



ANNUAL PROJECT REPORT 2006


**United Nations Development Programme
Afghanistan
Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups (DIAG)
01/01/2006 – 31/12/06**

Project ID:	Disbandment of Illegal Arms Groups (DIAG) /00043604
Duration:	January 2005 to December 2007
Component (MYFF):	1.3 Local Poverty Initiatives
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Unfunded:	\$ 3,459,728.83
Implementing Partners / Responsible parties: (optional)	NABDP, NSP, WatSan of MRRD, MoLSA

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DIAG Donors




Japan



Switzerland/SDC



Netherlands



Denmark




United Kingdom



United States/USAID



Italy



Canada/CIDA



UNDP

Acronyms

ANBP	Afghanistan's New Beginnings Programme
ANDS	Afghanistan National Development Strategy
AMF	Afghan Military Force
CONOPs	Concept of Operations
D&RC	Disarmament and Reintegration Commission
DC	Development Committee
DDA	District Development Assembly
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
DIAG	Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups
DoIC	DOIC
GoA	Government of Afghanistan
GOLIAG	Government Linked Illegal Armed Groups
IAG	Illegal Armed Group
IP	Implementing Partner
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
JPC	Joint Planning Cell
JPCC	Joint Planning and Coordination Cell
JS	Joint Secretariat
M&E	Monitoring & Evaluation
Mol	Ministry of Interior
MoD	Ministry of Defense
MoLSA	Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs
MRRD	Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development
NABDP	National Area Based Development Programme
NDS	National Directorate of Security
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NSC	National Security Council
NSA	National Security Advisor
NSP	National Solidarity programme
PC	Provincial Committee
PCDT	Provincial Community Development Team
PDC	Provincial Development Committee
PI	Public Information
PRT	Provincial Reconstruction Team
SSR	Security Sector Reform
UNAMA	United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WatSan	Water Supply and Sanitation Programme of MRRD

Executive Summary

As a consequence of disappointing Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups (DIAG) results in the latter part of 2006, the reasons for which were largely beyond Afghanistan's New Beginnings Programme (ANBP) ability to impact, it was recognized that the project was in dire need of fundamental review. Accordingly, following an initial paper submitted by ANBP with the deliberate intent to galvanize opinion on the need for change, the second vice-president initiated a Strategic Review in Late September – hastened by the irrefutable evidence of poor weapons surrender and, critically, the inescapable and uncomfortable fact that not one Illegal Armed Group (IAG) had yet been disbanded. The international community mobilized and stepped forward to take an active part with national colleagues in fundamentally revisiting every aspect of the DIAG construct, from strategic assumptions to operational design.

The Review reaffirmed that key messages on DIAG were not influencing opinion and perceptions to the extent required. It was recognised that Government Officials Linked to Illegal Armed Groups (GOLIAG) were a fundamental obstacle to DIAG and that the project would continue to founder until such time as they were effectively removed.

Additionally, informed by an ANBP paper on the subject, proper discussion and dialogue began on the key issue of the national capacity building required for the continuance of DIAG in the longer term. This discussion included sounding out prospective donors as well as revisiting the overall timeline and benchmarks currently set out in the Afghanistan Compact.

To summarize project results in 2006: the DIAG project collected a total of 26,848 weapons (23,172 light and 3,676 heavy). In addition, 23,205 boxes of ammunition and 241,360 pieces of ammunition have been verified. At the time of writing, 1496 IAGs are currently engaged in the DIAG process. A total of 456 GOLIAGs have been identified of which 72 received notifications letters for their cooperation. As a result of non-cooperation, 52 were recommended for termination of contract, of which five were relieved of their duties by their respective departments. During the negotiation process, a total of 1,846 weapons were collected from the targeted GOLIAGs.

The key challenges to project implementation have been caused by the deteriorating security situation, organisational shortcomings as well as the void in political action. The deterioration of the security situation as caused by the Taliban resurgence as well as the risk of potential formation of tribal militias, particularly in the south of Afghanistan, hampered and in some cases put a halt to project activities. Organisational shortcomings mainly concerned Joint Secretariat (JS), which demonstrated inefficiencies in structure and management. The JS has also faced challenges at provincial level in fulfilling DIAG objectives. However, improvements in JS efficiency have been made, particularly with regard to building the capacity of national staff, but more corrective measures need to and will be taken. Finally, the lack of political will and engagement of Government of Afghanistan (GoA) has been a major stumbling block to project implementation and progress. On the positive side, during the DIAG Review process major and unprecedented progress in political consensus and engagement was obtained including the firm and explicit support of and action by the President.

The single most important lesson to emerge thus relates, unsurprisingly, to the issue of political engagement and commitment. Additionally, it has been realized that greater flexibility should be applied in the relationship between compliance and authorizing development. Further, that DIAG Public Information (PI) strategy must be revised in order to intensify the battle for public consent. Finally, it is now widely accepted that further work is required in the legal sector and that enforcement capability must be credible and that government process - especially with regard to information management requires close attention. These lessons having been identified, and corrective measures set in train, there is scope for optimism looking forward.

The report will start by outlining the context and continue with the performance review under section 2, followed by project results summary under section 3, further on the implementation challenges under section 4 as well as lessons learned under section 5 and finalise with the financial summary and utilisation under section 6. Annexes including visual aids will follow the last section.

1. Context

With Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration's (DDR's) mandate restricted in scope to disarming and disbanding only the Afghanistan Military Force (AMF), it subsequently became necessary to set in train a project to disband those IAGs which remained outside the DDR process. The challenge was formidable, with estimated numbers at 125,000. The purpose of the project was to disarm the identified IAGs, thereby removing a major threat to the already prevailing weak rule of law. To initiate the project, the GoA drafted Gun Law and Security Company legislation in order to signal its intent. This legislation was created in tandem with a Joint Planning Cell (JPC) as part of a preparatory assistance project supported by the UNDP. Through a joint venture the ANBP, JPC produced key outputs including policy discussion papers in conjunction with key ministries. At this time the UNDP/ANBP encompassed the provision of support in terms of policy advice, qualified personnel, logistics and administrative assistance to achieve the goal of disbandment of IAGs. The project was placed under the leadership of the Second Vice Presidents Office, with project implementation through the Demobilisation and Reintegration Commission (D&RC) and the Joint Secretariat.

Despite having to confront significant challenges, DIAG is actively contributing to the achievement of the ANDS benchmark for DIAG by virtue of the handover of weapons from IAGs and GOLIAGs. Notwithstanding slow progress to date, in particular with regards to GOLIAGs, it is anticipated that, as a consequence of determined efforts to completely overhaul DIAG strategy, policy, implementing procedures and operational design, project success rate will increase in 2007.

In reaching its two objectives of improving security through disbandment of IAGs and removal of GOLIAGs, as well as providing basic development support to communities freed from threats posed by the above groups, DIAG contributes to the achievement of UNDAF Outcome 2. It promotes good governance and rule of law by providing support to the GoA in monopolizing the use of force, thereby safeguarding the security of its people. In this way, the GoA can better be held accountable vis-à-vis its people, and capable of delivering essential services at national and sub-national levels in the absence of illegal factions and elements threatening its efforts and outputs at all levels.

By providing policy support to the government in Security Sector Reform (SSR), and in helping to build the capacity of the GoA to progress towards building a strengthened public administration, DIAG contributes to strengthening government institutions and thereby improve the quality of public services such as security. DIAG has applied significant efforts into reaching population in remote areas in order to communicate the DIAG key messages and underpinning the advantages that accrue from compliance, as well as seeking to convey the very real improvement that will follow removal of those that operate with seeming impunity outside the law. DIAG therefore contributes to CPAP Service line 2.7, output 2 and 3.

The key stakeholder to the DIAG project is the GoA because DIAG is a government led project. The intent is that the project will eventually be taken over by the national parties upon the closure of ANBP. Naturally, the international community is also a key stakeholder and the unified ambition is that Afghanistan will evolve into a stable, self-supporting, self-sustaining country based on democratic principles and underpinned by the rule of law. The main implementing partners (PI) are National Area Based Development Programme (NABDP), National Solidarity Programme (NSP), Water Supply and Sanitation Project (WatSan) of Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD) and Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (MoLSA). The main beneficiaries are the GoA and

the people of Afghanistan because the disarmament and disbandment of IAGs and GOLIAGs will contribute significantly to enhancing security the provision of basic services to the people.

Not until the rate of compliance improves will the full potential of human development linked to the DIAG project be exploited to maximum effect. The calculus defining the relationship between weapons surrender and releasing development was revisited in the Strategic Review. The intent is that policy decisions will apply greater flexibility than hitherto and, by extension, accept that development is ultimately the most effective instrument to secure the all important public consent.

2. Performance Review

2.1 Progress Review

Overall progress towards the ANDS benchmark(s)

DIAG contributes to the achievement of the ANDS benchmark for Security, Program 3, by providing policy advice to the GoA and, in parallel, supporting implementation at the tactical level. The former involves submission of policy papers, responding to requests for guidance, and routine engagement with senior national figures at all levels of government. The latter includes support of government effort to disband IAGs by assisting in all aspects of planning, mentoring, liaison at national and sub national level and, in practical terms, physical involvement in weapons and ammunition collection for subsequent transfer to the GoA control. It further supports the GoA's governance objectives by utilizing the enabling process to reach the Electorate through information campaign and public information (PI) strategies. Importantly, through the processes of DIAG, national capacity is being built which will support the continuance of DIAG in the longer term. This will in turn help to improve the overall security environment and, by extension, facilitate the conditions for human and economic development.

Overall progress towards the UNDAF outcome

DIAG will contribute to the UNDAF Outcome 2, "By 2008, opportunities, skills, land, and infrastructure that allow for active participation in a strengthened formal economy and private sector are improved, particularly for poor and vulnerable groups" mainly through its development activities and by having assisted in the introduction of a series of development projects in different provinces – a continuing process that will exponentially contribute to the achievement of this benchmark. It will furthermore contribute to Outcome 2 by assisting the GoA in building its capacity in order to prosecute DIAG operations in the longer term through considered capacity building initiatives at national and subnational levels which, of themselves, extend beyond the immediate confines of DIAG since they have wider applicability across all line of law enforcement operations. An example is the support to building capacity at the provincial level security committees. Through these key activities, DIAG contributes positively and most immediately to other UN agencies in areas of rule of law and governance.

Overall progress towards the CPAP outcome and output(s)

DIAG will contribute to the achievement of CPAP Output 3, "Law and order institutions at the national and sub-national level strengthened and physical security of the population improved", with respect to all its activities on weapons collection as well as raising the awareness of the public on the negative impact and instability factor as caused by both IAGs and GOLIAGs. Under the same indicator, all known heavy weapons have been cantoned by ANBP – which is appropriately configured and resourced in order to respond to new requirements as they arise. The project also contributes to the achievement of CPAP Outcomes 2 on public administration reform in its partnership and cooperation with national and international stakeholders with regard to DIAG implementation. It has enhanced the implementation capacity of the project through the Strategic Review process while also identifying the requirement for a separate effort to enhance national capacity (and all levels) in order to support the continuance of DIAG in the longer term. By working jointly with the international community on the DIAG project as well as related issues such as legal reform, DIAG actively reinforces efforts directed by UNDP in other projects.

Capacity Development

ANBP has actively contributed to capacity development in a several distinct areas which are outlined in detail in section 3. ANBP has produced key outputs including policy discussion papers at the strategic level and has devised, developed and coordinated forums, seminars and discussions at both national and subnational level, working in close partnership with different front line ministries, departments and agencies. The DIAG Strategic Review, initiated at the request of the Second Vice-President involved active participation by all national (and international) stakeholders. It proved instrumental as the catalyst for the development of a Presidential endorsed Plan of Action and several key policy advancements which, when taken together, should profoundly improve the probability of project delivery.

It was during the processes of the Strategic Review that the question of national capacity building started to gain momentum. Although discussion continues at senior minister level, there is now broad acceptance that, having set in place revised structures for the GoA to lead DIAG, additional capacity is going to be needed for effective continuance in the longer term. In addition to engaging potential international donors to fund this potential new undertaking, ANBP is devising an appropriate strategy for eventual managed disengagement.

In terms of providing training to national counterparts and on-the-job mentoring exercises, the JS Development Team has focused on conducting capacity building training of provincial development staff. It has held project management workshops (to develop implementation strategies for future development projects). Capacity building has also taken place throughout provinces in the areas of PI. Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Section has recruited and trained assistants to strengthen DIAG Regional Offices as well as to conduct Base line Survey for DIAG.

The ending of DDR led to contract closures of IPs and this has led to the return of a wide variety of assets (containers, vehicles, phones, IT and electronic equipment and office furnishings etc). ANBP have donated the majority of these items to Afghan ministries and other UNDP Projects.

Impact on direct and indirect beneficiaries

The principal beneficiaries of DIAG are the Afghan People and, by extension, their elected representatives in government. DIAG has not had the intended direct impact by entirely disarming and disbanding IAGs as stated by the ANDS benchmarks but is working its way towards doing so. Thus far, much of the effort has involved supporting the building of political consensus, helping the GoA to educate the Electorate on the direct benefits to be accrued from compliance in terms of much needed development assistance and, in general, reinforcing critical messages on the rule of law. The effect of these will bring direct benefit by a significantly improved security and stability. This will help the GoA to deliver on the promises made to the Electorate and, in doing so, strengthen its position and build trust and confidence. The significance of this is that it serves to mitigate what is arguably the most serious risk to GoA, namely that the Electorate will become disenchanted with its democratic experience and therefore incline towards alternative structures.

To provide a concrete example of project impact, three target districts have achieved compliance and are scheduled for development projects. Furthermore, and as mentioned above ANBP PI section contributes with an invaluable impact both directly and indirectly on the beneficiaries of the project through information dissemination and awareness raising as well as training workshops, making large efforts to reach out to remote areas. It also publishes a newsletter on the achievements of DIAG, translated in Dari and Pashto distributed country wide, receiving positive feedback.

2.2 Implementation strategy review

Participatory/consultative processes

DIAG is a government led project involving active participation at central, provincial and district levels. Project design necessitates the extensive cooperation and engagement of the international community. This embraces formulation of project priority, tactics and structure as well as activity and delivery. Through well defined and managed participatory structures and processes, the project is continuously working with, between and on behalf of its multiple stakeholders at different levels.

Quality of partnerships

In terms of cooperation with other UN agencies, given its prominence as a major UNDP programme in Afghanistan, ANBP works closely on DIAG related issues with UNAMA at a strategic and policy development level. It also cooperates with a number of UN agencies – notably in the context of human development. Key national partners include D&RC, Ministry of Defence (MoD), the Office of the Vice president, MRRD and National Security Council (NSC). Partnership and cooperation with the donor community and embassies ranges across information sharing, provision of advice and guidance, staffing complex policy issues and funding provision. A Development Committee (DC) for DIAG has been established at JS consisting of IPs, donors and other stakeholders. During the DIAG Strategic Review, ANBP has been involved in intensified and continuous dialogue with key national and international stakeholders through the different working groups, engaging in formal and informal talks on a daily and weekly basis. The Review process has equally involved consultative and informative meetings with the President and the First and Second Vice-Presidents (with the latter chairing the D&R Commission). The attendance of key local, national and international stakeholders at public events has helped to raise the profile and morale of the project in the public view as well as the political realm. Through M&E, ANBP has actively consulted a wide spectrum of international actors including NGOs on project impact. As a consequence of considerable collective effort to reenergize the political commitment to DIAG, there are now positive signs of renewed engagement and leadership. Further, there is now a collective determination that concerted action will be needed to achieve the objective for DIAG as prescribed within the Afghanistan Compact. National political leadership have seemingly been convinced that, as owners of the DIAG project, they must lead by example.

As a concrete example of a recent partnership resulting from the latest developments, the JS has been invited by the MoI to assist the Ministry in selecting candidates for senior appointments, who will screen the nominees against the current IAG/GOLIAG database.

National Ownership

ANBP has provided support to the GoA in terms of policy advice, qualified staff, logistics and administration as outlined in section 3.

ANBP works in close collaboration with national counterparts in gathering information and intelligence on IAGs and GOLIAGs as well as reporting on the latest developments in various provinces, consulting them in formulating its priorities and planning its activities, for instance through its weekly JS operational meetings.

In terms of decentralisation of power, planning and implementation is carried out through provincial committees, with ANBP providing support. The Departments of Information and culture (DoIC) receives ANBP support at provincial level with logistics and funds to assist department staff in disseminating DIAG messages in remote areas.

During pre-assessment missions, key stakeholders at provincial levels have been consulted and their tasks identified. Based on these meetings and consultations, the missions assess the readiness and commitment of local stakeholders to begin the DIAG process. JS Development team has

conducted a number of field visits with its IPs and worked closely with MRRD with regard to development projects. Joint monitoring missions have been undertaken with Mol and NDS.

Sustainability

The sustainability factor was partially overlooked at the inception of DIAG and, in consequence, emerged as a major point from the Strategic Review. A separate paper submitted by ANBP sets out a suggested approach to informing any collective capacity shortfall and, thereafter, how it might be rectified. It is axiomatic that the capacity building factor will potentially impact upon the overall ANBP timeline.

2.3 Management effectiveness review

Quality of monitoring

ANBP has undertaken 43 Monitoring and review missions for DIAG in 7 different rounds, of which 7 missions were conducted in joint with International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), JS, Mol and NDS.

Each of the missions had a clearly defined set of objectives. M&E Assistants have been recruited and trained to strengthen DIAG Regional Offices. DIAG baseline survey, which provides information on the overall security situation, was conducted in 18 provinces where the DIAG project implementation has been initiated. The survey provides a set of indicators to track progress and evaluate performance, impact and sustainability of DIAG project. Staffs have received training on how to periodically update base line indicators and, in consequence, assess project impact.

DIAG readiness assessment was conducted in order to assess existing capacity of government institutions and ANBP offices involved in DIAG implementation. The assessment identifies capacity gaps (physical, financial and policy) that need to be filled for the effective achievement of project goals.

DIAG Crime Indicators measuring the crime situation in the country were collected from different government institutions, at central and regional levels, and collated for further analysis.

Community Awareness Assessment on DIAG was conducted for districts included in Group 1, 2 and 3 Provinces of DIAG. As a direct fallout, action has been implemented by the PI section to strengthen key messages and, at the same time, challenge misperceptions. Combined missions were undertaken with ISAF, JS, Mol and NDS.

DIAG preliminary Impact Assessment was conducted with the objective of assessing the perception of the community on expected political, economic, cultural and social impacts of the DIAG Project. It was shown that the DIAG project needs to be seen as an integral part of the Afghanistan Compact. Further, that the GoA would benefit from adopting a more integrated approach – fusing DIAG with other law and order activities such as Narcotics Control, Anti-corruption, Civil Service Reform, Decentralization and government capacity building.

The Monitoring Report of DIAG Project (until September 2006) was prepared, translated into local language and distributed to development partners. The Report presents a brief background of DIAG followed by the results achieved and activity conducted to date. It explores constraints and opportunities in expediting the implementation of DIAG and identifies pointers to the way ahead. The Report has been used as an input at the DIAG Working Group meetings and served to inform the DIAG Strategic Review process.

The GoA contribution has mainly consisted of information provided by Regional and Central government institutions and has spanned most of the activities already described.

Timely delivery of outputs

It is now widely accepted that DIAG is a profoundly different undertaking from the previous ANBP project – DDR. It represents a different and infinitely more complex set of challenges, which the report seeks to make clear. It is not feasible to define this project along with lines of other developmental projects with finite timelines. DIAG is a political process which, unless actively supported by all levels of government, will fail. Reenergizing this critical political support has required considerable and sustained effort.

Most stakeholders, national and international, are coming to the realization that DIAG timeline is excessively optimistic: not least because the security situation has deteriorated considerably since project inception. For its part, ANBP has fully delivered on the required output concerning provision of support to weapons collection and transfer to the GoA as and when required.

The project has supported the output of public outreach to change perceptions and behaviour regarding possession of weapons. This particular output is challenging to quantify given the tradition of weapon possession, the prevailing security situation, endemic corruption, powerful competing interests and the lack of effective governance. However, surveys conducted have shown a high degree of awareness of DIAG, corresponding to 77%. The change in perception will not come overnight but will require years of development and improvement in economic and security conditions within the country.

The community development project could not be delivered in 2006 due to lack of progress in weapons handover, but projects will be launched in three different districts in early 2007.

Resource Allocation

The proportion of other projects costs versus development activity costs for DIAG was 22% for 2006, which represents a 10 % decrease from the previous year.

Cost-effective use of inputs

When the DDR project ended in June 2006, ANBP cut its total workforce by 25% leading to the reduction of 166 national staff and the closing of its Kabul Regional office. Deterioration of security conditions in the South and South-east that had considerably hindered operational activities and endangered the security of ANBP staff working in those regions necessitated further staff reduction. In November 2006. Currently, ANBP employs 512 people, of whom 476 are national and 36 international.

The search for efficiencies has continued. A comprehensive Review has been undertaken with two essential objectives. First, to complete the process of realigning the ANBP organization to more effectively position it to undertake its mandated tasks. Second, and having carefully determined associated risks and set in hand appropriate mitigating measures, to reduce overhead (manning, activity and asset holdings). In parallel, work has begun to determine the most effective and efficient way to manage eventual programme disengagement.

The initial stages of the manpower review were completed in December 2006 leading to an approach to downsizing based on 3 phases. Contract non renewal would be synchronized with current contract end-dates. Within Phase One (with contracts ending around March 2007), international staff levels will be reduced by a factor of 40% resulting in accumulated savings of \$ 1.5 million in staffing cost until the end of 2007. The majority of the international posts will be disestablished resulting in potential efficiencies delivered through possible utilization of a centralized pool of experts who can be deployed to the Regions as required. The process for reducing the manning level for national staff will involve 2 phases and early indicators suggest an overall reduction, which is requirement driven, of approximately 25%.

In summary, financial saving to project will result from reductions in manpower, assets and activity. Work continues on the latter two categories.

3. Project Results Summary

Intended Outputs

1.1 Joint planning support to the GoA established and the capacity of the GoA to ensure community security through weapons reductions.

Indicative Activities

1. Assistance to DIAG Steering Committee and Forum to establish policies and priorities of DIAG project.

ANBP supported the GoA by writing papers and assisted in strategically reviewing the DIAG process and help create a new interim structure (JS and coordinating cells at National Security Advisor (NSA) and Vice Presidents Office) that will eventually be subsumed within the government structure. The new policy and structures will come into effect in 2007.

Hence, this indicator has been achieved with the participation of the beneficiaries (GoA) to their satisfaction. Due to the unique nature of DIAG project in so far as it is a government led project with participation at the highest executive level and various ministries, it is not easy to transpose the planning and implementation a schedule or finite timeline. Political exigency determines that the variables are simply too wide.

2. Assistance to DIAG Joint Secretariat for facilitation and coordination of DIAG Project.

ANBP has efficiently, and to the satisfaction of the GoA, achieved implementation of this activity. Assistance has been provided in terms of construction of office space (for JS) in the Office of the Vice President, providing logistical and administrative support. As a consequence of USAID's decision to pull out, ANBP took over the funding of the Joint Secretariat on 1 August 2006.

3. Assistance to DIAG Development Group to plan, coordinate policies, priorities and interventions and mobilise resources.

Frustratingly, the hitherto slow progress with surrender of weapons has stalled the inception of development initiatives in most targeted provinces (the determination being that 75% of assessed weapons held in any target district must be surrendered in order to release development funding). However, with compliance achieved in several districts, plans are now being taken forward to start the development action. It should be noted that cooperation between JS/ANBP development team and the main interlocutor (MRRD) has been satisfactory. Policy and procedures for selection of projects upon achievement of successful compliance have been established and mechanisms for implementing any given project finalised. Resource mobilisation has been adequate and sufficient funding provision has been established within MRRD.

This activity has been achieved in all aspects within the present workload of the development component.

4. Assistance to Provincial Security Committees for provincial implementation.

ANBP has provided one staff member (Provincial DIAG Coordinator) to every provincial Governor in order to assist DIAG planning and implementation. Additionally, ANBP supports PDC in the form of logistics and administration. It also becomes engaged in organising meetings and helping with PI outreach within the provinces. ANBP Regional Office Managers work closely with the PC to assist in the planning process and play a direct role in the implementation. ANBP has provided practical

support to all Regions through organising the collection, recording, security and onward move of weapons delivered through the DIAG process.

This activity has been achieved in all aspects.

5. Creation and maintenance of a government owned DIAG database.

This activity has been achieved in all aspects. The database has been created and is based in the JS. However, as part of the Review process it will be further refined and improved in 2007. This database, containing data received from a multitude of sources (both Afghan and International) is the property of the GoA, with technical custody resting with JS.

6. Implementation support to the GoA for disarmament of IAGs.

This activity has been achieved in all aspects.

1.2 Targeted IAGs disarmed, weapons collected and transferred to government control (approx 1800).

Indicative Activities

1. At the Central level ANBP has fully staffed the Joint Secretariat and the ANBP Central Office supports the GoA in all aspects towards the DIAG process.

ANBP has extended its presence from 8 regional offices to all 34 provinces to support the GoA. ANBP has the capability to have multiple missions across the country be it political negotiations, PI outreach, conduct of survey or assistance in collection of weapons and ammunition.

As an organization, ANBP has been ready to support the GoA in its implementation of DIAG but progress by government has been disappointing, largely as a consequence of lack of commitment and engagement. It is hoped that this has now been confined to the past and that, having revisited every aspect of policy and practice, DIAG will pick up momentum. It should be noted that the current insurgency in the South of Afghanistan has clearly had an adverse impact on the project, principally because, given the security vacuums that still exist in many parts of the Country, local people are naturally reluctant to surrender their only means of protection.

This activity has been partially achieved.

2. Provision of weapons collection teams as required, to meet operational tempo.

ANBP has achieved this activity in all aspects.

3. International advisory and oversight capacity established.

This activity has been achieved with the International Consultative Group actively engaged in the process and providing advice, support and oversight.

4. Weapons collected, stored under central Government control and destroyed unserviceable weapons and ammunition.

This activity has been met in all aspects within the sense that action was implemented on receipt of information received. However, there was a pronounced slowdown in the collection of weapons during 2006. Reason been given above, but also in section 4 under implementation.

The DIAG project collected a total 26,848 (23,172 light weapons and 3,676 heavy weapons). In addition, 23,205 boxes of ammunition and 241,360 pieces of ammunition have been verified. At this time, 1,496 IAGs are currently engaged in the DIAG process. A total of 456 GOLIAGs have been identified of which 72 received notifications letters for their cooperation. As a result of non-cooperation, 52 were recommended for termination of contract, of which five were relieved of their duties by their respective departments. During the negotiation process, a total of 1,846 weapons were collected from the targeted GOLIAGs.

1.3 General public perceptions, values, and behaviour regarding illicit weapons and possession and misuses changed through a public awareness campaign.

Indicative Activities

1. Structured PI exchanges with communities and public awareness programme on all aspect of illegal arms possession and uses through a media campaign, workshops, round table discussions and information tool kits, etc.

A PI strategy was conceived in close consultation with Ministry of Information and Culture (MoIC). The campaign was divided into 2 parts. The first part was to raise the general awareness of DIAG in 34 provinces. The second part was to have a focused effort to educate the public in selected 20 provinces. Methods used were Radio and TV broadcasts, public service announcements, posters and billboards, press conferences/media briefings and workshops. Public awareness and advocacy meeting with communities (elders, mullahs and commanders) were held in 15 provinces by the JS/ANBP PI Team.

This activity has received much attention and effort, but remains a critical challenge, as the possession of weapons is an integral part of the Afghan culture and tradition. Structural changes in perception and approach is needed over a long period of time and prerequisites a system of monopoly of use of force.

2.1 Community development consultative mechanisms established in each of the 34 provinces to cover up to 365 districts.

Indicative Activities

1. Consultative mechanisms with communities established at provincial level.

Provincial Community Development Teams (PCDTs) established, technically supported and coordinated in all 34 provinces by the JS and MRRD. The JS Development Team in coordination with MRRD supports provincial level plans development through Provincial Development Committees (PDCs), particularly in security sector. The plans have been developed for Kapisa, Wardak and Takhar provinces.

2. Development of Terms of Reference; identify and engage IPs.

Development Committee (DC) for DIAG has been established at JS consisting of IPs (NABDP, NSP, WatSan of MRRD, MoLSA and MoA) donors (Japan, Netherlands and Canada) and other concerned stakeholders (UNDP, UNAMA and ISAF). The DC meets on ad hoc basis to select the most feasible project for the complaint district and coordinate development activities in the target areas. The Terms of Reference for the IPs has been drafted and kept on hold for DIAG Strategic Review to be finalized.

2.2. Socio-economic community development projects delivered; governance structures improved where possible; participation of disbanded group members community development and social affairs.

Indicative Activities

1. Elicit community based priorities for socio-economic rehabilitation through consultative mechanisms.

To find development opportunities for DIAG, primary development pre-assessment survey conducted, information analyzed and incorporated into a database at JS, in all five DIAG Main Phase One Group I provinces. For selection of a project the JS development team has engaged the community through participatory, consultative manners using District Development Assemblies (DDA) established by MRRD for development projects. The DDA establishment is a MRRD/NABDP mandate. So far, NABDP has established 137 DDAs in 15 provinces. In DIAG targeted provinces, the districts which have not been covered, MRRD will use DIAG earmarked fund for the establishment of DDAs because of funding limitation. Currently MRRD is establishing DDA in Kohistan 2 district of Kapisa province.

4. Implementation Issues

The DIAG project, which has been running for 18 months, is proving far more challenging than originally envisaged. A significant impediment to project delivery thus far has been the deteriorating security situation, occasioned by Taliban resurgence and, in consequence, potential formation of tribal militias - particularly in the South of the Country. These factors unquestionably hampered, slowed down and in extreme cases made impossible the conduct of DIAG operations and activities. Other critical shortcomings negatively affecting project implementation were the absence of credible enforcement options, inadequate information and intelligence sharing as well as nascent legal system to effectively bring prosecutions of IAGs in courts of law.

On the political side, the principal challenge to overcome has been a pronounced lack of political commitment, engagement and leadership. Compounding the difficulties has been a chorus of dissenting voices actively briefing against the project in parliament. This has unsettled sectors of the Electorate and required concerted effort on the part of ANBP and major stakeholders. As an example, the Japanese Embassy initiated a series of sessions with senior parliamentarians to discuss DIAG in order to encourage better understanding of the principles and mechanisms involved.

Poor performance in compliance within targeted districts eventually prompted the Second Vice President to call for a Strategic Review. Work began in October 2006 and took nearly 6 weeks to complete. This initiative had several significant effects. First, it brought the issue to political and public attention and there was suddenly a noticeable change in the attitude amongst of senior political leadership – not least by the President himself. Second, it gave international stakeholders the chance to contribute to both policy and operational issues and tactical design. Third, it spawned an Action Plan and, at the same time, encouraged ANBP to propose alternative structures for DIAG in the medium and long term. Fourth, it raised the whole question of national capacity building needed for the continuance of DIAG in the longer term. Fifth, at an organisational level, it took forward several issues first raised in an ANBP paper criticising the functioning of the JS.

GOLIAGs have continued to obstruct progress and inhibit operational effect. Their continuance has underpinned the inability of the GoA to impose its will and, by association, damaged its collective credibility. The poor results in weapon hand in are set out in Annex 3.

In summary, there is now wide acceptance that the Strategic Review presented the ideal opportunity to set right most of the perceived problems with DIAG. In consequence, there is scope for optimism that results will improve in 2007, not least by the virtue of having placed responsibility squarely at the GoA. The Strategic Review process was exercised through a sub-committee structure addressing various components of information gathering and management, DIAG implementation, enforcement and PI. A further subcommittee of principals examined the strategic assumptions underlying DIAG evaluating the main policy principles and strategic approaches. The Review has delivered recommendations for a revised way ahead to the President.

The main findings of the Strategic Review are as follows:

Legal Framework: incomplete legislation for enforcement, lacking clarity in responsibility among law enforcement agencies, and legal jurisdiction with regards to courts.

Political Commitment: senior government officials' support has not been sufficiently visible to national audiences, some governors have been indifferent towards or actively obstructing the project and action against GOLIAGs has proceeded very slowly.

Parliamentary Support: needs to improve as there were few members voicing support for DIAG and a significant number actively opposing the program.

Program Structure: lack of government top tier accountability, slow Mol reforms, insufficient government representation at the Joint Secretariat (JS), and the need to create a bridging structure in order to facilitate capacity building which will facilitate transfer fully to the GoA.

Following these findings, the President directed that an Action Plan be drawn up to implement the recommendations. Implementation of the finalised Action Plan will begin in the near future. Positive senior government leadership support has effectively re-launched DIAG. The president also met with influential figures to improve DIAG activity in the provinces. This entire process marks an unprecedented level of political movement.

Further operational activities following the Review process include Action Plan implementation, CONOPs and Provincial Guideline revisions, shifting efforts to a number of non-compliant (districts of Kapisa and Takhar) and finally the preparation of those provinces which want to implement DIAG in the early spring 07.

5. Lessons Learnt and Next Steps

5.1. Lessons learnt

DIAG is a cross cutting process which links to and is affected by activity in the security, governance and development and development sectors. It is mutually re-enforcing and is essentially a political process. The rate of implementation or timely delivery depends on progress in all these sectors – Following the implementation challenges as mentioned above, DIAG strategy and operational design has had to be continually refined and adjusted – often requiring protracted engagement with senior government leadership at both national and subnational levels as well key international stakeholders. The application of lessons learned has been fundamental to reshaping both policy and practice in what is, by any yardstick, a dynamic and politically high-profile undertaking.

Continual application of monitoring and evaluation efforts suggest that, despite best efforts, public perceptions are still that DIAG is that essentially a weapons collecting exercise, along with same lines as the DDR project.

At a tactical level, an emphatically important lesson learned has been that cultural and weather events have little effect on DIAG operations (the latter can be ameliorated by programming to circumvent the impacts on access and mobility associated with winter months). More importantly, it has been seen that there is marked progress in keystone planning (see annex 3). There is now a strong expectation that, having fundamentally reviewed virtually every aspect of DIAG policy and practice, critically at the national level, results will show marked improvement at the tactical level. With increased compliance, the way is clear to introduce substantial development initiatives aimed at directly benefiting the electorate.

JS has, through an action review cell, effectively tracked progress of main phase operations. This has informed and assisted what changes have been needed in order to improve results.

At the strategic level, analysis based on M&E highlighted that the DIAG project activities need to better relate to improved quality of life measured against such criteria as crime rate. However, it has brought to light the lack of historical data and institutional knowledge which naturally precludes baseline reference and analysis. There is a pressing need to enhance such data collection, analysis and assessment at central and regional levels.

The DIAG Strategic Review has informed the way ahead for structural changes at the national decision making level which, once ratified, will assist in determining what capacity shortfalls need to be addressed in order for the continuance of DIAG in the longer term. The Review also reaffirmed the pressing need for an effective national ‘enforcement’ capability and, separately the urgent need to clarify several issues relating to statute and judicial process.

Finally, it has become increasingly apparent that information management across all levels of GoA will benefit from fundamental reassessment. Lack of consensus and effective information sharing and the availability of shared assessment and analysis has inhibited operational effect and frustrated progress markedly at the tactical level.

5.2. Recommendations

In aligning the DIAG with the Afghanistan Compact, it is recommended that the GoA adopts a more closely integrated approach across all lines of law enforcement. There should be

transparency across involved ministries with significantly better cooperation, information sharing and routine assessment of progress. Importantly, information and data management must be managed and captured more efficiently and thereby harnessed to work in support of operational intent. The key to this turns upon shared analysis and assessment in order to inform policy advice and operational decision making.

Influencing public perception more favourably towards DIAG will necessitate improved application of the information campaign and supporting strategies. The People of Afghanistan have to be helped to better understand the direct benefits to their quality that will be delivered as a consequence of compliance. Once the DIAG Review process and all its components have been completed, new PI strategies will be assessed and developed accordingly.

The Action Plan, a significant outcome of the Review process, focuses much needed attention at the strategic level, placing actions on responsible ministries, departments and agencies – expressed in prescribed benchmarks and timings. Amongst other stipulations, it makes reference to 1) The Office of the President being better informed and more involved; 2) An all round strengthening of political commitment within Cabinet, ministries, parliament and influential persons outside the GoA; 3) Refinement of the legal framework to support DIAG in order to better support enforcement and prosecution efforts; 4) Vastly improved information sharing which should not only be coordinated more effectively, but also more accurate, relevant and timely; 5) The NSC should be the overall coordinating body for government ministries, agencies and departments involved in DIAG; 6) The GoA must exert greater authority in robustly dealing with GOLIAGs; 7) ISAF will support and assist the GoA's DIAG activities as requested within ISAF's mandate. 8) Before MoI assumes lead responsibility for DIAG it will first be necessary to build the appropriate capacity, 9) Policy debate on incentives to disarm and disband should be revisited.

The Strategic Review has shown that in practice, the major disadvantage of the current DIAG arrangement is that it is divorced from Cabinet and – and with no direct involvement by the National Security Advisor - sits outside the core of national security strategy and policy formulation. And, whilst the D & R Commission served the interests of DDR, there is now a strong body of opinion that sees a need for change. The argument for change becomes even more convincing given the introduction of the DIAG Action Plan – oversight of which more naturally sits within Cabinet and the NSA rather than a Commission. This carries the additional benefit of ensuring that the President has the opportunity to be kept closely in touch with DIAG related policy issues and operational progress – which he has made clear he intends to do.

The Strategic Review further recommends for a new interim structure (JS and coordinating cells at NSA and Vice Presidents Office), which will eventually be subsumed within the government structure. The new policy and structures will come into effect in 2007.

6. Financial Status and Utilisation

Please note that annual figures are subject to later adjustment.

Financial Status

Table 1: Contribution Overview [Feb 05 – Dec 06]

Donor	Contributions		Contribution Balance
	Committed	Received	
Japan	5,695,010.17	5,695,010.17	-
Canada	3,623,544.00	3,623,544.00	-
USAID	200,000.00	-	200,000.00
Netherlands	1,204,819.00	1,204,819.00	-
UK	3,600,000.00	3,100,000.00	500,000.00
Swiss	1,500,000.00	1,500,000.00	-
UNDP Core	476,716.00	476,716.00	-
Denmark	1,362,917.00	1,362,917.00	-
Italy	1,272,264.63		1,272,264.63
Total	18,935,270.80	16,963,006.17	1,972,264.63

Table 2: Funding Status [as of the end of the year]

Donor	Expenditure				Earmarked (***)	Available Balance as of 1st Jan 07
	Received	2005	2006	Total		
Japan	5,695,010	-			Fund Received by end of 2006. As we had other donors which could cover 2006 expenses, Funds from Japan was directly allocated to 2007's budget.	5,695,010.17
Canada	3,623,544	79,818.20	2,317,989.77	2,397,807.96		1,225,736.04
Netherlands	1,204,819		1,157,992.38	1,157,992.38		46,826.62
UK	3,100,000	1,720,007.51	1,366,629.48	3,086,636.99		13,363.01
Swiss	1,500,000	-	1,483,892.27	1,483,892.27		16,107.73
UNDP Core	476,716	476,716.00	-	476,716.00		-
Denmark	1,362,917	-	1,031,198.97	1,031,198.97		331,718.03
Total	16,963,006.17	2,276,541.71	7,357,702.87	9,634,244.58	-	7,328,761.59

Financial Utilisation

Table 3: Annual Expenditure by Activity [1 January – 31 December]

Activity	Budget (2006)	Expenditure	Balance	Delivery Rate
Activity 1: Project Management	1,812,937.01	1,641,941.90	170,995.11	91%
Activity 2: Arms and Ammunition Collection	3,431,308.36	3,203,331.70	227,976.66	93%
Activity 3: Regional Development Capacity	1,164,332.99	1,038,940.00	125,392.99	89%
Activity 5: Integrated Technology Systems	277,213.72	243,599.79	33,613.93	88%
Activity 7: Public Information	741,437.33	648,358.39	93,078.94	87%
Activity 8: D & R Commission	283,871.82	231,164.29	52,707.53	81%
UNDP GMS (based on donor agreements)	385,555.06	350,366.80	35,188.26	91%
Total	8,096,656.29	7,357,702.87	738,953.42	91%

Table 4: Annual Expenditure by Donor [1 January – 31 December]

Donor	Activity	Budget (2006)	Expenditure	Balance	Delivery Rate	Remarks (*)
Canada	Activity1:Project Management	655,908.75	522,351.87	133,556.88	80%	
	Activity2:Arms and Ammunition Collection	990,542.96	849,647.95	140,895.01	86%	
	Activity3: Regional Development Capacity	592,651.49	473,272.83	119,378.66	80%	
	Activity5:Integrated Technology Systems	82,628.41	53,518.71	29,109.70	65%	
	Activity 7:Public Information	219,092.62	219,092.62	0.00	100%	
	Activity 8:D & R Commission	125,482.21	89,725.32	35,756.89	72%	
	UNDP GMS 5% - See the Donor Agreement	133,315.32	110,380.47	22,934.86	83%	
	Sub- Total Canada	2,799,621.76	2,317,989.77	481,632.00	83%	
Netherlands	Activity1:Project Management	390,796.45	390,796.45	0.00	100%	
	Activity2:Arms and Ammunition Collection	498,359.30	480,432.43	17,926.87	96%	
	Activity3: Regional Development Capacity	50,310.87	50,310.87	0.00	100%	
	Activity5:Integrated Technology Systems	237.53	233.53	4.00	98%	
	Activity 7:Public Information	54,415.08	43,227.74	11,187.34	79%	
	Activity 8:D & R Commission	153,327.77	137,848.87	15,478.90	90%	
	UNDP GMS 5% - See the Donor Agreement	57,372.35	55,142.49	2,229.86	96%	
	Sub- Total Netherlands	1,204,819.35	1,157,992.38	46,826.97	96%	
UK	Activity1:Project Management	377,637.56	364,910.88	12,726.68	97%	
	Activity2:Arms and Ammunition Collection	776,501.90	776,501.90	0.00	100%	
	Activity3: Regional Development Capacity	80,383.44	80,383.44	0.00	100%	

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

	Activity5:Integrated Technology Systems	9,242.81	9,242.81	0.00	100%	
	Activity 7:Public Information	70,512.86	70,512.86	0.00	100%	
	UNDP GMS 5% - See the Donor Agreement	65,713.93	65,077.59	636.33	99%	
	Sub- Total UK	1,379,992.50	1,366,629.48	13,363.01	99%	
Swiss	Activity1:Project Management	281,921.45	281,921.45	0.00	100%	
	Activity2:Arms and Ammunition Collection	614,292.65	598,951.95	15,340.70	98%	
	Activity3:Regional Development Capacity	354,019.24	354,019.24	0.00	100%	
	Activity5:Integrated Technology Systems	28,144.47	28,144.47	0.00	100%	
	Activity 7:Public Information	146,663.42	146,663.42	0.00	100%	
	Activity 8:D & R Commission	3,530.20	3,530.20	0.00	100%	
	UNDP GMS 5% - See the Donor Agreement	71,428.57	70,661.54	767.04	99%	
	Sub- Total Swiss	1,500,000.00	1,483,892.27	16,107.74	99%	
Denmark	Activity1:Project Management	139,147.93	81,961.25	57,186.68	59%	
	Activity2:Arms and Ammunition Collection	513,083.84	497,797.47	15,286.37	97%	
	Activity3: Regional Development Capacity	90,006.12	80,953.62	9,052.50	90%	
	Activity5:Integrated Technology Systems	157,200.00	152,460.27	4,739.73	97%	
	Activity 7:Public Information	255,000.00	168,861.75	86,138.25	66%	
	Activity 8:D & R Commission	59.90	59.90	0.00	100%	
	UNDP GMS 5% - See the Donor Agreement	57,724.89	49,104.71	8,620.18	85%	
	Sub- Total Denmark	1,212,222.68	1,031,198.97	181,023.71	85%	
Total		8,096,656.29	7,357,702.87	738,953.42	91%	

Annexes

List of Annexes

Annex 1 Charts (Trends 2006)

Annex 1



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