAF, candidates and civilians. On 19th July, a PC candidate in Kunduz was assassinated – this being the 3rd confirmed assassination of a PC candidate; and in North-Eastern Region, the convoys of a PC candidate, and that of a presidential candidate were attacked – with only minor injuries reported. The IEC reported the loss of 13 staff, while 14 were injured while performing their duties.

Although post-election violence and demonstrations were feared to occur, the situation largely remained calm around the country – thanks to regular calls from the leading candidates for calm and to let the IEC and the ECC complete due process. However, election-related security incidents continued after election-day with several attacks reported on vehicle convoys either in an attempt to destroy ballot materials or in retribution against IEC staff.

The widely held assumption that female candidates, agents or observers were more at risk than their male counterparts did not hold true as a smaller proportion of female candidates, agents and observers reported far less cases of bodily harm than males, and none were mortally wounded.

5.5 Support the Media Commission by strengthening its media regulation, monitoring and reporting function

To create awareness about the Media Code of Conduct, members of the Media Commission briefed print and electronic editors in Kabul about the Media Code of Conduct before start of the campaign period, and travelled to various provinces to brief provincial-based journalists and to stress the importance of complying with all the provisions of the Media Code. A three-day training of journalists was organised to create appreciation for rational electoral reporting.

Generally, the media of Afghanistan played an important role during the election campaign, bringing a wide range of issues up for debate between presidential candidates organised by both Media Commission and the media outfits themselves. The quality of the coverage - which focused more on issues than previously experienced - was widely acclaimed by both domestic and international observers as a major improvement since the election in 2005, with journalists showing more sophistication and aggressiveness in pursuing questions of public interest.

Private Media Institutions played a key role in public awareness broadcasting electoral programmes, round tables discussions and debates. The print media also helped to motivate people to go cast their votes. However, some private media outfits continued to show biases in their coverage, usually in favour of some candidates and the Media Commission's ability to make the coverage of the private media fairer was limited. Female candidates complained that they had problems getting adequate media attention.

Regular media monitoring was conducted by both the IEC Media Commission and the Media Monitoring Project of Afghanistan (MMPA). Weekly monitoring reports were produced and disseminated through press conferences. The Media Commission published six Media Monitoring reports announcing violations and infringements made by the state media. The final media monitoring report on the election campaign showed President Karzai received 90.77% of presidential candidate coverage on RTA radio news during the period July 21 and August 17. The candidate with the second highest quantity of coverage was Dr Abdullah Abdullah, with 1.95%.

Since its establishment up to the end of the campaign silence period, the Media Commission investigated and adjudicated around 30 media infringements, most of which were levelled against the state-owned RTA. The Commission took up three complaints against the privately owned newspaper, Mandagar. It notified the newspaper that several of its election reports were incorrect and misleading, and required corrections. The Media Commission laid a formal complaint with the ECC against the state media (RTA television, and the newspapers Hewad, Eslah and Anees) for failing to abide by four Media Commission decisions regarding violation of Article 53 of the Electoral Law.

Moreover, the Media Commission noted that 15 journalists, including both Afghans and foreigners, who tried to cover violent events in Kabul on Election Day were arrested in accordance with the Presidential decree banning media coverage of electoral violence. Several were assaulted while under arrest, and one had money stolen from him.

All presidential candidates were invited to participate in debates on television radio, to express their vision, policies, and strategies for the country. In this context, eight 40-minute television roundtables and seven 40-minute radio round tables were produced. Radio Azadi and RTA TV broadcast a live, two-hour debate between President Hamid Karzai, Dr Ramazan Basherdest and Dr Ashraf Ghani. Dr Abdullah was invited, but he declined to participate. The Media Commission chose respected independent journalists as moderators for the presidential roundtables.

Probably as a result of its profile, the Media Commission was a times threatened with "being taught a lesson" and individual Commissioners' future job security also threatened.

Some of the discussions about future structure will also include a review of the structure and role of the media Commission.

Below, Journalists listen during one of the IEC Press Conferences



5.6 Support IEC External Relations activities

In July, the IEC Media Centre was established at the Intercontinental Hotel in Kabul. Two staff were assigned by the IT department to work on the technical aspects of the centre with support from an International Technical Adviser.

Press conferences were held at the IEC Media Centre at the Intercontinental Hotel weekly, bi-weekly, daily, bi-daily, and every second day depending on the tempo of information.

Each press conference includes a prepared statement, Q&As, a press release, and (for results) a presentation. All press conferences were well attended with around 150 members of the press and stakeholders coming on a regular basis, rising to over 300 on Election Day and the first announcement of partial results on 25 August.

In response to high levels of media interest in electoral materials, IEC organised several tours of warehouses to enable them see packing and distribution of the materials. The media was also invited to observe loading of electoral materials on to donkeys in Panjshir; various public outreach events in Kabul and several major cities; and training of polling station staff. Events were extremely well attended by both international and national press. In addition, DVDs containing clips of public outreach materials, documentaries were distributed to the media, and footage of electoral preparations was prepared. In addition, a slide presentation of public outreach activities was developed and played at the beginning of every press conference. Nine fact sheets were produced on subjects such as tally centre operations, intake and audit procedures, polling kits, ballots, polling staff training, public outreach activities, final preparations and international support to the electoral process. These were uploaded on the IEC web site in both English and Dari and also distributed to various stakeholders.

Various observer and candidate liaison meetings were held in accordance with the IEC information dissemination strategy. The second meeting for Presidential Candidates was held on 28 July. The Minister of Defence and the Minister of Interior were present to discuss security issues for the Candidates and their Deputies, and arrangements for interprovincial travel for campaigning. The Chairperson of the IEC Commission was also present to answer questions on the electoral process. Thirty five candidates attended as well as selected media and International Observers. In addition, several rounds of coordination meetings were held separately with domestic and international observer groups

The final deadline for accreditation for organizations was 6 August while that for individuals from already accredited organizations was 13 August. However, IEC continued to accredit international media and special guests until the day before the election, mainly to assist those who had only just arrived in country. As shown in table 3, more than 280,000 observers comprising 22% female (61,951) were accredited to participate in the 2009 elections. Among the candidates, President Karzai and Dr Abdullah accredited the largest number of agents with 29,845 and 30,015 respectively.

The IEC allowed the media, with prior arrangements, to visit the Tally Centre to observe the tallying process. On average, the Tally Center received 40 visitors a day for the entire duration of the tallying process.

On request, two training sessions about polling and counting procedures were organized for FEFA provincial trainers. The training involved a simulation, followed by a question and answer session with the IEC Head of Field operations, the head of ERL and the Accreditation Officer. The trainings were held on July 26 and 30 and each was attended by two trainers for each of 17 provinces.

Table 3: Status of Accreditation for the 2009 Presidential and Provincial Council Elections

No	Type of Entity	No/Entity	No Accredited	Female	Male
1	Provincial Council Candidates	2,672	169,709	36,222	133,487
2	Presidential Candidates	14	92,897	21,103	71,794
3	International Observers	30	1,106	108	998
4	Domestic observers	21	9,228	3,758	5,470
5	Domestic Media	51	638	126	512
6	International Media	149	609	152	457
7	Special Guests	4	261	86	175
8	Political Parties	31	6,998	396	6,602
Total		2,972	281,446	61,951	219,495

Source: IEC

5.7 Support IEC Public Outreach activities

- A total of 2,300,000 million Mock ballot papers were printed and distributed to 34 provinces.
- A total of 400,000 sample ballots were also distributed and used in voter education.
- The 1,604 IEC Civic Educators informed the electorate using the mobile radio (loudspeakers), distributed sample ballots, organised mock elections, and pasted the “bubble” posters with the location of the different polling centres ahead of Election Day.
- A total of 370 Mobile Radios were distributed to all the provinces to aid voter education work.

- Seminars for women and mullahs were successfully held in 27 provinces. The IEC was not able to organise these seminars in the following seven provinces: Samangan, Saripul, Paktia, Badakhshan, Paktika, Khost and Nooristan.
- All the 684 billboards were printed and installed in the 34 provinces of Afghanistan.
- Four different types of the IEC Radio PSA were broadcast on 30 radio stations.
- Three different types of the IEC TV PSA were broadcast on 10 TV stations.
- Two Radio Roundtables on electoral matters were broadcast by Nawa radio, Ariana FM, Killid and Arman FM.
- Two TV roundtables on public outreach activities, and the role of Agents and Observers on Election Day were broadcast on Ariana, Lemar and Ayna and Tolo TV.
- All the radio soap opera, television and radio public service announcements were recorded and broadcast as planned. The 20-minute film Television documentary was broadcast in Dari and Pashto on four Television stations: Tolo, Lemar, Aina and Ariana.
- The number of operators in the IEC Call Centre was increased from 30 to 60 to increase call processing rates.
- A total of 526 Small Grant project applications were received from 32 provinces, 295 of which were selected by IEC. UNDP approved 96 projects for implementation: 62 projects were implemented before the elections; and 34 events were done after the elections.
- ISAF is re-broadcast the IEC PSAs on Sada-e-Azadi Channel which includes nine ISAF transmitters. Additionally ISAF published bimonthly the IEC posters and factsheets in the Sada-e-Azadi newspaper.
- Four roundtables (2 on radio and 2 on Television) on: (1) Security, agents and observers, and (2) Counting, transfer of results, tallying and the role of Electoral Complaints Commission were recorded and broadcast on Tolo, Lemar, Aina and Ariana.
- An election-themed drawing contest took place at Isteqlal High School. 120 students (8-13 years old) participated from eight different schools. The drawings of the four winners will be published in 70 newspapers as part of the continuing civic education initiatives after the election.
- IEC Graphic Design Unit created a factsheet and leaflet for the runoff election.
- The IEC call center is received between 30,000 - 35,000 calls per week throughout the election period.

Although a systematic assessment of the impact of public outreach has not been carried out, it appears very likely that IEC's concerted, multi-media public outreach programming played a key role in motivating millions of the electorate to turn out – even amidst serious security threats and risks – and participate in the August 20 presidential and provincial council elections.

5.8 Support the Electoral Complaints Commission

All ECC provincial-level structures were established. Pending lease for ECC provincial offices were concluded after agreement had been reached to the effect that PSS be the signatory on the leases. All required furniture, stationary, office and IT equipment were dispatched to ECC provincial offices in July. Networking was installed by IO Global.

To improve public awareness about the role and functioning of ECC, the institution conducted briefing sessions for about 50 campaign managers of presidential candidates, 42 media representatives, 26 observers, 87 candidates' agents.

By 20 August, the ECC had distributed close to 150,000 factsheets, 100,000 brochures and 100,000 posters (distribution of which was with assistance from the IEC). Throughout July and August the ECC held briefings and trainings for journalists, media editors and managers, polling agents, party and candidate representatives, observers and Ministry of Interior Inspector Generals. Additional ECC Public Outreach efforts included two television spots, 2 radio spots, a 30 minute radio

roundtable, print PSAs in 9 publications, including weekly placement into Killid and Mursal magazines. Several press conferences were held immediately following Election Day to announce progress on complaints arbitration.

Prior to elections, the ECC conducted a second round of training for the Provincial ECC (PECC) staff. The focus of the training was the polling and counting procedures, subsequent ECC intake and investigation plan for polling and counting period Complaints. In addition, staff were coached on how to detect polling and counting irregularities. Prior to Polling Day, the five ECC Commissioners travelled to five regions to meet with stakeholders, civil society, candidates and members of the media.

Since polling day, the ECC had received 2,384 allegations of widespread electoral fraud and irregularities from candidates, poll agents, observers, and others entities. Polling and counting complaints were processed at the newly established and temporary Complaints Processing Center at UNOCA. As shown in table 4 below, about 750 complaints were thought to be serious enough to affect the election results. The majority of the complaints were related with polling irregularities (41%) and undue influence of votes using intimidation and violence (28%). Table 4 below shows the types of complaints received by ECC.

Table 4: Summary of Electoral Complaints and Adjudication

Total complaints received during polling and counting period	2,384
Total complaints assessed as priority A	751
Total complaints received to date (including Campaign period)	2,851
Total complaints adjudicated	249
Total complaints dismissed	200
Total exclusions (Campaign period onwards)	2
Total fines	25
Total warnings	21
Total other sanctions	2

Source: ECC

Table 5: Type of Complaints received by ECC

No.	Description	Percentage
1	Polling irregularity	40.65%
2	Counting irregularity	6.57%
3	Tally centre results	0.44%
4	Access	11.40%
5	Missing materials	4.07%
6	Undue influence (intimidation, violence,...)	27.99%
7	Others	8.13%

Source: ECC

By end of the reporting period, ECC had made several decisions invalidating presidential election results from 83 polling stations in Ghazni, Paktika and Kandahar provinces. Investigations were

still being undertaken in several other locations by both HQ and Provincial Electoral Complaints Commissions.

ECC also issued an order to the IEC for an audit and recount of suspiciously fraudulent ballot boxes where results showed greater than 100% turn out and/or more than 95% of votes cast were found to be for one candidate (provided that more than 100 votes had been cast). The order emphasised that the recount takes place in the presence of observers, candidates' agents and ECC staff.

A statistical sample of suspiciously fraudulent ballot boxes would be audited rather than look at each questionable ballot box to save time and allow the holding of a runoff, if required, before onset of winter. A total of randomly selected 313 ballot boxes (out of 3,063) boxes would be audited from Kabul. The sample boxes would be drawn from 28 provinces.

The audit was planned to dove-tail with the on-going investigation and arbitration of other electoral complaints by the ECC. A decision of whether to order a run-off, or confirm President Hamid Karzai would be based on the outcome of both the audit and the rest of ECC investigations. At the time of writing these processes were not concluded.

Output 6: IEC has a continuing mandate, an approved plan, access to financing, management structure, staffing, and inventory needed to better maintain its functions beyond 2010

In consultation with donors, UNDP constituted and commissioned an independent evaluation team to assess the performance of ELECT and inform strategic future directions including 2010 electoral programming. In addition, informal conversations were held with OSCE specialist teams and some donors. Key issues that were discussed, and which require serious reflection and decision making include the way ahead for voter registration – a difficult issue in the light of the uncertainty as to the date of the parliamentary elections; electoral fraud mitigation in the next elections – including a possible run-off; the nature and scope of support to the IEC; the nature and management of support to broader stakeholder groups and so on. It is hoped that a Substantive Revision of the Project Document that determines activities for 2010 - and which foreshadows planning for beyond 2010 – will emerge as an outcome of a collaborate, collective review process.

The IEC Gender Unit drafted their first annual strategic plan which included a review of the work of the IEC to date on gender and plans for the future. It was sent for comments to stakeholders including UNDP ELECT, IEC, donors, international political foundations and local NGOs. A half day consultation meeting was held, chaired by Commissioner Yari, for further discussion about the plan. Responses were very positive. The final version will be completed in August following more input from IEC heads of department. The plan focuses on gender and election related activities, gender mainstreaming in the IEC, and capacity building and sustainability of the Gender Unit.

During the quarter, the position of Capacity Development Advisor to the IEC was advertised by UNDP.

The evaluation team will be recommending a more focussed lessons learned requirement from advisors to capture explicit and implicit learning. In addition, there were discussions among the evaluation team mission to upgrade the Capacity Advisor position and to focus more on future planning and capacity building needs.

Output 7: Police, candidates’ agents, domestic observers, and the media each play a positive role in the electoral process according to their mandates

7.1. Develop media capacity for electoral reporting and monitoring.

The UNDP Elect Media ‘Part A’ Training Program was completed by Internews Afghanistan a head of the presidential and provincial council elections. During the training, journalists and editors showed acute awareness of the importance of their role in informing the public during the elections.

According to Internews, a total of 164 journalists and 40 media managers from 8 locations around the country took part in Part A training (of which 19.5% were female), as well as 158 members of civil society organizations (with over 41% female). A report produced by Internews on media performance on Election Day concluded that a more experienced media did a better job covering the campaign and highlighting the key issues than five years ago. This view was broadly shared among both domestic and international observers.

Internews also initiated preparations for the rollout of ‘Part B,’ training programme which will focus on media performance during the post-electoral period.

7.2. Facilitate capacity-building of MOI/ANP in electoral policing.

The cascade training for police officers and commanders was completed before 20 August 2009 (Election Day). The training covered their role and duties during the electoral process, basic human rights principles, general knowledge on elections and security of Polling Centres. The training was conducted in two phases: the first was completed by the European Union Police Mission (EUPOL) to first line officers at four regional centres, while the second phase was completed at provincial level by the officers trained during the first phase. Monitoring of the cascade training has suggested that over 20,000 Afghan National Police Officers received training or briefing. In addition, 40,000 pocket booklets with graphics and text on the course were distributed to every province.

7.3. Enhance role of party representatives and candidates’ agents.

The National Democratic Institute (NDI) commenced the training of 30 master trainers on 20th July, at eight regional training hubs. The trained trainers then helped to roll-out a marathon cascade training of other candidates’ agents at provincial level ahead of the August 20 presidential and provincial council elections.



A total of 30,309 candidates’ agents (24,872 male agents and 5,437 female agents) were trained directly. It is estimated that a further 10% were indirectly trained by agents who had participated in the Poll Agent Trainings program. About 150,000 candidates’ agents manuals were printed and are being distributed through both NDI and IEC field offices.

Poll agents receive training from National Democratic Institute

National Democratic Institute concluded its call centre operations with 2,116 successful calls to candidates, including 196 female candidates. The direct candidate outreach campaign had been instituted specifically to inform candidates about the agent training opportunity, and the need to ensure that all candidates' agents got accredited.

7.4. Facilitate deployment of trained domestic observers.

The Free and Fair Elections Foundation of Afghanistan (FEFA) employed 68 provincial observers to coordinate election observation in their respective provinces, and to train district observers.

According to FEFA, 7,368 FEFA electoral observers were deployed on Election Day, of which 2,642 were female. FEFA's observers were fielded in 68.4% (249 districts) of the 364 districts of the country. A preliminary report which FEFA released highlighted several electoral violations and challenges, but concluded that: "Amidst many challenges, this phase of the electoral process was an important step in Afghanistan's progress towards building a civil and democratic government."

FEFA delivered several media press briefings over the electoral period, and coordinated with international observers through weekly meetings. From an organisational and physical visibility perspective, FEFA was applauded by the international community for doing a sterling job under very difficult circumstances. The key element for future consideration will be the capacity of headquarters to maintain oversight throughout and further mainstream the organisation within the broader democratization processes that Afghanistan has embarked upon.

The Technical Advisor remain in place with FEFA to assist with the consolidation of the report and to prepare for a possible run-off.

Discussions have been ongoing with donors as to the retention of support to FEFA within the Basket. The evaluation team will offer some reflections on this will be part of the broader donor consultation on the Project Document revision.

Output 8: Informed participation of the Afghan electorate in the 2009 and 2010 elections

8.1. Promote voter education and civic engagement in the electoral process.

All four organizations conducting civic education concluded their first grants in July or August. Civic education projects were implemented throughout the country, covering 30 provinces. The projects focused on general civic education topics such as what is democracy; citizens' roles in a democracy; why one should vote; and current affairs. Each organization had a specific geographic area to cover, which was based on the mapping exercise ELECT carried out, to ensure there was no overlap. . In all, the organizations reached 3,524,730 Afghans through their programming (this number is most likely higher as it is difficult to get accurate radio station listenership data).

Additionally, each organization focused on specific activities: mobile cinema and theatre, workshops, radio programs, and town hall meetings. Target audiences included mullahs, community leaders, women, youth, and the general population. Each group conducted one full project before the elections.

The performance of all the partner organisations exceeded expectations given the volatile environment in which operated.

- Afghanistan Center for Training and Development (ACTD) conducted 1,116 training and briefing sessions in 13 districts within 3 provinces (Balkh, Jowzjan, and Samangan). Their

approach involved building relationships with community leaders such as mullahs and members of ulemas, and delivering civic education sessions and public gatherings. . These sessions involved the participation of 33,480 people. In addition 26 meetings were conducted with Mulas and Ulemas (2 per district) and 13 public gatherings.

- Afghan Women’s Educational Centre (AWEC) conducted an inclusive programme of community-level events. This included 603 briefings for local populations in 3 provinces (Balkh, Wardak, Herat), backed up by a gender assessment. From all the 27 civic educators that were hired, seven of them were women.
- Foundation for Culture and Civil Society (FCCS) conducted a mobile cinema and mobile theatre campaign delivering 73 showings across 20 districts in 3 provinces (Badghis, Ghor, and Paktia). The focus of their mobile cinema and mobile theatre revolved around civic responsibility, including: the rights of women and minorities, obligations of voters, grassroots involvement in political processes, assessing candidates and their platforms and reactions to political violence. FCCS was awarded a Second Grant Agreement that came to an end on 31 August. One of the highlighted achievements was two Afghan television stations, Khost TV and Ariana TV, aired FCCS’ movie, free of charge, reaching 1.1million viewers.
- Afghan Civil Society Forum (ACSF) conducted a media campaign producing 12 radio programmes which were broadcast 6 times per week to provinces in the south, including Nimroz, Farah, Helmand, and Kandahar. The coverage area of the radio stations employed for these broadcasts will serve to extend programming to Khost. In addition, 6,000 copies of ACSF’s monthly magazine “Jamea-e-madani” featuring essays and reports on civic education were printed.

Table 6 summarises activities undertaken by civic education organisations.

Table 6: Overview of Civic Education activities supported by ELECT

Organization	No of Activities	Afghans Reached
ACSF	12 broadcast	More than 2,500,000 (it is difficult to get accurate radio station listenership numbers)
ACTD	1116 meetings and gatherings	33,480 total 10,514 women
FCCS	82 mobile theatre and cinema productions; 2 cinema broadcasts on Afghan television	Through local performances; 24,440 total 1,988 women 1,1000 on television

As part of the civic education outreach programs, ELECT developed a facilitators’ manual with the pro-bono assistance of National Constitution Center (NCC), a United States (US) based NGO focused on civic education. The manual was completed in July and soft copies were made available to ELECT’s four partners as well as Counterpart and other international organizations. ELECT also developed 19 detailed national maps which featured all activities and activities broken down by audience, issue, and mode of implementation. The maps were updated monthly.

Thus far, only one organization has been issued a second grant based on performance. A financial evaluation of one of the organization (Afghan Women’s Education Center) was conducted by UNDP CO and results were mixed. Subsequent grants to Afghanistan Center for Training and Development were still pending; a second grant to Afghan Civil Society Forum was unlikely.

Challenges

Risks

The project's risk environment was comprehensively fore-casted within a results-based management framework during the 2nd substantial ELECT ProDoc revision. Since then, the risk environment has been a subject of multi-stakeholder review – the latest being in June 2009. In general, project performance is threatened by a multitude of risks which have been categorised under:

- a) Voter access and turn out;
- b) Integrity of the elections;
- c) Public outreach
- d) Conduct of politic campaigns;
- e) Technical and legal issues;
- f) Electoral challenges and complaint mechanism;
- g) Security; and
- h) Funding.

Annex I provides a detailed description of the risks and the mitigation measures that have been undertaken.

Issues

The following issues impacted on the Project during the reporting period:

- Election results: By end reporting period, there was still significant speculation in the press, local population, and among the international community regarding how much electoral fraud and irregularities occurred during the election, and what the IEC and ECC intended to do. The issue was heightened by the IEC taking a decision on exclusions based on fraud, then reversing that decision within 24 hours. At the same time the ECC issued an order on recounts and audit of suspiciously fraudulent ballot boxes. The Afghan population was reportedly becoming increasingly concerned by how long it was taking to declare final certified results.
- Media capacity building: A major issue encountered while implementing media training was ensuring journalists participating in media training absorbed key information in a short time. To address this issue, the training was made focused, practical and interactive, but this made sessions longer than had been planned.
- Domestic Observation: The key element for future consideration with regards to FEFA is the capacity of headquarters to maintain oversight throughout and further mainstream the organization within the broader democratization processes that Afghanistan has embarked upon. One of the challenges is consolidating the headquarters Management Structure at FEFA in order for the headquarters management structure to work efficiently and effectively and so enhance communication between the different units.
- Polling Centre list finalisation. The finalisation of polling centre over-delayed due to the lack of responses and clarity from the security forces on whether they would be able to

secure the centres or not. This in turn created uncertainties with regards to packaging and delivery of electoral materials and the actual number of centres to be opened on Election Day.

- **External Relations:** The late arrival of equipment of the IEC Media Centre created some degree of operational anxiety. The Media Centre was set up late (on 19 August), with audiovisual equipment borrowed from ISAF. Further more, the IEC had no staff qualified for simultaneous translation and had to borrow a UNDP/ELECT interpreter for consecutive translation from the stage. The distance of the Intercontinental Hotel from the IEC (approximately 1 hour by car) led to IEC personnel often arriving late and thus delaying commencement of press conferences.

All efforts must be made to ensure that a dedicated IEC Media Centre is built nearer to the IEC or inside the compound for next year. The equipment already purchased must be kept in good condition to fit out the new centre. A design has been approved by the IEC and UNDP/ELECT is following through some necessary revisions with the architects.

- **Changing Contract Modalities:** An important and continuing Human Resources challenge is the transition of International staff from ALD (Appointment of Limited Duration) to the new TA (Temporary Assignment) and FTA (Fixed-Term Appointment) contract modalities. This large and complex transition is accompanied by a degree of uncertainty and confusion. UNDP/ELECT Human Resources continued to work closely with UNDP Country Office and HQs so as to implement the changeover as smoothly as possible.
- **Public Outreach:** Security issues continued to be the main challenge: this hampered the IEC Civic Educators in many provinces throughout the voter education campaign. Several provinces were seriously affected by increased AGE activities. Civic Educators were restricted from going to villages and had difficulties mobilising community members since the latter were hesitant to participate due to threats posed by the AGEs.
- **Insecurity:** Insecurity as anticipated proved to be the most significant challenge of the electoral process. Prior to the elections, AGEs had issued incessant threats warning that they will disrupt the process and attack whoever participated. More than 100 insurgent incidents were reported on Election Day; 24 IEC convoys with election materials were attacked; while 175 polling centres came under direct AGE attack. There were some election-related fatalities, injuries, and kidnappings sustained by IEC, ANP, ASAF, candidates and civilians.
- **Distribution and Retrieval of Election Materials:** Distribution and retrieval of materials to all polling centres hampered by a volatile security situation in some parts of the country. As already mentioned, 24 IEC convoys were attacked with either small arms fire, rocket fire, or improvised road-side explosive devices. Despite these challenges, the IEC managed to get materials to Polling Centres in readiness for polling and a timely retrieval of results and other materials to provincial warehouses was registered.
- **Female staff recruitment:** Although 47,056 female staff were successfully recruited to work in polling stations and centers – representing 39% of all 120,462 temporary election that IEC had engaged, there was still a short-fall of female workers. Consequently, men were used to fill-in the female staffing gaps. The presence of male staff in female polling stations could have negatively affected women’s willingness to vote. Provinces where there were more male staff in female posts than women include: Wardak (197 female, with 573 female posts taken by males); Paktia (67 female, with 1665 female posts taken by males); Paktika (1 female, with female 2761 posts taken by males); Khost (495 female, with female 934 posts taken by males); Zabul (96 female, with 120 female posts taken by males); Orozgan (105 female, with 160 female posts taken by males).

- Before the Parliamentary elections, detailed plans and budgets need to be made to ensure proper recruitment and training of female body checkers for all polling stations. All staff at female polling stations need to be female. Training for media in women’s political rights and participation, in how to include women and women’s issues in media stories, events and round tables will need to be given more attention during the next elections.
- Civic Education: Having the civic education component added to the project document in December posed numerous challenges. In order to have a robust and comprehensive civic education project, the intervening organization needs more time to develop the project, create stakeholder buy-in, and implement the project. ELECT had just a few months. Challenges faced because of this include rushing to push through grants, inability to identify a larger number of qualified and motivated organizations, and a lack of time and resources to work closely with the partner organizations on strategy, approach, messaging, and implementation, among other factors. ELECT was able to work through these challenges, however the project would have benefited if the component was added to the project document earlier. Future civic engagement programming need to consider the time horizon required.
- Media Commission: The MC functioned with extremely limited authority and inadequate political support within Afghan national institutions. Private media were unwilling to implement commission recommendations because the MC’s authority does not extend to private media. But even State media, where the MC’s authority had been granted within the media code of conduct framework, failed to show respect or responsiveness to the commission.

There is need for coordinated international pressure to weigh in upon government, in particular the Ministry of Information and Culture, to dispense its media regulatory and oversight functions in a fair, balanced, and rational manner. UNAMA could play a lead role in challenging government to play its role of ensuring a level playing field for all political candidates in accordance with the media code of conduct.

Lessons Learned

The conduct of the August 20 elections, with all its flaws, constitutes an invaluable lesson that will enable electoral institutions such as the IEC, ECC, and the Electoral Media Commission to better understand and carry out their roles in future elections. Attendant issues such as minor malfunctions in equipment on polling day; impediments to civic education prior to Election Day, hiccups in distributing electoral materials, the constant evolution of internal IEC processes, recruitment and deployment of polling staff, in particular women, etc provide lessons for the planning and conduct of the 2010 Parliamentary and District Council Elections in 2010.

Future Plans

UNDP/ELECT awaits the final decision of the ECC with regards to alleged electoral fraud and irregularities. ECC decision will identify finally whether there will be a run-off election or not. UNDP has already procured the consumables and materials necessary for this process – just in case a run-off be ordered, and is set to support the full run-off process – should there be one. Resources for a run-off election were quarantined within the 2009 ELECT budget.

With the Mid-Term Evaluation of ELECT nearing completion, the Project will focus more on planning for 2010, taking into account the recommendations of the Independent Evaluation Team,

as well insights from informal discussions with the OSCE specialist team and the donors. Donors have expressed their keen interest in continued engagement in the planning process through thematic working groups.

Financial Section

Table 1. Funding Overview

DONOR NAME	Commitment (Currency of the Agreement)	CONTRIBUTIONS		Balance (Currency of the Agreement)
		Received (Currency of the Agreement)	Received (USD)	
Denmark	DKK 3,700,000	DKK 3,700,000	666,108	-
	DKK 3,700,000	DKK 14,999,940	2,833,920	-
Italy	EUR 582,000	EUR 582,000	499,376	-
	EUR 5,000,000	EUR 5,000,000	6,476,684	-
	EUR 5,000,000	EUR 5,000,000	7,032,349	-
Canada/CIDA*	CDN \$ 1,000,000	CDN \$ 1,000,000	862,069	-
	CDN \$ 4,000,000	CDN \$ 4,000,000	3,297,609	-
	CDN \$ 21,000,000	CDN \$ 11,000,000	8,856,683	CDN \$ 10,000,000
UNDEF	\$336,567	\$336,567	336,567	-
UK (FCO)	GBP 1,000,000	GBP 1,000,000	1,996,008	-
	GBP 4,100,000	GBP 4,100,000	5,890,805	-
	GBP 1,500,000	GBP 1,700,000	2,442,529	-
DFID	GBP 4,900,000	GBP 4,900,000	9,007,353	-
	GBP 5,000,000	GBP 5,000,000	7,183,908	-
UNDP	\$1,269,430	\$1,269,430	1,269,430	-
Germany**	\$10,000,000	\$10,000,000	10,000,000	-
	\$12,000,000	\$12,000,000	12,000,000	-

	NOK 15,000,000	NOK 15,000,000	2,798,507	-
	NOK 69,930,000	NOK 32,430,000	4,646,132	-
Norway		NOK 37,500,000	5,827,506	
	\$6,756,717	\$6,756,717	6,756,717	-
Netherlands***	\$4,411,725	\$4,411,725	4,411,725	-
Spain	EUR 1,500,000	EUR 1,500,000	1,943,005	-
	SEK 60,000,000	SEK 20,000,000	2,512,563	-
Sweden/SIDA****		SEK 20,000,000	2,837,684	SEK 20,000,000
AUSAID	AUD 6,000,000	AUD 6,000,000	4,210,257	-
USAID I	\$65,000,000	\$65,000,000	65,000,000	-
USAID II	\$55,000,000	\$55,000,000	0	\$55,000,000
France	EUR 1,000,000	EUR 1,000,000	1,278,772	-
Japan	\$36,600,000	\$36,600,000	36,600,000	-
Switzerland	CHF 1,500,000	CHF 1,500,000	1,305,483	-
India	\$1,000,000	\$1,000,000	1,000,000	-
Estonia	\$40,000	\$40,000	40,000	-
Korea	\$1,000,000	\$1,000,000	1,000,000	-
Croatia	\$50,000	\$50,000	50,000	-
Ireland	EUR 50,000	EUR 50,000	65,876	-
Luxembourg	EUR 75,000	EUR 75,000	105,485	-
Turkey	\$3,000,000	\$3,000,000	3,000,000	-
Finland	EUR 500,000	EUR 500,000	702,247	-
EC	EUR 34,750,000	EUR 33012500	47,500,000	EUR 1,737,500
Belgium	EUR 1,000,000	EUR 1,000,000	1,404,494	-
TOTAL			276,926,624	

Table 2: Expenditure Status (by activity)

Activity	Donor	Sum of Budget	Quarter 1		Quarter 2		Quarter 3		Total Exp Quarter 3	Cumulative Exp 2009
			Commitment	Disbursement	Commitment	Disbursement	Commitment	Disbursement		
ACTIVITY01	00012 - UNDP		(5)	-	-	-	-	-	-	(5)
	00095 - Denmark	55,642	(665)	56,307	-	-	-	-	-	55,642
	00137 - Italy		-	-	(8,279)	-	-	-	-	(8,279)
	00248 - UK		(792)	-	(8,591)	-	-	-	-	(9,383)
	00550 - CIDA		(14,759)		-	-	-	-	-	(14,759)
	10480 - USAID	41,554	(765,644)	762,644	(33,771)	30,209	-	48,116	48,116	41,554
ACTIVITY01 Total		97,196	(781,865)	818,951	(50,641)	30,209	-	48,116	48,116	64,770
ACTIVITY02	00550 - CIDA	17,214	-	17,214	-	-	-	-	-	17,214
ACTIVITY02 Total		17,214	-	17,214	-	-	-	-	-	17,214
ACTIVITY03	00137 - Italy		(67,915)	67,915	-	-	(24,804)	24,804	-	-
	00248 - UK		(147,242)	147,242	-	-	-	-	-	-
	10480 - USAID		(70,054)	69,640	(255,127)	252,408	(32,500)	-	(32,500)	(35,633)
ACTIVITY03 Total		-	(285,211)	284,797	(255,127)	252,408	(57,304)	24,804	(32,500)	(35,633)
ACTIVITY04	00012 - UNDP		-	-	-	7,299	-	-	-	7,299
	00095 - Denmark	120,373	167	120,408	(87)	-	(115)	-	(115)	120,373
	00117 - Germany		(109,604)	109,604	(58,080)	58,080	(31,696)	31,696	-	-
	00137 - Italy			2,944	-	-	-	-	-	-

			(2,944)						-	-
	00550 - CIDA	557,911	(1,500)	541,484	-	18,010	-	(84)	(84)	557,911
	10480 - USAID	376,438	15,984	254,323	-	71,030	-	24,131	35,100	365,468
	10869 - UNDEF		-	-	(18,400)	-	-	-	-	(18,400)
ACTIVITY04 Total		1,054,722	(97,897)	1,028,763	(76,567)	154,419	(31,811)	55,743	34,902	1,032,651
ACTIVITY05A	00137 - Italy	3,322,367	-	-	-	-	-	920,030	4,137,428	920,030
	00187 - Norway	1,684,301	-	-	-	1,184	-	1,683,118	1,424,139	1,684,301
	00551 - DFID		-	179	-	(181)	-	-	-	(1)
	10480 - USAID	625,624	-	3,043,002	-	1,193,444	-	(8,337,326)	(8,337,326)	(4,100,880)
ACTIVITY05A Total		5,632,292	-	3,043,181	-	1,194,447	-	(5,734,179)	(2,775,759)	(1,496,550)
ACTIVITY05B	00137 - Italy	2,092,051	-	-	-	-	-	863,300	2,092,051	863,300
	00182 - Netherlands	6,622,523	9,300	139,888	89,819	358,422	(94,244)	1,429,266	1,335,022	1,932,451
	00187 - Norway	2,590,136	(6,882)	(47)	-	215,505	741,469	1,640,091	2,381,560	2,590,136
	00550 - CIDA	1,963,719	149,558	137,197	(146,828)	146,828	(2,730)	5,324	2,594	289,349
	10480 - USAID	12,302,161	(2,399,019)	7,588,617	1,397,578	2,380,473	(3,380,706)	6,715,218	106,144	12,302,160
ACTIVITY05B Total		25,570,589	(2,247,043)	7,865,655	1,340,569	3,101,229	(2,736,211)	10,653,198	5,917,371	17,977,396
ACTIVITY05C	00550 - CIDA		-	(1,521)	-	-	-	-	-	(1,521)
	10480 - USAID	2,764,003	16,862	1,697,774	(12,650)	282,506	-	-	279,787	1,984,492
ACTIVITY05C Total		2,764,003	16,862	1,696,252	(12,650)	282,506	-	-	279,787	1,982,971
ACTIVITY05D	00117 - Germany				-	-	-	-		

			(402)						-	(402)
	00137 - Italy	764	-	-	-	-	-	764	764	764
	10480 - USAID	678,313	(47,205)	134,216	(18,348)	45,924	(500)	-	(500)	114,087
ACTIVITY05D Total		679,077	(47,607)	134,216	(18,348)	45,924	(500)	764	264	114,450
ACTIVITY05E	00137 - Italy	580,810	-	-	-	-	-	580,810	580,810	580,810
	10480 - USAID	3,023,840	502,520	2,573,218	(361,977)	286,341	(70,548)	94,285	2,929	3,023,840
ACTIVITY05E Total		3,604,650	502,520	2,573,218	(361,977)	286,341	(70,548)	675,095	583,739	3,604,650
ACTIVITY05F	00012 - UNDP		(143,428)	143,428	-	-	-	-	-	-
	10480 - USAID		(10,722)	10,722	-	-	-	-	-	-
ACTIVITY05F Total		-	(154,150)	154,150	-	-	-	-	-	-
ACTIVITY06A	00141 - Japan	13,051,610	-	-	-	2,836,835	2,631	10,147,612	10,150,243	12,987,078
	00182 - Netherlands	3,764,128	-	-	-	4,802	-	3,759,325	3,759,325	3,764,128
	00204 - Korea	924,131						210,000	-	210,000
	00232 - Switzerland	1,214,099	-	-	-	-	-	846,390	846,390	846,390
	00244 - Turkey	2,790,000	-	-	-	-	-	2,790,000	3,000,000	2,790,000
	00248 - UK	3,203,758	-	-	5,837	6,731	(5,837)	3,197,027	3,191,190	3,203,758
	11234 - AUSAID	1,075,269	-	-	-	-	-	1,075,269	1,075,269	1,075,269
ACTIVITY06A Total		26,022,995	-	-	5,837	2,848,368	(3,206)	22,025,622	22,022,416	24,876,622
ACTIVITY06B	00117 - Germany	1,935,484	-	-	913,011	-	(913,011)	1,310,569	397,558	1,310,569
	00141 - Japan			-						

		13,870,968	202,784		4,950,721	1,183,840	(2,187,191)	9,663,826	7,476,636	13,813,980
	00187 - Norway	166,800	-	-	-	-	166,800	-	166,800	166,800
	00248 - UK	1,800,000	-	-	-	1,800,000	-	-	-	1,800,000
	00551 - DFID	9,261,429	-	-	2,524,582	6,385,342	(1,150,645)	1,435,720	285,075	9,194,999
	10480 - USAID	9,744,406	24,630	-	5,048,015	145,000	(3,661,162)	8,187,923	1,298,010	9,744,406
	11234 - AUSAID	1,075,269	851,200	-	(175,102)	1,177,771	(676,098)	(102,502)	(778,600)	1,075,269
ACTIVITY06B Total		37,854,356	1,078,614	-	13,261,227	10,691,953	(8,421,306)	20,495,536	8,845,479	37,106,024
ACTIVITY06C	00095 - Denmark		-	(29)	-	-	-	-	-	(29)
	00137 - Italy	393,696	21,434	29,610	7,778	94,059	11,761	229,054	240,815	393,696
	00187 - Norway	4,971,673	-	20,094	529	2,513,038	971	305,130	2,306,102	2,839,763
	00220 - Spain	409,145	-	-	181,600	119,270	(45,400)	122,491	77,091	377,961
	00550 - CIDA		-	(2,519)	-	1,260	-	-	-	(1,259)
	00555 - SIDA	2,498,328	76	116,890	42,860	772,347	(9,222)	854,941	845,718	1,777,891
	10480 - USAID	62,700	-	29,827	-	32,873	-	-	-	62,700
ACTIVITY06C Total		8,335,543	21,510	193,873	232,767	3,532,849	(41,890)	1,511,616	3,469,726	5,450,724
ACTIVITY06D	00137 - Italy	2,713,439	-	7,856	520	510,644	600	1,449,514	1,450,114	1,969,133
	10480 - USAID	21,505	-	109	-	7,176	-	-	-	7,285
ACTIVITY06D Total		2,734,944	-	7,965	520	517,820	600	1,449,514	1,450,114	1,976,418
ACTIVITY06E	00105 - Estonia	37,200	-	-	-	2,014	103	18,790	18,893	20,907
	00117 - Germany		-	207,368	-					

		5,530,452				2,249,378	45,059	2,086,443	2,131,502	4,588,248
	00131 - India	16,022	-	-	-	1,770	-	(201,756)	(201,756)	(199,986)
	00137 - Italy	37,467	-	-	3,015	34,452	-	-	-	37,467
	00141 - Japan	40,153	-	-	-	9,545	8,751	21,857	30,607	40,153
	00187 - Norway	662,547	-	-	-	174,218	-	7,951	7,951	182,168
	00220 - Spain	1,397,849	-	-	50,938	15,770	817,650	466,465	1,284,115	1,350,823
	00248 - UK	1,855,106	-	-	433,359	188,484	(188,888)	1,422,152	1,233,263	1,855,106
	00550 - CIDA	202,656	-	-	900	-	(900)	202,656	201,756	202,656
	00551 - DFID	612,903	-	-	170,365	68,331	161,246	(366,528)	(205,282)	33,414
	00555 - SIDA		-	-			(404)		(404)	(404)
	10480 - USAID	10,508,530	-	7,844,006	9,408	2,683,446	-	(28,329)	(28,329)	10,508,530
	11234 - AUSAID	860,216	-	1,268	38,820	58,261	(24,037)	522,915	498,878	597,227
ACTIVITY06E	Total	21,761,102	-	8,052,642	706,804	5,485,668	818,580	4,152,615	4,971,195	19,216,309
ACTIVITY06F	00112 - France	1,189,230	-	-	97,691	18,216	3,680	132,485	136,165	252,072
	00117 - Germany	555,545	-	-	-	9,840	124,000	-	124,000	133,840
	00137 - Italy	859,495	-	-	433,859	129,118	(138,359)	162,758	24,399	587,376
	00141 - Japan	2,582,151	-	1,168,529	392,365	533,710	(2,875)	140,358	137,483	2,232,086
	00248 - UK	3,020	-	-	-	-	425	2,507	2,932	2,932
	00550 - CIDA	7,961,399	-	-	4,800,198	217,371	(303,036)	1,545,091	1,242,055	6,259,623
ACTIVITY06F			-							

Total		13,150,840		1,168,529	5,724,112	908,254	(316,165)	1,983,199	1,667,034	9,467,930
ACTIVITY06G	00117 - Germany	3,656,400	-	-	5,000	544,817	(5,000)	1,633,065	1,628,065	2,177,882
	00131 - India	913,978	-	-	849,993	-	(849,993)	849,993	-	849,993
	00137 - Italy	2,473,118	-	-	449,138	-	(226,604)	286,204	59,600	508,738
	00141 - Japan	4,493,118	-	-	761,548	142,468	(368,106)	447,336	79,230	983,247
ACTIVITY06G Total		11,536,615	-	-	2,065,679	687,285	(1,449,703)	3,216,597	1,766,894	4,519,859
GMS		12,104,441								
Grand Total		172,920,580	(1,994,267)	27,039,407	22,562,205	30,019,681	(12,309,463)	60,558,241	48,248,778	125,875,805

Table 3. Expenditure Status (by donor)

Donor	Activity	Sum of Budget	Commitment	Disbursement	Commitment	Disbursement	Commitment	Disbursement	Total Exp Quarter 3	Cumulative Exp 2009	Balance	Delivery
00012 - UNDP	ACTIVITY01		(5)	-	-	-	-	-	-	(5)	5	
	ACTIVITY04		-	-	-	7,299	-	-	-	7,299	(7,299)	
	ACTIVITY05F		(143,428)	143,428	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
00012 - UNDP Total		-	(143,433)	143,428	-	7,299	-	-	-	7,294	(7,294)	
00095 - Denmark	ACTIVITY01	55,642	(665)	56,307	-	-	-	-	-	55,642	0	100%
	ACTIVITY04	120,373	167	120,408	(87)	-	(115)	-	(115)	120,373	(0)	100%
	ACTIVITY06C		-	(29)	-	-	-	-	-	(29)	29	
00095 - Denmark Total		176,015	(498)	176,686	(87)	-	(115)	-	(115)	175,986	29	100%
00105 - Estonia	ACTIVITY06E	37,200	-	-	-	2,014	103	18,790	18,893	20,907	16,293	56%

00105 - Estonia Total		37,200	-	-	-	2,014	103	18,790	18,893	20,907	16,293	56%
00112 - France	ACTIVITY06F	1,189,230	-	-	97,691	18,216	3,680	132,485	136,165	252,072	937,159	21%
00112 - France Total		1,189,230	-	-	97,691	18,216	3,680	132,485	136,165	252,072	937,159	21%
00117 - Germany	ACTIVITY04		(109,604)	109,604	(58,080)	58,080	(31,696)	31,696	-	-	-	
	ACTIVITY05D		(402)		-	-	-	-	-	(402)	402	
	ACTIVITY06B	1,935,484	-	-	913,011	-	(913,011)	1,310,569	397,558	1,310,569	624,915	68%
	ACTIVITY06E	5,530,452	-	207,368	-	2,249,378	45,059	2,086,443	2,131,502	4,588,248	942,204	83%
	ACTIVITY06F	555,545	-	-	-	9,840	124,000	-	124,000	133,840	421,705	24%
	ACTIVITY06G	3,656,400	-	-	5,000	544,817	(5,000)	1,633,065	1,628,065	2,177,882	1,478,518	60%
00117 - Germany Total		11,677,880	(110,006)	316,972	859,931	2,862,115	(780,648)	5,061,773	4,281,125	8,210,137	3,467,744	70%
00131 - India	ACTIVITY06E	16,022	-	-	-	1,770	-	(201,756)	(201,756)	(199,986)	216,007	-1248%
	ACTIVITY06G	913,978	-	-	849,993	-	(849,993)	849,993	-	849,993	63,986	93%
00131 - India Total		930,000	-	-	849,993	1,770	(849,993)	648,237	(201,756)	650,007	279,993	70%
00137 - Italy	ACTIVITY01		-	-	(8,279)	-	-	-	-	(8,279)	8,279	
	ACTIVITY03		(67,915)	67,915	-	-	(24,804)	24,804	-	-	-	
	ACTIVITY04		(2,944)	2,944	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
	ACTIVITY05A	3,322,367	-	-	-	-	-	920,030	4,137,428	920,030	2,402,338	28%
	ACTIVITY05B	2,092,051	-	-	-	-	-	863,300	2,092,051	863,300	1,228,751	41%
	ACTIVITY05D	764	-	-	-	-	-	764	764	764	-	100%
	ACTIVITY05E		-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	100%

		580,810	-	-	-	-	-	580,810	580,810	580,810		
	ACTIVITY06C	393,696	21,434	29,610	7,778	94,059	11,761	229,054	240,815	393,696	-	100%
	ACTIVITY06D	2,713,439	-	7,856	520	510,644	600	1,449,514	1,450,114	1,969,133	744,306	73%
	ACTIVITY06E	37,467	-	-	3,015	34,452	-	-	-	37,467	-	100%
	ACTIVITY06F	859,495	-	-	433,859	129,118	(138,359)	162,758	24,399	587,376	272,118	68%
	ACTIVITY06G	2,473,118	-	-	449,138	-	(226,604)	286,204	59,600	508,738	1,964,381	21%
00137 - Italy Total		12,473,208	(49,425)	108,324	886,031	768,273	(377,406)	4,517,238	8,585,981	5,853,035	6,620,173	47%
00141 - Japan	ACTIVITY06A	13,051,610	-	-	-	2,836,835	2,631	10,147,612	10,150,243	12,987,078	64,533	100%
	ACTIVITY06B	13,870,968	202,784	-	4,950,721	1,183,840	(2,187,191)	9,663,826	7,476,636	13,813,980	56,988	100%
	ACTIVITY06E	40,153	-	-	-	9,545	8,751	21,857	30,607	40,153	0	100%
	ACTIVITY06F	2,582,151	-	1,168,529	392,365	533,710	(2,875)	140,358	137,483	2,232,086	350,064	86%
	ACTIVITY06G	4,493,118	-	-	761,548	142,468	(368,106)	447,336	79,230	983,247	3,509,872	22%
00141 - Japan Total		34,038,000	202,784	1,168,529	6,104,634	4,706,398	(2,546,790)	20,420,988	17,874,199	30,056,544	3,981,456	88%
00182 - Netherlands	ACTIVITY05B	6,622,523	9,300	139,888	89,819	358,422	(94,244)	1,429,266	1,335,022	1,932,451	4,690,072	29%
	ACTIVITY06A	3,764,128	-	-	-	4,802	-	3,759,325	3,759,325	3,764,128	0	100%
00182 - Netherlands Total		10,386,651	9,300	139,888	89,819	363,225	(94,244)	5,188,591	5,094,347	5,696,578	4,690,072	55%
00187 - Norway	ACTIVITY05A	1,684,301	-	-	-	1,184	-	1,683,118	1,424,139	1,684,301	-	100%
	ACTIVITY05B	2,590,136	(6,882)	(47)	-	215,505	741,469	1,640,091	2,381,560	2,590,136	-	100%
	ACTIVITY06B	166,800	-	-	-	-	166,800	-	166,800	166,800	-	100%

	ACTIVITY06C	4,971,673	-	20,094	529	2,513,038	971	305,130	2,306,102	2,839,763	2,131,910	57%
	ACTIVITY06E	662,547	-	-	-	174,218	-	7,951	7,951	182,168	480,379	27%
00187 - Norway Total		10,075,458	(6,882)	20,047	529	2,903,945	909,240	3,636,290	6,286,551	7,463,169	2,612,289	74%
00204 - Korea	ACTIVITY06A	924,131						210,000	-	210,000	714,131	23%
00204 - Korea Total		924,131	-	-	-	-	-	210,000	-	210,000	714,131	23%
00220 - Spain	ACTIVITY06C	409,145	-	-	181,600	119,270	(45,400)	122,491	77,091	377,961	31,184	92%
	ACTIVITY06E	1,397,849	-	-	50,938	15,770	817,650	466,465	1,284,115	1,350,823	47,027	97%
00220 - Spain Total		1,806,995	-	-	232,538	135,040	772,250	588,956	1,361,206	1,728,784	78,210	96%
00232 - Switzerland	ACTIVITY06A	1,214,099	-	-	-	-	-	846,390	846,390	846,390	367,709	70%
00232 - Switzerland Total		1,214,099	-	-	-	-	-	846,390	846,390	846,390	367,709	70%
00244 - Turkey	ACTIVITY06A	2,790,000	-	-	-	-	-	2,790,000	3,000,000	2,790,000	0	100%
00244 - Turkey Total		2,790,000	-	-	-	-	-	2,790,000	3,000,000	2,790,000	0	100%
00248 - UK	ACTIVITY01		(792)	-	(8,591)	-	-	-	-	(9,383)	9,383	
	ACTIVITY03		(147,242)	147,242	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
	ACTIVITY06A	3,203,758	-	-	5,837	6,731	(5,837)	3,197,027	3,191,190	3,203,758	-	100%
	ACTIVITY06B	1,800,000	-	-	-	1,800,000	-	-	-	1,800,000	-	100%
	ACTIVITY06E	1,855,106	-	-	433,359	188,484	(188,888)	1,422,152	1,233,263	1,855,106	-	100%
	ACTIVITY06F	3,020	-	-	-	-	425	2,507	2,932	2,932	88	97%
00248 - UK Total		6,861,884	(148,034)	147,242	430,605	1,995,216	(194,300)	4,621,685	4,427,385	6,852,413	9,471	100%
00550 - CIDA	ACTIVITY01		(14,759)	-	-	-	-	-	-	(14,759)	14,759	
	ACTIVITY02							-	-		-	100%

		17,214	-	17,214	-	-	-			17,214		
	ACTIVITY04	557,911	(1,500)	541,484	-	18,010	-	(84)	(84)	557,911	-	100%
	ACTIVITY05B	1,963,719	149,558	137,197	(146,828)	146,828	(2,730)	5,324	2,594	289,349	1,674,370	15%
	ACTIVITY05C		-	(1,521)	-	-	-	-	-	(1,521)	1,521	
	ACTIVITY06C		-	(2,519)	-	1,260	-	-	-	(1,259)	1,259	
	ACTIVITY06E	202,656	-	-	900	-	(900)	202,656	201,756	202,656	-	100%
	ACTIVITY06F	7,961,399	-	-	4,800,198	217,371	(303,036)	1,545,091	1,242,055	6,259,623	1,701,776	79%
00550 - CIDA Total		10,702,899	133,299	691,855	4,654,270	383,469	(306,666)	1,752,988	1,446,322	7,309,215	3,393,685	68%
00551 - DFID	ACTIVITY05A		-	179	-	(181)	-	-	-	(1)	1	
	ACTIVITY06B	9,261,429	-	-	2,524,582	6,385,342	(1,150,645)	1,435,720	285,075	9,194,999	66,430	99%
	ACTIVITY06E	612,903	-	-	170,365	68,331	161,246	(366,528)	(205,282)	33,414	579,489	5%
00551 - DFID Total		9,874,332	-	179	2,694,947	6,453,492	(989,399)	1,069,192	79,793	9,228,412	645,920	93%
00555 - SIDA	ACTIVITY06C	2,498,328	76	116,890	42,860	772,347	(9,222)	854,941	845,718	1,777,891	720,437	71%
	ACTIVITY06E		-	-			(404)		(404)	(404)	404	
00555 - SIDA Total		2,498,328	76	116,890	42,860	772,347	(9,626)	854,941	845,314	1,777,487	720,841	71%
10480 - USAID	ACTIVITY01	41,554	(765,644)	762,644	(33,771)	30,209	-	48,116	48,116	41,554	(0)	100%
	ACTIVITY03		(70,054)	69,640	(255,127)	252,408	(32,500)	-	(32,500)	(35,633)	35,633	
	ACTIVITY04	376,438	15,984	254,323	-	71,030	-	24,131	35,100	365,468	10,970	97%
	ACTIVITY05A	625,624	-	3,043,002	-	1,193,444	-	(8,337,326)	(8,337,326)	(4,100,880)	4,726,504	-655%
	ACTIVITY05B	12,302,161	(2,399,019)	7,588,617	1,397,578	2,380,473	(3,380,706)	6,715,218	106,144	12,302,160	0	100%

	ACTIVITY05C	2,764,003	16,862	1,697,774	(12,650)	282,506	-	-	279,787	1,984,492	779,511	72%
	ACTIVITY05D	678,313	(47,205)	134,216	(18,348)	45,924	(500)	-	(500)	114,087	564,226	17%
	ACTIVITY05E	3,023,840	502,520	2,573,218	(361,977)	286,341	(70,548)	94,285	2,929	3,023,840	-	100%
	ACTIVITY05F		(10,722)	10,722	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	ACTIVITY06B	9,744,406	24,630	-	5,048,015	145,000	(3,661,162)	8,187,923	1,298,010	9,744,406	-	100%
	ACTIVITY06C	62,700	-	29,827	-	32,873	-	-	-	62,700	-	100%
	ACTIVITY06D	21,505	-	109	-	7,176	-	-	-	7,285	14,220	34%
	ACTIVITY06E	10,508,530	-	7,844,006	9,408	2,683,446	-	(28,329)	(28,329)	10,508,530	-	100%
10480 - USAID Total		40,149,075	(2,732,648)	24,008,099	5,773,128	7,410,831	(7,145,416)	6,704,017	(6,628,568)	34,018,011	6,131,064	85%
10869 - UNDEF	ACTIVITY04		-	-	(18,400)	-	-	-	-	(18,400)	18,400	
10869 - UNDEF Total		-	-	-	(18,400)	-	-	-	-	(18,400)	18,400	
11234 - AUSAID	ACTIVITY06A	1,075,269	-	-	-	-	-	1,075,269	1,075,269	1,075,269	0	100%
	ACTIVITY06B	1,075,269	851,200	-	(175,102)	1,177,771	(676,098)	(102,502)	(778,600)	1,075,269	-	100%
	ACTIVITY06E	860,216	-	1,268	38,820	58,261	(24,037)	522,915	498,878	597,227	262,989	69%
11234 - AUSAID Total		3,010,753	851,200	1,268	(136,283)	1,236,033	(700,134)	1,495,681	795,547	2,747,765	262,989	91%
GMS		12,104,441									12,104,441	0%
Grand Total		172,920,580	(1,994,267)	27,039,407	22,562,205	30,019,681	(12,309,463)	60,558,241	48,248,778	125,875,805	47,044,776	73%

Annexes

Annex I: UNDP/ELECT Performance Tracking Matrix: July – September 2009

UNDP/ELECT Output #4: Voter Registration

Hierarchy of Results	Progress Indicators	Base-Line Information	Performance Benchmarks and Targets	Implementation Progress (July – September 2009)
Output #4: Eligible men and women (including harder to reach groups) who do not have voter registration certificate are given the opportunity to obtain one in time for 2009 elections	Number of voters registered; disaggregated by gender, social groups and province	1,047,048 people registered in the first phase of voter update (October 6 - November 4 2008) covering 14 provinces; 414,702 of being female and 11,401 being Kuchies (<i>ref, IEC records</i>).	At least 5 million eligible voters are registered by end of February 2009 in accordance with criteria set by the IEC	<i>LARGELY COMPLETED IN THE FIRST QUARTER:</i> The final mobile voter registration (VR) exercise which was being undertaken by two teams in three Helmand districts concluded on August 10. This was a complementary exercise in newly accessed districts; the main VR having been concluded before. More than five million eligible Afghans registered as voters during the nation-wide exercise that started in October 2008.
4.1 Assist IEC's HR management through the provision of salaries and a payment system for all temporary staff	Number of temporary staff recruited for voter registration; Proportion of female staff recruited	36,800 voter registration staff in 2004, half of whom were female, and half of the female were literate;	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 22,500 temporary voter registration staff recruited by the IEC; 50% of the recruited staff are female 	<i>COMPLETED IN 1ST QUARTER</i>
4.2 Procure equipment and commodities for voter registration. (a) Acquire, set up or	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Number of electoral offices set up and running; Number of voter registration centres established 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 35 provincial offices set up in 2004; Assorted office, communications and security equipment 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Procurement plan developed, approved by July 2008; Supplies, equipment, materials and infrastructure 	<i>COMPLETED IN 1ST QUARTER</i>

<p>improve infrastructure facilities at IEC Hqs, Regional and Provincial offices (b) Establish and equip voter registration centres</p>		<p>for all offices in 2004;</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Local companies subcontracted for varied tasks e.g. furniture, fuel supply in 2004; 	<p>investments for voter registration procured according to schedule;</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> IEC Offices established at Regional and Provincial level by September 2008, equipped and maintained throughout the electoral cycle; At least 600 Voter Registration Centres (VRCs) established around the country 	
<p>4.3 Procure communication equipment and materials for the data centre</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Type and quantity of equipment and materials procured for the data centre; Total number of voter records entered into the voters' register 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1,100 mobile HF units, 35HF base stations, and 6,200 satellite phones were programmed and managed nationally in 2004; A data entry centre was constructed at UNAMA compound and equipped with 122 data entry computers; 8 administrative computers; 2 Microsoft Structure Query Language servers; and 2 domain controllers 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> National data centre set up at IEC and equipped with communication and IT facilities by October 2008; Voter registration data is entered into the register in time for the presidential elections; At least 5 million voters' records processed through the biometric scanning system by end of June 2009 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The Data Entry Staff number increased to 292 personnel. The total number of scanned forms is approximately 3.5 million, while the total number of data capture exceeded 1.5 million records The Biometrics Company finalised generation of templates for duplicate checking, enabling the data centre to perform error filtration and duplicate scans. IEC ceased all the Voter Registration Data processing operations at the Data Center on August 10, 2009. The data centre premises were refurbished and converted into the Tally Center a head of the August 20 Presidential and Parliamentary elections.

<p>4.4 Facilitate transportation of voter registration materials and personnel</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Type and scale of transportation facilities used to transport voter registration materials; % of voter registration centres that receive equipment and materials on schedule 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 2,250 Russian jeeps deployed in 2004; 113 vehicles (86 Ford Pickups and 27 Nissan Patrols) procured and deployed in 2004; Donkeys hired to deliver registration teams in remote areas in 2004; <p>Coalition airdrops of registration teams to insecure areas in 2004;</p>	<p>Assorted transportation means deployed to ensure 600 voter registration centres are supplied with registration materials in time for voter registration exercise; and materials are retrieved after the exercise</p>	<p>COMPLETED IN 2nd QUARTER.</p>
<p>4.5 Support public outreach activities</p> <p>(a) Design and implement a nationwide public outreach campaign on TV and Radio;</p> <p>(b) Design and install public outreach on billboards all over the country;</p> <p>(c) Design, publish and</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Categories of public outreach activities implemented; % of the population that is aware and informed about voter registration by gender; Number of male, female and Kuchi voters registered as eligible voters 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 3000 copies of a 112-page lexicon of election terminology in both Dari and Pashto were developed and distributed to village leaders, mullahs, NGOs and community groups in 2004; 4000 mobile radio, mobile cinema and theatre productions in 2004/2005; 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> A public outreach campaign on TV and radio developed and implemented nationwide by end of February 2009; A public outreach campaign on billboards developed and implemented nationwide through 400 billboards placed all over the country by end of February 2009; 250,000 posters, 1,700 flipcharts, 300,000 brochures, 500,000 leaflets 	<p>COMPLETED IN 1ST QUARTER</p>

<p>disseminate posters, flipcharts and leaflets;</p> <p>(d) Establish a call centre for public outreach;</p> <p>(e) Develop and implement an SMS public outreach campaign through major mobile telecommunication companies;</p>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 90% of eligible voters aware that they needed a registration card to vote according to TAF survey of March 2004; • 72% of the population reached through radio in 2004/2005; • 28% of the population reached by TV in 2004/2005; • 20% of the population reached through the print media in 2004/2005; 	<p>developed, printed and distributed around the country by end of February 2009;</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A Call Centre put into place by 21 September 2008; • 55 million SMS messages on voter registration sent to the public by end of February 2009; • At least 1 small grant given out to support local public outreach groups and/or initiatives in each province by February 2009; 	
<p>4.6 Train IEC personnel including short term voter registration staff</p> <p>(a) Train Provincial Public Outreach Officers and Civic Educators on voter registration methodology, guidelines and procedures;</p> <p>(b) Train Police Commanders on</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Number of /category of trainees by gender; • Number/category of training delivered 	<p>1500 Civic Educators were trained in 2004;</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 110 Provincial Public Outreach Officers trained by February 2009; • 1,500 Civic Educators trained by February 2009; • 100% of all the IEC and voter registration female employees trained by February 2009; 	<p><i>COMPLETED IN 1ST QUARTER</i></p>

<p>Electoral Security Guidelines;</p> <p>(c) Provide additional facilitation to female staff (mehrmas) – if necessary to maximise female participation</p>				
<p>4.7 Provide advice on external relations, media conferences and stakeholder fora</p>	<p>Number of external relations, media conferences and stakeholder fora held</p>	<p>Irregular external relations, media conferences and stakeholder fora events before June 2008</p>	<p>Weekly external relations/media events conducted, starting August 2008;</p>	<p><i>COMPLETED IN 1ST QUARTER</i></p>
<p>4.8 Provide international and national technical assistance to the IEC</p> <p>(a) Recruit and engage international Technical Advisors to support IEC at Hqs, Regional and Provincial levels;</p> <p>(b) Recruit and engage international UN volunteers to support IEC at Hqs, Regional and Provincial levels;</p> <p>(c) Recruit and engage international staff to support voter registration process</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Number of international staff recruited by gender • Number of national staff recruited by gender 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Nearly 200 International staff in 2004; • 237 national staff in 2004 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 131 international staff providing technical and management support to the electoral process, at least 50% of which being female; • 370 national staff providing technical and management support to the electoral process, at least 50% of which being female; 	<p><i>COMPLETED IN 1ST QUARTER</i></p>

<p>through the UNDP/ELECT Project Management Unit;</p> <p>(d) Recruit and engage National Associates at the IEC;</p> <p>(e) Recruit and engage National Associates at the UNDP/ELECT PMU</p>				
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ELECT OUTPUT # 5: National Elections Conducted...

Hierarchy of Results	Progress Indicators	Base-Line Information	Performance Benchmarks and Targets	Implementation Progress (July – September 2009)
<p>Output #5:</p> <p>2009 and 2010 elections are concluded by the IEC with minimal disruption and controversy</p>	<p>Percentage of eligible voters (disaggregated by gender, social groups, and province) who turn out to vote in 2009 and 2010</p>	<p>70% total voter turnout in 2004 (Afghanistan);</p> <p>37% female voter turnout in 2004;</p> <p>56% male turn out and 41% female turnout in 2005 (ref. JEMB records)</p>	<p>At least 55% total voter turnout on election day, of which 35% will be female</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The Presidential and Parliamentary elections were held on August 20, 2009. • The IEC prepared for an estimated 15,295,016 eligible voters, out of which 38.7% were able to participate in the voting process. Of those who voted, 58.4% were males, 38.8% were females and 2.8% were Kuchis (<i>figures subject to change depending on ECC decisions</i>). • Two of the 41 Presidential candidates were women; 333 women ran for seats on the provincial councils, constituting 10% of candidates.
<p>Activities:</p> <p>5.1 Review/formulate electoral regulations and procedures that are consistent with the legal framework</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Number and types of procedures and regulations passed by IEC; • Extent to which IEC regulations and procedures are understood by: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a) IEC personnel; b) Candidates; c) Observers • Extent to which IEC procedures and guidelines encourage women to participate as: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a) Voters; b) Political candidates; c) Observers 	<p>The following procedures were enacted in 2004/5:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Candidate nomination procedures; • Voter registry update procedures; • Procedures for transfer of election materials; • Counting procedures; • Quarantine and audit procedures; • Meshrano Jirga election procedures <p>Women participation is recognised in existing legal frameworks as an important ingredient of successful elections</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The IEC Board of Commissioners approves regulations and procedures in a timely manner to ensure the integrity of the electoral process; • IEC regulations and procedures are understood by at least 75% of IEC personnel; candidates, and observers; • Gender is mainstreamed in all IEC procedures & guidelines so as to promote participation of women as voters, candidates, and political observers 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Procedures for intake of sensitive and non sensitive materials including forms were finalised by IEC. . All IEC field staff received training on how to operationalise these procedures. • The IEC also formulated plans, procedures, and checklists for election audits, and conducted intensive briefing of the audit teams to members on how audits should be conducted. • Compliance with various regulations and procedures which IEC formulate to ensure proper conduct of the elections has not been properly assessed yet, but preliminary views and impressions indicate that compliance levels differ for different regulations, procedures and locations.

<p>5.2 Facilitate implementation of the IEC’s operational plan for 2009 and 2010 elections through procurement and installation of infrastructure, equipment and other logistical supplies</p> <p>(i) Assess infrastructure requirements for the 2009 and 2010 elections, (ii) Procure equipment and supplies (local sourcing, to the extent possible), (iii) Install equipment (e.g. communications), service as required, and, (iv) Retrieve and secure custody of electoral assets for future use</p>	<p>Percentage of polling centres that:</p> <p>a) open and remain open, b) receive an adequate supply of materials for the 2009 and 2010 elections, c) transfer electoral data without loss, disruption or significant delay, d) return equipment and supplies to storage after election day e) women-only polling stations that remain open and maintain an adequate supply of materials</p>	<p>5000 polling centres were operational in 2004</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • At least 75% of the polling centres per province are opened and closed within timelines established by the IEC during the 2009 and 2010 elections; • At least 50% of the polling centres per province will be supplied with adequate election materials and equipment within timelines established by the IEC; • At least 50% of the PEOs are able to submit electoral data – candidate nomination, voter counts, etc – to HQ within timelines established by the IEC; • A comprehensive inventory of electoral assets is conducted at IEC HQ and PEOs three months after the 2009 and 2010 elections; 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The distribution of election materials by air, road and donkey/horse-back was completed in all provinces largely as per IEC movement plans with only minor disruptions. • The retrieval of material took place in an efficient manner and beside some delays, all the material was retrieved to the Provincial Offices within a few days. • Retrieval of the Tamper Evident Bags from provinces to the National Tally Center was also conducted as per schedule. A limited number of Tamper Evident Bags remained in the provinces for almost a week after elections for operational, logistical, or security-related constraints. The (post-election) materials of 6 polling centres were either lost or destroyed due to security or other incidents. • IEC reduced number of polling centres to 6,519 following a joint security assessment. Of those, 6210 polling centres (95.1%) with 24183 polling stations opened on Election Day. But due to polling day security threats, 760 polling centres and 2694 polling stations remained inactive or closed prematurely. • Exclusively, 11,029 and 1756 polling stations served women and nomadic Kuchi voters respectively
<p>5.3 Enhance IEC human resource capacity by recruiting, training and managing temporary election staff</p> <p>(i) Recruit temporary election staff, (ii) Provide staff training</p>	<p>Number of temporary election staff (male and female) deployed;</p> <p>Proportion of IEC staff who have received relevant training and are able to perform their</p>	<p>125,000 JEMB polling staff were deployed in 2004;</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • At least 30% of the IEC staff recruited are female; • 80% IEC (male and female) staff are trained per province, before the 2009 and 2010 elections; • 75% of the trained IEC staff (male and female) understand and perform their duties in accordance with regulations and 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • About 120,462 temporary election staff were recruited of which approximately 39% (47,056) were female. All the temporary staff were trained on polling and counting procedures through a cascade training system. • A Training of Trainers (ToT) program was conducted at HQs in Kabul for 177 Regional and Provincial trainers in two different phases. • IEC staff were general highly applauded by both international and domestic observers for courageously delivering the August 20 elections

<p>(iii) Pay staff salaries and compensation (iv) Monitor and evaluate staff performance</p>	<p>duties effectively;</p>		<p>guidelines established by the IEC;</p>	<p>despite relentless threats and risks of kidnapping and targeted killings imposed on them by AGEs despite the media reports of some personnel being linked with electoral violations.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Payment of all temporary polling staff who worked in the 2009 elections was completed across the 34 provinces of Afghanistan.
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<p>5.4 Plan, coordinate and ensure security for electoral activities</p> <p>(i) Formulate an electoral security provision and coordination plan in collaboration with MoI, MoD, ISAF, and any other formal electoral security providers as applicable;</p> <p>(ii) Maintain liaison with security service providers (e.g. ANP, MoD, and ISAF);</p> <p>(iii) Provide regular briefings on elections logistics, share information, as appropriate, across the various elections operations centres</p> <p>(iv) Establish and operationalise security coordination structures at HQ, regional and provincial levels</p> <p>(v) Frequently review the electoral security environment and develop contingency plans as appropriate</p>	<p>Availability of a joint/consensus electoral security coordination plan;</p> <p>Satisfaction of security actors with:</p> <p>the frequency and specificity of the information provided by IEC</p> <p>information/communication protocols in place between IEC and security forces, and within the IEC, HQ to provinces</p> <p>Satisfaction of IEC with:</p> <p>the frequency and specificity of the information provided by security actors</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> information/communication protocols in place between IEC at all levels – HQ to provinces) and security forces 	<p>Security plans and coordination structures & plans were in place for 2008/9 VR process</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> A security provision and coordination plan – specifying in particular, modalities to ensure women’s participation – is endorsed by all formal security agencies by June 2009; Roles for different security actors at national and sub-national level are clearly spelled out, and are performed throughout the 2009 and 2010 election period in accordance with the joint security coordination plan; Electoral security coordination structures are established and operational at HQ, regional and provincial levels by June 2009 to ensure free flow of information between IEC and security agencies; 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Overall, the joint security mechanism worked better than what had been projected. 95% of the polling centres which IEC had planned actually opened on Election Day but due to polling day security threats, about 12% of those (about 760 polling centres with 2694 polling stations) remained inactive or closed prematurely. 175 Polling Centres were directly attacked by AGEs around the country. More than 100 security incidents were reported over polling day, while about 24 IEC convoys were attacked by AGEs There were some election-related fatalities, injuries, and kidnappings sustained by IEC, ANP, ASAF, candidates and civilians. The widely held assumption that female candidates, agents or observers were more at risk than their male counterparts did not hold true as a smaller proportion of female candidates, agents and observers reported far less cases of bodily harm than males, and none were mortally wounded
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<p>5.5 Support the Media Commission by strengthening its media regulation, monitoring and reporting capabilities</p> <p>(i) Develop guidelines to regulate the establishment and operation of the Media Commission;</p> <p>(ii) Develop and publish the media Code of Conduct, in consultation with media houses;</p> <p>(iii) Undertake media monitoring, analyse monitoring findings and complaints received and prepare reports</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Existence of a functional Media Commission Number of media institutions signing up to Media Code of Conduct once agreed Proportion of media outlets that avail journalists (male and female) to be trained within the media capacity building framework, and who demonstrate clear understanding of the provisions of the media code of conduct. Extent to which media monitoring findings on political communications keep track of candidate air time allocated negative campaigning activity, hate messaging (including gender bias) by candidates • Number and type of sanctions and incentives used to enforce the media code of conduct 	<p>The Electoral Law (2005) provides for the Media Commission;</p> <p>84 Media outlets (radio and TV stations) were closely monitored in 2004/5 elections;</p> <p>In 2004/2005 elections, the Media Commission reprimanded and instructed defaulting media outlets to apologise to aggrieved candidates and political parties.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The Media Commission is established and operational by June 2009; • At least 50% of all the media outlets (radio & TV stations) per province are engaged in formulating the media Code of Conduct, and sign up to the code by June 2009; and again in June 2010; • At least 80% of the media outlets that signed up to the media code of conduct make both male and female journalists available for training, and engage in balanced and gender-sensitive reporting/coverage during the 2009 and 2010 electoral cycles; • Candidate air time allocations, negative campaigning, hate messaging (including gender bias) by candidates is monitored and reported per province by the Media Commission in a fair, transparent and efficient manner during the 2009 and 2010 electoral campaigns; • Media Code of 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Members of the Media Commission briefed print and electronic editors in Kabul about the Media Code of Conduct before start of the campaign period, and travelled to various provinces to brief provincial-based journalists and to stress the importance of complying with all the provisions of the Media Code. • The quality of the coverage - which focused more on issues than previously experienced - was widely acclaimed by both domestic and international observers as a major improvement since the election in 2005, with journalists showing more sophistication and aggressiveness in pursuing questions of public interest. • Weekly media monitoring reports were produced and disseminated through press conferences. • The Media Commission investigated and adjudicated around 30 media infringements, most of which were leveled against the state-owned RTA. • 15 journalists, including both Afghans and foreigners, who tried to cover violent events in Kabul on Election Day were arrested in accordance with the Presidential decree banning media coverage of electoral violence. • All presidential candidates were invited to participate in debates on television radio, to express their vision, policies, and strategies for the country.
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			<p>Conduct/policy is passed by April 2010</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> The media code of conduct is enforced by the Media Commission using appropriate sanctions and incentives in a fair, transparent and efficient manner; 	
<p>5.6 Support IEC External Relations activities</p> <p>(i) Formulate and implement an IEC external relations strategy;</p> <p>(ii) Deliver on core external relations mandates including management of accreditations procedures</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Availability of an External Relations Strategy for IEC; Proportion of eligible entities receiving accreditations by the agreed timeline 	<p>No IEC external relations strategy in 2008</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> An IEC public affairs strategy is agreed and enacted in consultations with key stakeholders by April 2009, and reviewed/ revised in the first quarter of 2010; IEC public affairs are conducted in accordance with timelines and procedures laid out in the External Relations Strategy and other relevant IEC guidelines; Accreditations are issued to eligible entities within timelines set by the IEC; 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The IEC Media Centre was established at the Intercontinental Hotel in Kabul. Press conferences were held at the IEC Media Centre at the Intercontinental Hotel weekly, bi-weekly, daily, bi-daily, and every second day depending on the tempo of information. IEC organised several tours of warehouses to enable journalists see packing and distribution of the materials; various public outreach events in Kabul and several major cities; training of polling station staff; and the tallying process. Various observer and candidate liaison meetings were held More than 280,000 observers comprising 22% female (61,951) were accredited to participate in the 2009 elections.

<p>5.7 Support IEC Public Outreach activities</p> <p>(i) Design and deliver broad-based, gender- and culturally sensitive public outreach campaign for the 2009 electoral process</p> <p>(ii) Review the 2009 public outreach campaign by the first quarter of 2010 to inform Public Outreach programming during the 2010 electoral period.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Percentage of voters (disaggregated by gender and social groups) who identify the following as their main source of information about the election: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a) Radio, TV b) Print media c) Posters or pamphlets d) Mullah or Shura e) Civic educators f) Other • Percentage of the public (disaggregated by gender / social group) who describe: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a) the purpose/value of elections; b) the steps needed to participate in elections 	<p>72% of the population received radio messages in 2004;</p> <p>28% of the population received TV messages in 2004;</p> <p>90% of eligible voters were aware that they needed a voter registration card to vote in 2004 (TAF Voter Education Survey)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • At least 50% and 40% of the male and female members of the population respectively receive public outreach messages on the 2009 and 2010 elections through a range of media options; • At least 50% and 40% of the eligible male and female voters respectively including marginalized social groups are: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a) aware of the importance/value of elections; b) informed about the steps they must take to cast a vote • At least 75% of the voters who turn out to vote in the 2009 and 2010 election link their decision to vote with public outreach information 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 1,604 IEC Civic Educators reached out to the electorate using mobile radio (loudspeakers), sample ballots, mock elections, flip charts and posters ahead of Election Day. • Seminars for women and mullahs were successfully held in 27 provinces. The IEC was not able to organise these seminars in the following seven provinces: Samangan, Saripul, Paktia, Badakhshan, Paktika, Khost and Nooristan. • Billboards, radio & TV PSAs; radio and TV roundtables; radio soap opera; tool-free call centre; and small grant projects are avenues which were used to reach out to the Afghan population • An election-themed drawing contest took place at Isteqlal High School. 120 students (8-13 years old) participated from eight different schools.
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<p>5.8 Support the Electoral Complaints Commission</p> <p>(i) Launch the Electoral Complaints Commission as an independent, body with a staff and office presence in all provinces</p> <p>(ii) Create public awareness about ECC to ensure political parties, candidates, candidate agents and voters understand role, process and responsibilities of ECC</p> <p>(iii) Adjudicate electoral complaints from political parties, candidates, candidate agents and voters in a manner that equitable, transparent, and which enables vulnerable entities such as women and kuchies to seek and obtain redress.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Availability of ECC regulations and procedures; • The number of provinces with accessible ECC facilities and structures; <p>Percentage of total claims of misconduct by police, candidates' agents and media reported to the ECC that are:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a) judged to be valid, and b) adjudicated in a timely and transparent manner <p>---by gender and province</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Percent of: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a) voters b) candidates, c) agents, d) political parties --- who understand the role, responsibilities, and process of dealing with ECC by gender and province 	<p>Not available – to be determined after 2009 elections</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ECC regulations & procedures are approved by April 2009; • ECC facilities and structures are established and operationalised in all provinces at least 60 days before the 2009 and 2010 elections; • ECC will adjudicate at least 50% of the valid electoral complaints lodged by voters, candidates, agents and political parties within a timeframe set by ECC regulations and guidelines; • At least 75% of the candidates, agents, political parties; and 40% of the voters understand the role, responsibilities and process of dealing with ECC, • A special unit within the ECC is created and operationalised to examine cases of complaints from women and other vulnerable groups in all provinces. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • All ECC provincial-level structures were established. • ECC institution conducted briefing sessions for about 50 campaign managers of presidential candidates, 42 media representatives, 26 observers, 87 candidates' agents; and distributed 150,000 factsheets, 100,000 brochures, and 100,000 posters about its roles, responsibilities, and the complaints procedure. • Since polling day, the ECC had received more than 2,300 allegations of widespread electoral fraud and irregularities; 750 of those were thought to be serious enough to affect the election results. • About 250 complaints had been adjudicated; 200 dismissed. • ECC had made several decisions invalidating presidential election results from 83 polling stations in Ghazni, Paktika and Kandahar provinces. Investigations were still being undertaken in several other locations by both HQ and Provincial Electoral Complaints Commissions. • ECC also issued an order to the IEC for an audit and recount of a sample of 3,063 suspiciously fraudulent ballot boxes
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UNDP/ELECT Output #6: An Increasingly Self-Reliant IEC with a Post Elections Plan...

Hierarchy of Results	Progress Indicators	Base-Line Information	Performance Benchmarks and Targets	Implementation Progress (April – June 2009)
<p>Output #6:</p> <p>IEC has a continuing mandate, an approved plan, access to financing, management structure, staffing and inventory needed to better maintain its electoral functions beyond 2010</p>	<p>Number of IEC benchmarks on institutional independence and performance achieved (Ref. IFES Report on IEC Institutional Assessment Benchmarks for details);</p>	<p>14, out of 47 benchmarks on institutional independence and performance were achieved either wholly partly by September 2008 (IFES)</p>	<p>At least 40 benchmarks on institutional independence and performance are achieved by December 2010</p>	

<p>Activities:</p> <p>6.1 Develop IEC management, administrative and programming systems and capacity</p> <p>Develop and implement a gender sensitive capacity development strategy to strengthen strategic management, administration, finance, HR, and IT systems based on priority departmental needs</p>	<p>Availability of an approved IEC capacity building strategy;</p> <p>Percent of IEC departments achieving their departmental targets as set out in the IEC Operational Plans</p>	<p>No IEC capacity development strategy in 2008;</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A gender sensitive capacity development strategy of IEC is developed in consultation with all IEC senior staff, and approved by the Board of IEC Commissioners by December 2009, and reviewed annually – starting December 2010; • At least 75% of IEC departments meet their operational targets within timelines set in the IEC’s 2009 and 2010 Operational Plans as a result on implementing the capacity development strategy; 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The position of Capacity Development Advisor to the IEC was advertised by UNDP. • The IEC drafted its Gender strategic plan which included a review of the work of the IEC to date on gender and plans for the future.
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<p>6.2 Formulate IEC post-election strategy:</p> <p>Formulate the IEC sustainability strategy in consultations with and UNAMA to secure increased direct core funding, maintain electoral infrastructure and core staffing at national and sub-national levels beyond 2009 and 2010 elections</p>	<p>Availability of an approved IEC post-2010 sustainability strategy;</p> <p>Percent of IEC's budget funded by Government of Afghanistan</p>	<p>IEC lacked a post-2010 sustainability in 2008;</p> <p>Less than 1% of IEC's 2008 budget was funded by Government of Afghanistan</p>	<p>The IEC Post-2010 sustainability strategy specifying:</p> <p>a) post-2010 programming priorities, b) staffing, c) infrastructure needs, and d) budget --- is approved by Board of IEC Commissioners and submitted by September 2010, to the Ministry of Finance for funding;</p> <p>Government of Afghanistan commits to funding at least 50% of IEC's budget for 2011</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • In consultation with donors, UNDP constituted and commissioned an independent evaluation team to assess the performance of ELECT and inform strategic future directions including 2010 electoral programming. • Informal conversations were held with OSCE specialist teams and some donors to reflect on: the way ahead for voter registration; electoral fraud mitigation in the next elections; the nature and scope of support to the IEC; the nature of support to broader stakeholder groups and so on. • A Substantive Revision of the Project Document that determines activities for 2010 - and which foreshadows planning for beyond 2010 - will emerge as an outcome of a collaborate, collective review process
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UNDP/ELECT Output #7: A Conducive Environment for elections...

Hierarchy of Results	Progress Indicators	Base-Line Information	Performance Benchmarks and Targets	Implementation Progress (April – June 2009)
<p>Output #7:</p> <p>Police, candidates’ agents, domestic observers and the media each play a positive role in the electoral process according to their mandates</p>	<p>Voters’ perceptions (disaggregated by gender & social group) on the role played by:</p> <p>a) Police, b) Candidates’ agents, c) Media, d) Observers --- during the electoral process</p>	<p>Not available - to be developed after 2009 elections</p>	<p>At least 60% of both male and female voters perceive a positive role played by police, agents, media and observers</p>	
<p>7.1 Develop media capacity for electoral reporting and monitoring</p> <p>(i) Develop a media capacity building strategy;</p> <p>(ii) Train media institutions in accordance with training needs and media capacity building strategy</p>	<p>Availability of media capacity building strategy</p> <p>List of media organizations participating in media capacity building;</p> <p>Number of training participants (men and women), by media organization, by province;</p> <p>Proportion of journalists who,</p>	<p>No media capacity building strategy during the 2004/2005 elections;</p> <p>Not available – to be developed after 2009 elections)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Media capacity building strategy is developed by May 2009 in consultations with Afghan media institutions; • Gender sensitive media training content is developed and delivered in all provinces, based on needs assessment and insights generated through the media monitoring starting June 2009; • At least 30% of the female journalists are trained during the 2009 and 2010 electoral cycles; • 75% of the trained men and 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A total of 164 journalists and 40 media managers from 8 locations around the country took part in Part A training (of which 19.5% were female), as well as 158 members of civil society organizations (with over 41% female). • A report produced by Internews on media performance on Election Day concluded that a more experienced media did a better job covering the campaign and highlighting the key issues than five years ago. This view was broadly shared among both domestic and international observers.

	<p>after the training:</p> <p>a) report clear understanding and knowledge on rational electoral reporting;</p> <p>b) Engage in professional and fair coverage of the electoral process;</p>		<p>women journalists report clear understanding and knowledge on rational electoral reporting during the 2009 and 2010 electoral cycles;</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • At least 50% of the candidates in 2009 and 2010 electoral cycles feel they received fair media coverage. 	
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<p>7.2 Facilitate capacity building of MOI/ANP in electoral policing</p> <p>(i) Liaise with MOI/ANP CSTC-A, ANA, and ISAF to jointly develop an electoral policing training strategy;</p> <p>(ii) Prepare and deliver electoral policing training modules cast within a human rights perspective and focused on:</p> <p>a) general electoral awareness,</p> <p>b) roles and responsibilities of police officers over an election period</p> <p>(iii) Provide technical assistance /mentoring to MOI/ANP as required.</p>	<p>Availability of electoral policing training modules which reflect training needs endorsed by Mol/ANP leadership;</p> <p>Number of men and women police officers and commanders who complete training;</p> <p>Proportion of (men and women) police officers and commanders who, at the end of the training:</p> <p>a) can describe their role in the electoral process</p> <p>b) indicate confidence in being able to carry out this role</p> <p>c) understand basic human rights principles; and</p> <p>d) articulate how understanding of human rights helps them improve their electoral policing functions</p>	<p>Not available – to be developed after 2009 elections</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Electoral policing training modules are developed in a consultative manner, and endorsed by Mol/ANP by April 2009; and reviewed in the first quarter of 2010; • 80% of the police officers and commanders identified for training by Mol/ANP complete training at least 2 weeks before election day; • 80% of female police women are trained and involved in electoral policing; • 75% of the trained officers and commanders (men and women) demonstrate clear understanding and knowledge of their role in the 2009 and 2010 electoral processes; 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The cascade training for police officers and commanders was completed before 20 August 2009 (Election Day). The training covered their role and duties during the electoral process, basic human rights principles, general knowledge on elections and security of Polling Centres. • Over 20,000 Afghan National Police Officers received training or briefing. As well, 40,000 pocket booklets with graphics and text on the course were distributed to every province
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<p>7.3 Enhance role of party representatives, and candidates' agents</p> <p>Design and deliver training modules for candidates, and candidates' agents on their respective electoral roles and responsibilities</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Number (male and female) political candidates, and candidates' agents, trained; • Proportion of (men and women) candidates, and candidates' agents who, at the end of the training can describe their roles and responsibilities 	<p>Not available – to be determined after 2009 elections</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 30% of the candidates and agents who attend training prior to the 2009 and 2010 elections are female; • 75% of candidates, and candidates' agents (male and female) who attend training report a clear understanding of their respective roles and responsibilities in the 2009 and 2010 electoral processes; 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The National Democratic Institute (NDI) commenced the training of 30 master trainers on 20th July, at eight regional training hubs before rolling out a marathon cascade training of other candidates' agents at provincial level ahead of the August 20 presidential and provincial council elections. • A total of 30,309 candidates' agents (24,872 male agents and 5,437 female agents) were trained directly. • It is estimated that a further 10% were indirectly trained by agents who had participated in the Poll Agent Trainings program. • About 150,000 candidates' agents manuals were printed and are being distributed through both NDI and IEC field offices. • National Democratic Institute concluded its call centre operations with 2,116 successful calls to candidates, including 196 female candidates.
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<p>7.4 Facilitate deployment of trained domestic observers</p> <p>(i) Engage with the Free and Fair Election Foundation of Afghanistan (FEFA) and other domestic observers as appropriate, in the design and delivery of gender-sensitive observer training and the provision of technical assistance;</p> <p>(ii) Develop a capacity development strategy to enhance FEFA's sustainability and quality of operations;</p> <p>(iii) Facilitate deployment of accredited domestic observers by FEFA and other entities as appropriate</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Percentage of polling stations covered by trained and accredited domestic observers, by province; • Number of observers (men and women) who are: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a) trained b) deployed, ---- by province • Availability and timely submission of domestic observation reports; • Availability of FEFA's sustainable capacity development strategy; 	<p>Domestic observers (from different institutions) were present in 65% of polling stations <u>observed</u> by AIHRC in 2004;</p> <p>5,321 domestic, 121 international observers were deployed on polling day in 2004</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Trained observers who include both men and women, are deployed in at least 50% of the polling stations to observe 2009 and 2010 elections; • Impartial domestic observation reports highlighting evidence-backed instances of fraud, intimidation, manipulation and other breaches of electoral procedures (if any) are submitted to the IEC/ECC on a weekly basis during the 2009 and 2010 election campaign period; and a final comprehensive report submitted two weeks after the 2009 and 2010 election day; • A Sustainable Capacity Development Strategy for FEFA is developed in consultation with IFES and other international electoral stakeholders partners by Sept 2010. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • FEFA employed 68 provincial observers to coordinate election observation in their respective provinces, and to train district observers. • 7,368 FEFA electoral observers were deployed on Election Day, of which 2,642 were female. • FEFA's observers were fielded in 68.4% (249 districts) of the 364 districts of the country. • A preliminary report which FEFA released highlighted several electoral violations and challenges, but concluded that: "Amidst many challenges, this phase of the electoral process was an important step in Afghanistan's progress towards building a civil and democratic government."
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UNDP/ELECT Output #8: Informed Participation...

Hierarchy of Results	Progress Indicators	Base-Line Information	Performance Benchmarks and Targets	Implementation Progress (July – September 2009)	
<p>OUTPUT #8</p> <p>Informed participation of the Afghan electorate in the 2009 and 2010 elections</p>	<p>Percent of voters (disaggregated by gender, youths, IDPs and Kuchis; province) with positive assessment of the role of elections in ensuring good governance</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • In 2008, 56% of the Afghan population believed “voting can lead to improvement in the future” (ref. TAF survey); • 82% of the population felt 2004 presidential elections were free and fair (ref, IRI survey) • 74% of the population in 2005 felt the Wolesi Jirgah election was free and fair, while 73% of the population felt that Provincial Council election had been free and fair (ref, Charney Omnibus survey) • 93% percent of the population felt, in 2005, that a government leader should be elected by the people in order to be accepted by the people (ref, Charney Omnibus survey) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • At least 70% of the voters (disaggregated by gender & social group) demonstrate understanding of the positive role of elections in ensuring good governance; • At least 60% of the population (disaggregated by gender & social group) consider the results of the 2009 and 2010 elections as acceptable 		

<p>ACTIVITIES:</p> <p>8.1 Promote voter education and civic engagement in the electoral process</p> <p>(i) Support CSOs to design audience specific messaging on democratic participation themes using a broad range of media (e.g. TV, radio, theatre, etc.).</p> <p>(ii) Provide technical and management support in delivery of gender sensitive civic empowerment initiatives</p> <p>(iii) Engage with women’s and other disadvantaged groups on outreach initiatives that encourage these constituencies to participate in the electoral process</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Number of CSOs, women and other disadvantaged groups engaged on civic empowerment programmes • Number and range of voter education/civic empowerment materials distributed by province; • % of messages that emphasise women’s participation • Number of people (men, women, youths, IDPs, Kuchis, disabled) directly reached through programming; 	<p>Not available (i.e. for CSO) – to be determined after 2009 elections</p> <p>72% of the population received radio messages in 2004;</p> <p>28% of the population received TV messages in 2004;</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CSOs, women and other disadvantaged groups are supported in all 34 provinces during the 2009 and 2010 electoral cycles; • At least of 30% of the civic empowerment messaging specifically emphasises women’s participation during 2009 and 2010 programming; • Electronic, print and other non-formal civic education materials are received by 65% of the target audiences. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • All four organizations conducting civic education concluded their first grants in July or August. • Civic education projects focused on general civic education topics such as what is democracy; citizens’ roles in a democracy; why one should vote; and current affairs. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Afghanistan Center for Training and Development (ACTD) conducted 1,116 training and briefing sessions in 13 districts within 3 provinces (Balkh, Jowzjan, and Samangan). – Afghan Women’s Educational Centre (AWEC) conducted 603 briefings for local populations in 3 provinces (Balkh, Wardak, Herat); – Foundation for Culture and Civil Society (FCCS) conducted a mobile cinema and mobile theatre campaign delivering 73 showings across 20 districts in 3 provinces (Badghis, Ghor, and Paktia). two Afghan television stations, Khost TV and Ariana TV, aired FCCS’ movie, free of charge, reaching 1.1million viewers. – Afghan Civil Society Forum (ACSF) conducted a media campaign producing 12 radio programmes which were broadcast 6 times per week to provinces in the south, including Nimroz, Farah, Helmand, Kandahar and Khost. • In all, the organizations reached 3,524,730 Afghans through their programming (this number is most likely higher as it is difficult to get accurate radio station listenership data). • Target audiences included mullahs, community leaders, women, youth, and the general population. Each group conducted one full project before the elections.
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Annex II: UNDP/ELECT Risk Mitigation Log: July – September 2009

A) VOTER ACCESS AND TURN OUT

Description of Risk	Probability (P) & Impact (I) of Risk	Mitigation measures undertaken (July-September 2009)	Remarks
1. Insecurity or lack of government presence prevents the IEC conducting elections in some areas or limits voting to districts. This leads to disenfranchisement, especially in the south and south east.	P = Medium – High I = Medium - High	A security assessment was carried out by joint security forces to assess whether or not they could secure 6969 polling centres that IEC had planned. Eventually, security forces recommended that the number of planned centres be reduced from 6,519. On election day, 6210 polling centres (95.1%) with 24183 polling stations opened.	Due to polling day security threats, 760 polling centres out of those which had opened remained inactive or closed prematurely.
2. Turn out is low, particularly in insurgency-affected areas, or is reported as low because of the high registration figures.	P = Medium I = Medium - High	1,604 IEC Civic Educators reached out to the electorate using mobile radio (loudspeakers), sample ballots, mock elections, flip charts and posters ahead of Election Day. IEC also used billboards, radio & TV PSAs; radio and TV roundtables; radio soap opera; tool-free call centre; and small grant projects to reach out to the Afghan population and encourage them to vote.	The IEC had prepared for an estimated 15,295,016 eligible voters, out of which 38.7% were able to participate in the voting process. Of those who voted, 58.4% were males, 38.8% were females and 2.8% were Kuchis.
3. Women’s’ participation is low	P = Low – Medium I = Medium - High	Seminars for women and mullahs were held in 27 provinces to stress the importance of women’s participation in elections. IEC mounted an aggressive campaign to engage female workers as polling officials.	Of the 120,462 temporary election staff that were recruited by IEC, approximately 39% (47,056) were female. As already indicated in (2) above, around 38.8% of those who turned out to vote on August 20 were female.
4. There are insufficient women candidates in some provinces to fill seats ear-marked for women.	P = High I = Medium	An aggressive public outreach campaign mounted by IEC during the candidate nomination process resulted in all provinces registering more women candidates than the allocated women’s seats, except in Uruzgan and Kandahar. This campaign was sustained during the election campaign period to encourage female candidates not to withdraw.	Two of the 41 Presidential candidates were women; while 333 women ran for seats on the provincial councils, constituting 10% of provincial council candidates.
5. Due to reserved seats, women win seats with fewer votes than men that don’t win seats	P = High I = Low		

B) INTEGRITY OF THE ELECTIONS

Description of Risk	Probability (P) & Impact (I) of Risk	Mitigation measures undertaken (July-September 2009)	Remarks
6. The IEC does not perform or is not perceived to perform its duties in a neutral manner.	P = Medium I = Medium - High	<p>IEC mounted an aggressive external relations campaign to boost its image as a transparent, independent institution; and to provide information to all candidates, candidates' agents; media, and observer groups. The campaign included the following:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Press conferences were held at the IEC Media Centre at the Intercontinental Hotel weekly, bi-weekly, daily, bi-daily, and every second day depending on the tempo of information. • IEC organised several tours of warehouses to enable journalists see packing and distribution of the materials; various public outreach events in Kabul and several major cities; training of polling station staff; and the tallying process. • Various observer and candidate liaison meetings were held • More than 280,000 observers comprising 22% female (61,951) were accredited to participate in the 2009 elections. 	Some allegations of IEC staff partiality were reported in the media. Complaints about IEC involvement in electoral fraud and irregularities are some of those which were lodged with the ECC.
7. The incumbent uses state resources to win votes	P = Medium I = Medium - High	<p>The IEC carried out a sensitisation campaign to brief print and electronic media editors in Kabul about the Media Code of Conduct before start of the campaign period, and travelled to various provinces to brief provincial-based journalists and to stress the importance of complying with all the provisions of the Media Code.</p> <p>164 journalists (19.5% were female), 40 media managers, and 158 members of civil society organizations (with over 41% female) received training on electoral reporting.</p> <p>Regular media monitoring was conducted by both the IEC Media Commission and the Media Monitoring Project of Afghanistan (MMPA);</p>	The incumbent enjoyed greater media coverage by the state media. For example, the final media monitoring report on the election campaign showed President Karzai received 90.77% of presidential candidates coverage on state-owned RTA radio news during the period July 21 and August 17.

		The Media Commission investigated and adjudicated around 30 media infringements, most of which were levelled against the state-owned RTA.	
8. There is wide-spread electoral fraud.	P = High I = Medium - High	<p>More than 280,000 observers comprising 22% female (61,951) were accredited to observe the 2009 elections.</p> <p>A total of 30,309 candidates' agents (24,872 male and 5,437 female agents) were trained directly about their roles in the electoral process. A further 10% were indirectly trained by agents who had participated in the Poll Agent Trainings program.</p> <p>UN and the international community supported the ECC to perform its electoral complaints arbitration function. ECC structures were established and operational at HQ and province levels. On the basis of complaints received, ECC issued an order to the IEC for an audit and recount of a sample of 3,063 suspiciously fraudulent ballot boxes.</p> <p>ECC also issued a number of decisions invalidating presidential election results from 83 polling stations in Ghazni, Paktika and Kandahar provinces, and was continuing with investigations of electoral complaints lodged.</p>	Allegations of widespread electoral fraud were reported by candidates, poll agents, observers, and others since polling day. Since polling day, the ECC has received 2,384 electoral complaints/allegations, 751 of which were categorised as high priority with strong potential to alter the outcome of the elections.
9. The electoral process is controlled by local strongmen or community leaders. State or non-state local strongmen influence polling and security staff, observers, and agents. They control access to polling facilities.	P = High I = Medium - High	IEC continued its policy of positively engaging local power brokers, including religious leaders and tribal leaders in community mobilisation efforts, and to enlist their support in reaching out to the hard-to-reach voters such as women. The power brokers in some cases helped with the female recruitment drive.	President Hamid Karzai reportedly invited former war-lord General Dostom to come and boost his campaign efforts. The media reported that the return of the powerful warlord could have swayed the opinion of the local population in Northern Region in favour of Karzai.
10. Reports surface that indelible ink can be washed away.	P = Medium I = Medium	Physical and scientific tests were carried out on ink samples that were procured.	It was reported by candidates, agents observers, and in the media that some indelible was actually removable in several polling centres.
11. The IEC recruitment of staff is politicised,	P = Medium – High	IEC regulations on recruitment of temporary staff	There were no systematic reports of distinct

corrupt or excludes distinct communities.	I = Medium - High	were operationalised during the recruitment of polling officials. Wherever possible, ELECT and/or UNAMA staff were invited to observe the recruitment process for polling officials.	communities being excluded from IEC temporary staffing.
12. Out-of-country voting (OCV) is decided late, facilities are established in neighbouring countries and external voting suffers from wide-spread irregularities.	P = Low I = Medium - High	NONE	The IEC pronounced in April 2009, that it will not organise OCV owing to insurmountable technical, logistical, financial and security considerations.
13. Domestic observers are prevented from, or incapable of conducting observation in a sufficient number of polling stations to provide accurate analysis.	P = Low – Medium I = Medium	7,368 FEFA electoral observers were deployed on Election Day, of which 2,642 were female. FEFA’s observers were fielded in 68.4% (249 districts) of the 364 districts of the country.	
14. Candidates’ agents do not provide adequate monitoring – either because some agents cannot access polling stations, or because they do not understand procedures and their roles.	P = Medium I = Medium - High	A total of 30,309 candidates’ agents (24,872 male agents and 5,437 female agents) were trained directly about their roles in the electoral process. A further 10% were indirectly trained by agents who had participated in the Poll Agent Trainings program. About 150,000 candidates’ agents manuals were printed and are being distributed to agents; The National Democratic Institute made 2,116 successful calls to candidates, including 196 female candidates, encouraging them to accredit their agents and make them available to attend poll agent training.	IEC accredited 169,709 provincial council candidates’ agents (36,222 being female); and 92,897 presidential candidate’s agents (21,103 being female).
15. Results are contested by losing candidates.	P = High I = Medium - High	ECC launched investigations on allegations of widespread electoral fraud and irregularities which major losing candidates alleged to have occurred. ECC ordered IEC to conduct an audit and recount of 3,063 suspiciously fraudulent ballot using a statistical sampling procedure.	
16. Lack of credible opposition candidates leads to current political opposition to protest at executive interference in the electoral process. Spoilers may decide to make political capital out of Karzai’s constitutional term coming to	P = Medium I = Medium		

an end.			
17. Turn out, especially for women is unusually high in some areas, in particular the south and south east.	P = Medium I = Medium - High	IEC put electoral safeguards in place to prevent, or reduce the risk of inflated female voting. These included accreditation of nearly 280,000 observers to observe the polling process.	Allegations of proxy voting have been made by candidates, agents, observers, and were also reported in the media.

C) OUTREACH

Description of Risk	Probability (P) & Impact (I) of Risk	Mitigation measures undertaken (July-September 2009)	Remarks
18. The IEC public outreach campaign does not resonate in some areas.	P = Medium I = High	1,604 IEC Civic Educators reached out to the electorate using mobile radio (loudspeakers), sample ballots, mock elections, flip charts and posters ahead of Election Day; Billboards, radio & TV PSAs; radio and TV roundtables; radio soap opera; toll-free call centre; and small grant projects are avenues which were used to reach out to the Afghan population; Seminars for women and mullahs were held in 27 provinces. An election-themed drawing contest took place at Isteqlal High School. 120 students (8-13 years old) participated from eight different schools.	Public outreach was seriously in several provinces by increased AGE activities. Civic Educators were restricted from going to villages and had difficulties mobilising community members since the latter were hesitant to participate due to threats posed by the AGEs.
19. Outreach materials are not prepared on time.	P = Low I = Medium - High	IEC followed production and delivery schedules as specified in its Operational Plan	The production and delivery of all public outreach materials was on schedule
20. Civic educators cannot access all areas of the country, or are intimidated in some areas.	P = High I = Medium – High	The work of 1,604 civic educators was complemented by various multi-media options to increase the variety and range of outreach. Posters, bill-boards, radio and TV spots, PSAs, radio and TV soap opera, mobile theatre, etc were integrated to reach the electorate across the country.	Public outreach was seriously in several provinces by increased AGE activities. Civic Educators were restricted from going to villages and had difficulties mobilising community members since the latter were hesitant to participate due to threats posed by the AGEs.
21. Service providers especially in electronic media back out from supporting elections due to intimidation.	P = Medium I = Medium - High	ELECT trained media houses and journalists about their role in the electoral process, and the need to engage in balanced coverage (and thereby thwart retributions from aggrieved candidates). Regular IEC media events such as press conferences in addition to providing information, helped to boost the confidence and motivation of the media.	All mobile telecommunications networks which were providing sms services about elections were intimidated by AGEs into cancelling their electoral engagements.

22. Candidates are unable to campaign in parts of the country for presidential and provincial council elections	P = High I = Medium	The ANP provided security to candidates which enabled them to campaign in all provinces. All presidential candidates were invited to participate in debates on television radio, to express their vision, policies, and strategies for the country. Eight 40-minute television roundtables and seven 40-minute radio round tables were produced.	AGEs disrupted campaign activities in several provinces. For instance on 19th July, a PC candidate in Kunduz was assassinated; and in North-Eastern Region, the convoys of a PC candidate, and that of a presidential candidate were attacked – with only minor injuries reported.
23. Candidates use private media to dominate public space before the elections. Candidates with fewer resources do not have access to media resources.	P = High I = Medium	The Media Commission investigated and adjudicated around 30 media infringements. The Commission took up three complaints against the privately owned newspaper, Mandagar. It notified the newspaper that several of its election reports were incorrect and misleading, and required corrections.	The IEC Media Commission lacked authority to sanction media outfits which fail/refuse to comply with the media code of conduct. The Ministry of Information and Culture, which could have helped to reprimand transgressing private media was reportedly not helpful.
24. Wealthy candidates spend large sums of money on the campaign	P = High I = Medium	All presidential candidates were requested to declare their campaign finances in accordance with IEC regulations on financial disclosure.	The regulations on campaign finance disclosure don't impose a limit on spending. Presidential candidates with lots on money will therefore still be able to spend more as long as they submit their campaign financing returns to the IEC. The regulations don't affect provincial council candidates.
25. Candidates are intimidated or killed during the campaign	P = High I = Medium - High	Mol provided some security to presidential candidates. The offensive against the Taliban strongholds around the country improved the confidence of the candidates to campaign.	Three provincial council candidates were assassinated; the convoys of a PC candidate, and that of a presidential candidate were attacked in North-Eastern Region – with only minor injuries reported.

D) TECHNICAL/LEGAL

Description of Risk	Probability (P) & Impact (I) of Risk	Mitigation measures undertaken (July-September 2009)	Remarks
26. There are major technical weaknesses in polling and counting these could include missing electoral materials, errors in the ballots, crowding and tension around polling centres, procedural problems with polling and counting, issues related to the transfer and tabulation of results, etc.	P = Medium I = High	All the 120,462 temporary election staff were trained on polling and counting procedures through a cascade training system in which: 1) provincial staff trained DFCs, 2) DFCs trained senior polling staff (Polling Center Chairperson, Polling Station Manager, Inking Officer), and 3) Polling Station Managers briefed remaining polling staff prior to	Almost half of all the complaints made to the ECC were about polling and counting irregularities (40.65% and 6.57% respectively).

		election day.	
27. Election materials arrive in country late.	P = Low – Medium I = Medium - High	The distribution of election materials by air, road and donkey/horse back. In all, 3039 trucks, various air missions, and 3,171 donkeys delivered the election materials	Delivery schedules for materials arriving from outside the country was either on time, or within the contingency limits of delay. Distribution was completed in all provinces and districts largely as per IEC movement plans with only minor disruptions.
28. A new Electoral Law is passed by parliament before the elections. This creates new eligibility criteria for candidates and considerable operational complications for the IEC (including district level counting).	P = Low – Medium I = High		This is no-longer likely to occur.
29. A presidential candidate dies between polling and the announcement of results.	P = Low – Medium I = High	NONE	
30. Candidate data is lost during candidate registration. This could be through theft from provincial offices or procedural issues with data transfer	P = Low I = Medium - High		No data loses were reported during candidate nominations. All candidate nomination materials have been retrieved.
31. The IEC cannot recruit enough qualified electoral staff, in particular women.	P = Medium I = Medium	IEC liaised with tribal and religious leaders to motivate local people including women to apply for, and implement IEC jobs. UNIFEM, MOWA, UNAMA, and other civil society organisations carried out a concerted campaign to motivate women to seek IEC temporary polling jobs.	Although 47,056 female staff were successfully recruited to work in polling stations and centers – representing 39% of all 120,462 temporary election that IEC had engaged, there was still a short-fall of female workers. Consequently, men were used to fill-in the female staffing gaps. The presence of male staff in female polling stations could have negatively affected women's willingness to vote.
32. The IEC is unable to find sufficient polling facilities. This could be due to lack of agreement from relevant ministries – in particular the Ministries of Health and Education.	P = Medium I = High	Agreement was reached between IEC on the one hand, and Ministry of Health and Ministry of Education about the use of their facilities for polling activities. Polling also took place at Mosques.	
33. The count in polling stations is messy and confused.	P = High I = High	<u>As in 26 above.</u>	
34. The results transfer is problematic, with results not reported and materials lost between polling centres and provincial offices.	P = Medium I = Medium - High	<u>See 26 above.</u>	The retrieval of material took place in an efficient manner and beside some delays, all the material was retrieved to the Provincial Offices within a few days.

			Overall, retrieval of the Tamper Evident Bags from provinces to the National Tally Center was also conducted as per schedule with only few delays in some provinces. Materials of 6 polling centres were either lost or destroyed due to security or other incidents.
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E) CHALLENGES AND COMPLAINTS

Description of Risk	Probability (P) & Impact (I) of Risk	Mitigation measures undertaken (July-September 2009)	Remarks
35. The vetting of candidates especially related to DIAG is perceived as politicised or ineffective.	P = High I = Medium		
36. The Electoral Complaints Commission (ECC) is not established in time to adjudicate challenges in accordance with the electoral law and timeline.	P = Low – Medium I = High	All ECC provincial-level structures were established. Pending lease for ECC provincial offices were concluded. All required furniture, stationary, office and IT equipment were dispatched to ECC provincial offices in July. Networking was installed by IO Global. ECC conducted a second round of training for the Provincial ECC (PECC) staff – with a focus of polling and counting procedures, complaints mechanism, and detection and investigation of electoral fraud and irregularities.	
37. The ECC is overwhelmed by complaints and expectations of the complaints mechanism are disappointing.	P = High I = Medium - High	ECC received more than 2,300 electoral complaints since polling day. For purposes of expediency, it categories the complaints into three sets: high priority (with strong potential to affect the election results and outcome), medium priority, and low priority. The Complaints were investigated by the priority order.	Concerns have been raised by both the local population and the international community at the slow pace of complaints arbitration by the ECC.

F) SECURITY PROVISION

Description of Risk	Probability (P) & Impact (I) of Risk	Mitigation measures undertaken (July-September 2009)	Remarks
38. Police around polling stations do not understand their role. In some cases, they interfere in the polling process – controlled	P = Medium I = High	The cascade training for police officers and commanders was completed in which around 20,000 police officers participated. The training	The training was conducted in two phases: the first was completed by the European Union Police Mission (EUPOL) to first line officers at

<p>access, stuffing ballot boxes, etc</p>		<p>covered their role and duties during the electoral process, basic human rights principles, general knowledge on elections and security of Polling Centres.</p> <p>40,000 electoral policing pocket booklets with graphics and text on the course were distributed to police officers.</p>	<p>four regional centres, while the second phase was completed at provincial level by the officers trained during the first phase.</p>
<p>39. Poor coordination between the IEC and national and international security agencies</p>	<p>P = Medium I = High</p>	<p>All national security agencies and international security forces were involved in electoral security planning within the Joint Security Planning Group (JSPG) framework and the Mol/MoD joint order. IEC worked closely with JSPG as a supplier and consumer of information.</p>	<p>The finalisation of polling centre lists over-delayed due to the lack of responses and clarity from the security forces on whether they would be able to secure the centres or not. This in turn created uncertainties with regards to packaging and delivery of electoral materials and the actual number of centres to be opened on Election Day.</p>
<p>40. There are insufficient security resources to support the elections</p>	<p>P = High I = High</p>	<p>The Mol provided some level of security to all polling centres except those located in “black” districts. It also provided minimum security to presidential candidates.</p> <p>Based on recommendations of the joint security assessment, IEC reduced the number of polling centers from the originally planned 6,969 to 6,519.</p>	<p>6,210 centres or (95%) of the polling centres which security agencies had cleared actually opened on Election Day but due to polling day security threats, about 760 polling centres remained inactive or closed prematurely.</p> <p>About 175 Polling Centres were directly attacked by AGEs around the country.</p> <p>More than 100 security incidents were reported over polling day, while about 24 IEC convoys were attacked by AGEs.</p>
<p>41. There are insufficient women in the police force to provide security for women’s polling stations.</p>	<p>P = High I = Medium</p>	<p>Civilian female searchers were recruited and trained with financial support from USAID</p>	<p>There are less than 500 female officers in the police force, and none of these participated in the Mol training of trainers on electoral policing.</p>
<p>42. The campaign with the presidency leads to violence. This could be particularly acute during a closely-fought second round.</p>	<p>P = Low I = High</p>	<p>IEC maintained dialogue with all candidates and their agents with a view to resolving issues that could lead to campaign violence.</p>	
<p>43. A direct attack on IEC facilities in Kabul or the provinces.</p>	<p>P = Low I = High</p>	<p>The IEC maintained tight security at its HQs with logistical support from USAID and ELECT. IEC engaged additional private guards to secure warehouses and provincial and regional offices.</p>	
<p>44. Polling facilities are attacked during polling or</p>	<p>P = Medium</p>	<p><u>See 43 above</u></p>	

counting – most likely by AGEs, but this could overlap with factional fighting.	I = Medium - High		
45. Electoral officials – DFC, polling and counting staff are attacked or killed.	P = Medium I = Medium - High	<u>See 43 above.</u>	<u>See 43 above.</u>
46. International electoral staff are injured, kidnapped or killed.	P = Medium I = High	All international staff have to comply with UNDSS security conditions such as working or living in MOSS- and MORSE-compliant facilities, moving in armoured vehicles, seeking security clearances before travel, etc.	
47. Elections are post-postponed due to insecurity. An upsurge of violence could be a valid reason or a justification for postponement.	P = Low I = High	The international community consistently maintained that it was in the best interest of the country the elections went ahead without any recourse.	

G) FUNDING

Description of Risk	Probability (P) & Impact (I) of Risk	Mitigation measures undertaken (July-September 2009)	Remarks
48. Funding is provided late, impacting the procurement of electoral materials.	P = Low I = High	ELECT Management maintained constant dialogue with donors, and frequently briefed them about the project's financial status and progress of implementation.	
49. Funding is provided too late for the second round of elections.	P = Low I = High	The budget for a possible run-off was quarantined in the 2009 Annual Work Plan and Budget	
50. The elections cost more than originally projected.	P = Low I = High	Stringent UNDP internal financial controls and discipline were maintained.	This scenario cannot occur because UNDP in principle never spends what it doesn't have.