

United Nations Development Programme Afghanistan

Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups (DIAG)

ANNUAL PROJECT REPORT 2008



Weapons turned in by IAGs in Wardak Province,
February 2008

Project ID: 00043604

Duration: January 2005—March 2009

Strategic Plan Component: Crisis Prevention
and Recovery

Total Budget: USD 26,829,250

Unfunded: Nil

Table of Contents

Executive summary	3
I. Context	5
II. Performance review	6
1. Overall progress towards the CPAP outcome and output(s).....	6
2. Capacity development	6
3. Impact on direct and indirect beneficiaries	7
Implementation strategy review.....	7
1. Participatory/consultative processes	7
2. Quality of partnerships	8
3. National ownership.....	8
4. Sustainability.....	9
Management effectiveness review	9
1. Quality of monitoring.....	9
2. Timely delivery of outputs.....	9
3. Resources allocation.....	10
4. Cost-effective use of inputs	10
III. Project results summary	10
IV. Implementation challenges.....	17
Project risks and actions.....	17
Project issues and actions.....	17
V. Lessons learnt and next steps	18
Lessons learnt.....	18
Recommendations	19
VI. Financial status and utilization	20
Financial status	20
Financial utilization	21

Executive summary

The Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups (DIAG) project took major strides in 2008 towards the expected outcomes and fulfilling the two outputs. Government institutions involved in DIAG were strengthened and able to provide greater security to many parts of Afghanistan. However, due to the need for ongoing technical support to the Government, the DIAG mandate was extended from March 2008 to March 2009.

For the output on weapons collection and disbandment of illegal armed groups (IAGs), the project achieved important policy decisions designed to strengthen the Ministry of Interior's (Mol) capacity, regulate private security companies and individual weapons, and update the information on IAGs in each province. The number of IAGs disarmed and disbanded by the end of 2008 increased to 402 and over 42,000 weapons have been collected. Out 104 targeted districts, 48 were compliant with DIAG and declared to be 'peace districts.' These efforts have strengthened the peace and security for the population covered and enhanced the Government's authority in those areas.

The output on socio-economic community development and governance interventions was advanced by ongoing support to District Development Assemblies (DDAs) in identifying and initiating development projects. Strengthening the DDAs improves local governance and gives communities a greater voice in local development. Four community infrastructure projects were completed during the year and 62 were identified, under planning, or initiated. In terms of monitoring and evaluation, DIAG undertook three baseline surveys for District DIAG Implementation (DDI) and one post-compliance survey covering districts under DDI round 1.

The progress made under DIAG is attributed to various factors. First, the careful selection of targeted districts, namely those conducive to DIAG activities and could be implemented by provincial authorities, meant that resources and efforts were concentrated in the areas where the most impact could be attained. Second, strong government leadership at the top level drove key policy initiatives that were transformed into action at the central and provincial levels. Third, adjustments to the process of identifying and initiating community-based development projects enabled more viable projects to commence.

The Government's ability to manage and implement DIAG is still limited and requires extensive support from ANBP. This challenge is being addressed by a capacity building action plan for Mol that will run from November 2008 to March 2010. A second issue is the slow progress in completing development projects. Many projects were slowed by inappropriate project identification, a lack of engineers to prepare feasibility studies, and complicated procurement procedures. Measures to address these problems included raising the budget ceiling for development projects and hiring engineers to work exclusively on DIAG development projects. These changes have resulted in projects being identified and implemented more quickly than before.

Several lessons were learned during 2008. Many of these lessons relate to the DIAG development projects and how to facilitate their implementation. Also, project managers need to allow for more time than anticipated for the Government to make key policy decisions and to have those decisions implemented at the local level. A high level 'champion' within the Government is indispensable for moving a project along. Finally, disarmament and disbandment results will likely become more difficult to achieve in the future. DDI has focused until now on districts that are most conducive to DIAG implementation. Less secure districts remain for DIAG, and the negotiating process with IAGs in these districts will become more protracted and complicated. ANBP is therefore exploring new strategies for implementing DIAG.

This annual report contains six sections. It begins with the background and context to DIAG, followed by a performance review focusing on progress, implementation, and project management. Next, the main results are highlighted along with implementation challenges. The fifth section delineates key lessons learned and recommendations for the next stages of the project. The final section presents the financial status of the project and how funds have been utilised.

I. Context

Following the successful transformation of Afghanistan Military Forces into the Afghan National Army through the Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) project of Afghanistan's New Beginnings Programme (ANBP), the Government of Afghanistan (GoA) identified the need to address numerous illegal armed groups (IAGs) that were destabilizing the country. Therefore, the Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups (DIAG) project evolved from the DDR project in order to support the Government in tackling this critical security problem posed by IAGs.¹ DIAG supports the Government of Afghanistan by improving human security through disarmament and disbandment of illegal armed groups and reducing the level of armed violence in communities. In addition, DIAG empowers existing government programmes for socio-economic development, which enhances stability and the promotion of good governance.

The main objective of DIAG is to extend the authority of the GoA by developing its capacity for effective local governance and creating the conditions for a secure population. DIAG also aims to strengthen public support for the lawful organs of government and raise the public's awareness about the destabilizing effect of IAGs. Equally important is the objective of developing communities that have become free of IAGs.

DIAG supports the Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS) strategic benchmark whereby all illegal armed groups will be disbanded by 20 March 2011.² The expected ANDS outcome relevant to DIAG is to enhance public trust in the Government's ability to deliver security by disbanding IAGs. To help achieve this goal, DIAG's two outputs are (1) implementation of weapon collection and disbandment of illegal armed groups fully supported; and (2) identification and monitoring of socio-economic community development and governance interventions fully supported.

DIAG is an important part of the UNDAF's Governance, Rule of Law and Human Rights area of cooperation, and DIAG contributes to the realization of UNDAF Objective 1³ and Country Team Outcome 2.⁴ The project's outputs also help to achieve the Country Programme Action Plan (CPAP) Outcome II⁵ and Output 2.2.⁶

The Disarmament and Reintegration Commission (D&RC) guides project implementation with H.E. Second Vice President M. Karim Khalili as the chair of the D&RC. The Joint Secretariat of DIAG provides support to the D&RC in policy formulation and guidance on project implementation. The Ministry of Interior (Mol) is the main implementation agency in terms of disarming and disbanding IAGs, and this occurs with technical support provided by ANBP. For the development component, the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD) plays the lead role in implementing

¹ ANBP manages a second project as well, the Anti-Personnel Mine and Ammunition Stockpile Destruction (APMASD) project.

² The original Afghanistan Compact benchmark 1.4 called for disbanding all IAGs by March 2008, but the target shifted to March 2011 following a decision by the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB) in October 2007.

³ By 2008, Government at all levels and civil society, including communities and individuals, are better able to realize improved governance based on the rule of law and human rights, with particular emphasis on women and marginalized groups.

⁴ By 2008, an effective, more accountable and more representative public administration is established at the national and sub-national levels, with improved delivery of services in an equitable, efficient and effective manner.

⁵ The democratic state and government institutions strengthened at national and sub-national levels to govern and ensure the delivery of quality public services including security with special attention to marginalized groups.

⁶ Law and order institutions at national and sub-national levels strengthened and security of the population improved.

the district level development projects through the National Area-Based Development Programme (NABDP).

The specific development challenges entail establishing Mol's capacity to fully assume responsibility for disarming and disbanding IAGs, maintaining the various databases that have been designed, and overall project management.

The main beneficiaries of DIAG are the Government and the populations in compliant districts. Enhanced security and the provision of basic services are made possible by collecting weapons and disbanding IAGs. Other beneficiaries include regional neighbours and the wider international community, which benefit from improved security in a more stable and secure Afghanistan.

The key stakeholder in DIAG is GoA not only because it leads the project but also because greater peace and security will enable the Government to extend its effective authority in more parts of the country. The international community is also a major stakeholder through its interests in good governance, stabilisation, and police reform in Afghanistan.

II. Performance review

1. Overall progress towards the CPAP outcome and output(s)

The relevant CPAP outcome is strengthened democratic state and government institutions to govern and ensure the delivery of quality public services, and the corresponding CPAP output is strengthened law and order institutions and improved security of the population. Disarming and disbanding IAGs strengthens the Government's authority and makes it solely responsible for security and protection. In turn, this helps create the necessary conditions to enable the Government to provide vital basic services and allows for the further participation of the Afghan people in democratic institutions. DIAG complements other ongoing initiatives by the GoA, UNDP and donors, such as the Enhancing Legal and Electoral Capacity for Tomorrow (ELECT) project, the Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA), Focused District Development (FDD), the European Commission's National Indicative Programme (containing elements on governance, police reform, mine action, and rural development) and Canada's training and mentoring of Afghan security forces and supporting democratic development.

2. Capacity development

DIAG made significant achievements in national capacity building in 2008, which helps to prepare the Government in assuming greater responsibility over the implementation of DIAG. The most notable aspect of institution and capacity building was the establishment of the DIAG Unit at Mol. The DIAG Unit is responsible for the registration of private security companies (PSCs), individual weapons registration, and DIAG operations at the central, regional and provincial levels. In September, H.E. Second Vice President Khalili approved an 18-month capacity building action plan. Thirty-four people at the central level were selected as staff for the DIAG Unit and commenced with training in November. Based on the action plan, selection and training of regional and provincial DIAG officers will occur in April 2009.

In early 2008, ANBP conducted a three-day training session on the weapons registration software for Mol staff who will manage the software for the DIAG Unit. Day-to-day support and capacity building occurs through the provision of ANBP mentors to Mol.

The Joint Secretariat's Development Team collaborated with MRRD in providing a two-day training session on improving the implementation of development projects for heads and chief engineers of MRRD's Provincial Departments and the Provincial DIAG coordinators (PDCs) in the central and

eastern regions. The training focused on the procedures for DIAG development projects' identification and implementation, along with the roles and responsibilities of MRRD's Provincial Departments and PDCs. Twenty MRRD provincial staff received the training.

The Joint Secretariat also worked closely with the Ministry of Interior's FDD on retraining police forces in targeted districts. The training included efforts to enhance the police's role in promoting DIAG at the district level, as well as the procedures for handling confiscated weapons. The Joint Secretariat produced a training manual that is used in FDD's training programme.

Further DIAG capacity building efforts were made in collaboration with the Ministry of Hajj and Islamic Affairs during the second quarter by hosting a 'training-the-trainers' workshop for 75 senior clerics. The training focused on DIAG messages for dissemination by the clerics. A similar training workshop was held in August for 34 senior Islamic scholars.

3. Impact on direct and indirect beneficiaries

The direct beneficiary of DIAG is GoA, particularly Mol. ANBP has provided ongoing support to Mol in implementing all aspects of DIAG, including mentoring and capacity building activities. These efforts enabled Mol to assume greater responsibility for DIAG and ultimately strengthen the Government's ability to provide security. ANBP facilitated Mol in implementing DIAG by translating the weapons registration and licensing and IAG databases into Dari.

In addition to disarming and disbanding IAGs, DIAG includes a development component in which peace districts receive a development project based on local needs. In 2008, four DIAG development projects were completed and another 24 were in progress. The four projects directly benefitted approximately 191,500 people (Kohistan District veterinary project: 100,000 people; Shortepa District veterinary project: 50,000 people; Pashtoon Zarghon District health clinic: 40,000 people; and Cha Ab District school: 1,500 children).

Indirect beneficiaries entail those people in DIAG-targeted districts who are now more secure as a result of disarming and disbanding IAGs in their communities. This includes 23 districts in 2008 that became DIAG compliant. Post-compliance evaluations reveal that the local populations feel more secure following DIAG. Cumulatively, DIAG has achieved compliance in 48 districts (out of 104 targeted).

Implementation strategy review

1. Participatory/consultative processes

DIAG is a government-led project supported by ANBP. As such, government at all levels (central, provincial, and district) continues to play the leading role in defining priorities and strategies and implementing activities. The D&RC, chaired by the Second Vice President, is responsible for defining policies, priorities, and guidelines for DIAG. The Joint Secretariat, which is comprised of representatives from the Ministry of Defence (MoD), Mol, National Directorate of Security (NDS), the United Nations Assistance Mission for Afghanistan (UNAMA), ANBP and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), is the executive body of the D&RC. The broad representation in these bodies ensures that DIAG is conducted in a participatory manner.

At the provincial level, provincial security committees have been established in all 34 provinces. They are chaired by governors and comprised of local government institutions as well as UNAMA, ISAF and Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) representatives. Provincial security committees participate in DIAG by collecting information, assessing the security situation, implementing activities and monitoring DIAG in accordance with the central policy and the D&RC guidelines.

Participation is also evident at the local level. The development component of DIAG involves facilitating District Development Assemblies (DDAs), comprised of local government representatives, community leaders and elders, in identifying local needs and selecting the types of development projects that are most appropriate.

2. Quality of partnerships

DIAG maintains quality partnerships with government, other UN agencies, and donors. The major national partners are the D&RC, Office of the Second Vice President, Mol, MoD, NDS, MRRD, and the National Security Council. These partnerships are sustained by frequent interaction between ANBP and government bodies in the planning and implementation of DIAG. Cooperation takes place at the highest levels of government as seen in the Second Vice President serving as the chair of D&RC. This is further enhanced through weekly Joint Secretariat Operations Group meetings to coordinate the delivery of DIAG among the stakeholders.

Cooperation with other UN agencies occurs with UNAMA on a strategic and policy level. UNAMA is a member of the D&RC and the Joint Secretariat, and therefore it is involved in setting policies and priorities, along with liaising and coordinating operations. Additionally, UNAMA participates in DIAG at the provincial level. Also of note are partnerships with UNDP's ELECT and NABDP. ANBP started hosting regional ELECT offices late in 2008 and transferred 13 staff to the project in the fourth quarter. The remapping procedure conducted by provincial governors prepared ANBP to assist ELECT and the Independent Election Commission (IEC) in the forthcoming screening of electoral candidates against the IAG and Government Officials Linked to Illegal Armed Groups (GOLIAG) databases. Communication and coordination between DIAG and NABDP strengthened in 2008 by hiring a DIAG coordinator at MRRD in addition to eight engineers and surveyors who work exclusively on DIAG development projects.

ANBP regularly engaged the donor community to keep the embassies and aid agencies abreast of key DIAG developments. The weekly Joint Secretariat Operations Group meetings have been the main method to engage donors. Additionally, the quarterly donors' conferences provide an excellent forum for tracking progress, sharing information, and enhancing coordination. Although ANBP maintains effective partnerships, there is greater scope for partnerships with donors on the district-level development projects, either in terms of coordination or co-financing.

3. National ownership

From the beginning DIAG has been under the leadership and direction of senior government officials. This is evident with H.E. Second Vice President Khalili serving as the chair of the D&RC and frequently leading DIAG meetings. Also, Mr. Mohammed Masoom Stanekzai, Special Advisor to HE President Hamid Karzai, is heavily involved in all aspects of DIAG by serving as the Vice Chair of D&RC and serving as the government focal point for the Joint Secretariat.

In terms of field operations, Mol is responsible for the collection of weapons and negotiating disbandment with the local commanders. ANBP merely provides technical support and logistics. National ownership is also seen in the development component of DIAG. DDAs made up of local leaders assess their communities' needs and submit prospective project ideas to the Joint Secretariat. MRRD handles the feasibility studies and procurement procedures, and it is responsible for implementation of the development projects.

The only area in which government has not taken the lead is monitoring and evaluation (M&E). M&E is currently performed by ANBP, but this function will be turned over to the Government before the end of DIAG.

4. Sustainability

Enhancing sustainability is consistently at the foreground of DIAG, with a key milestone of 2008 being the November inauguration of the DIAG Unit facility at Mol. The Japanese-funded facility was outfitted with the equipment necessary for the new DIAG officers to operate. The opening of the facility along with the Mol capacity building action plan adopted in October serve as a strong foundation for turning over DIAG completely to the Government.



H.E. Minister Atmar opens the DIAG Unit facility at Mol in November

Management effectiveness review

1. Quality of monitoring

Baseline and post-compliance surveys track progress and help to evaluate performance, impact, and sustainability of DIAG. ANBP's M&E section conducted four District DIAG Implementation (DDI) surveys in 2008, including three baseline surveys and one post-compliance survey, along with four assessments of development projects.

The DDI round 1 post-compliance survey found that 79 percent of the people sampled said the security situation improved after the implementation of DIAG in their districts. Also, 93 percent stated that the former IAGs are now behaving as normal civilians in the community. The outcomes for socio-economic development were much less apparent. Only 50 percent of the sample indicated that the socio-economic conditions in their districts have improved.

The M&E function of DIAG has not been turned over to the Government for lack of appropriate human resources. The field interviews are conducted by Provincial DIAG Coordinators and Regional Verification Committees. Mol will need to identify or hire personnel who can take over the M&E role before ANBP's mandate ends.

2. Timely delivery of outputs

The two outputs were achieved in accordance with the Annual Work Plan 2008: (1) supporting the implementation of weapon collection and disbandment of IAGs and (2) supporting the identification and monitoring of socio-economic community development and governance interventions. No specific annual targets had been set for the number of districts to become compliant, number of weapons to be collected, number of IAGs to be disbanded, or the number of development projects completed.

ANBP and DIAG's mandate was extended from March 2008 to March 2009 due to a policy decision by the Government and UNDP. However, the Mol capacity building action plan that commenced in November 2008 is scheduled for completion in March 2010. For this reason, a further extension is being processed that will take ANBP until March 2011.

The only output to experience a delay was the establishment of the DIAG Unit and a corresponding facility at Mol. The Government of Japan allocated \$4.4 million for the creation and capacity building of the DIAG Unit, but the formation of the unit and completion of the facility were delayed because of bottlenecks in releasing funds from the Ministry of Finance to the Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA). ANBP provided 'bridge funding' to enable the completion of the facility and its opening in November.

3. Resources allocation

The development activities of DIAG comprised 61% of the programmable budget in 2008. This proportion covers the four development activities of DIAG: Arms and Ammunition Collection; Regional Development Capacity; Public Information; and the D&R Commission.

4. Cost-effective use of inputs

DIAG resource utilisation achieved cost-effectiveness by sharing project management costs with APMASD. For the year, additional cost-effectiveness was achieved by minimising new capital purchases and renting space to ELECT at the ANBP regional offices on a cost recovery basis. DIAG also saved costs by consolidating the Gardez regional office with the Kabul regional office.

Given that the amount of resources used for "Regional Development Capacity" (Activity 3) exceeded those of "Arms and Ammunition Collection" (Activity 2), greater achievements should have been made in the provision of district-based development projects for DIAG-compliant districts. For the year only four projects were completed. The aforementioned hiring of a DIAG coordinator and engineers at MRRD to work exclusively on DIAG development projects should improve the completion rate in the future.

III. Project results summary

Output 1 – Implementation of weapon collection and disbandment of illegal armed groups fully supported.

Activity 1.1 – Enhance the capacity of Government to ensure community security through weapons reduction.

Indicative Activities (as per the Project Document)

1. Assistance to DIAG Steering Committee and Forum to establish policies and priorities of DIAG project.

ANBP provided continuous support to the DIAG Steering Committee and senior government leaders throughout 2008. The provision of experts and technical assistance assisted the government/D&RC/Joint Secretariat in formulating policy and implementing decisions made by the Steering Committee. In March a Steering Committee meeting led by H.E. Second Vice President Khalili set policies on enforcement, registration of PSCs, and implementation of DIAG development projects. The DIAG Steering Committee met again in September under the chairmanship of H.E. Vice President Khalili to discuss the transition of DIAG to Mol, how to enhance DIAG development projects, processes to support the remapping procedure led by DR&C and the provincial governors, and re-focus the work of DIAG. The Joint Secretariat prepared a DIAG progress report for the meeting. ANBP also assisted the Government in preparing the Mol capacity building action plan.

A third Steering Committee meeting for the year was held in October again under the chairmanship of H.E. Second Vice President Khalili. At this meeting the Ambassador of Japan announced an increase in the ceiling for DIAG development projects, from USD150,000 to USD300,000. The Vice President agreed to issue a formal instruction on the capacity building plan for the MoI DIAG Unit. Also, relevant ministries and international stakeholders were requested to coordinate actions on combating weapon smuggling. Finally, the Vice President agreed to order the Ministry of Finance to solve the problem of bank guarantees which delayed the registration of private security companies.

A major policy development set forth by the D&RC was the remapping procedure. The purpose was to reassess all districts and acquire current data about IAGs. Among the information to be collected were the size, strength, and activities of IAGs, estimated number of weapons, and level of threat to the government. The Second Vice President signed a decree in September for governors to carry out the remapping procedure by the end of November.

Additional key policy and strategic outputs from ANBP to support the senior government leadership in 2008 included the following:

Output	Date
DIAG DDI operations sequence	January 2008
DDI weapon collection criteria	January 2008
Draft regulations for Cabinet	February 2008
Draft decree on private security companies for Office of the President	March 2008
Initial registration and temporary licenses to private security companies	May 2008
Paper on need for a national weapons database for D&RC	May 2008
DIAG analysis and the need for a review concept note	August 2008
MoI capacity building action plan	October 2008

The main DIAG policy and strategic outputs from the government in 2008 included the following:

Output	Date
Cabinet resolution on private security companies and administrative decree to regulate PSCs	In progress
Executive order for remapping procedure	September 2008
Instruction from 2 nd Vice President to MoI (on capacity building and procurement plan)	October 2008

2. Assistance to DIAG Joint Secretariat for facilitation and coordination of DIAG project

The Joint Secretariat is responsible for liaison, coordination and operations for the D&RC. The Joint Secretariat operationalizes DIAG policy and reports on progress against agreed operational objectives and tasks. ANBP continued to provide vital support in 2008 for the Joint Secretariat in the form of funding, staff, and office space. ANBP provided 20 staff for the Joint Secretariat and allocated \$1.53 million in 2008 to support its activities. Additionally, ANBP housed the Joint Secretariat after its necessary departure in July from the Vice President's compound. This support has enabled the Joint Secretariat to carry out its functions effectively and efficiently.

The Joint Secretariat in 2008 was instrumental in progressing the registration of PSCs and individual weapons and in preventing individuals connected with IAGs from attaining posts in central and local government. Key achievements for the year include the following:

Private security companies. Interim guidelines for the registration of PSCs were finalized in March and meant to regulate PSCs until Parliament passes the registration law. (A draft PSC registration law currently rests with the Government's legal committee for approval before it can be sent to the Parliament.) The following month, meetings were held with PSCs to inform them of the rules and procedures, and at the end of May 36 PSCs registered and received temporary licenses. Thirty-nine PSCs received temporary licenses in 2008. The registration of PSCs is delayed by the issue of bank guarantees for the PSCs. Furthermore, ANBP finalized the PSC database, but Mol is not able to manage it yet because of the holdup with LOTFA funds to procure the necessary hardware.

Weapons registration. ANBP completed the database for individual weapons registration in the first quarter of 2008, including the translation into Dari. Mol officials received training on utilising the database and are now operating it on their own. Over 14,800 weapons were registered by the end of 2008. Two other measures were taken to facilitate weapons registration in the country. First, ANBP's weapons registration mentor prepared standard operating procedures for Mol's Registration and Licensing Office. Second, ANBP worked with the Police Department, Police Intelligence Department, and the Criminal Investigation Department in preparing a Joint Cooperation Plan.

Government appointments. The Joint Secretariat and D&RC play a key role in screening nominees to government posts by cross-referencing names in the IAG database. ANBP assistance to the Independent Directorate for Local Governance in appointment selection involved screening 367 candidates. Twenty-seven were found to have linkages with IAGs. Three of these 27 complied with DIAG by turning in their weapons and ammunition. The Joint Secretariat and D&RC helped the Mol Appointment Board screen 221 nominees and rejected 74 due to their connections with IAGs. Additionally, the Joint Secretariat and D&RC reviewed the names of 20 nominees from the Presidential Senior Appointment Board for senior government positions, and seven were found to have links with IAGs. In terms of current GOLIAGs, out of 72 targeted GOLIAGs, only 20 remain non-compliant and in their positions, down from 28 in 2007.

Focused District Development. The Joint Secretariat achieved greater coordination with Mol's Focused District Development (FDD) efforts for retraining police forces. FDD previously worked in many districts where DIAG could not operate due to the high-risk security situation. However, FDD shifted its focus to more stable districts, thereby increasing opportunities for coordination. The Joint Secretariat produced a training manual about DIAG and weapons collection procedures by the police.

3. Assistance to DIAG Development Group to plan, coordinate policies, priorities, and interventions and mobilise resources.

The DIAG Development Group is part of the Joint Secretariat and works closely with DDAs in identifying district-level development projects. Closer coordination occurred between the Development Group and MRRD to accelerate the process of delivering development projects to districts in compliance with DIAG. The DIAG Development Group has helped in the identification or implementation of 62 district projects (including those from 2007), up from 39 in 2007. A key factor in 2008 was the Government of Japan's agreement to increase the ceiling for DIAG development projects.

5. Creation and maintenance of government-owned DIAG database.⁷

The IAG database was further refined and enhanced in 2008 with the restructuring and re-design of the software. It includes more relevant information than before and has helped to improve decision making by the various DIAG bodies. Additionally, ANBP translated the IAG database into Dari. However, the database is still managed by ANBP due to a lack of capacity at Mol.

⁷ Activity 4 entailed assistance to Provincial Security Committees, but this activity is no longer relevant due to the focus shifting from the provinces to the districts.

The results of the remapping procedure will become inputs to the database and provide the Government with an updated set of data on IAGs throughout the country.

6. Implementation support to the GoA for disarmament of IAGs.

ANBP assisted the Government in launching DDI rounds 2 through 5 in 2008, covering 53 districts. A total of 104 districts have been targeted since DDI took effect in 2007. Out of the targeted districts, 48 have been declared compliant with DIAG. The number of disbanded IAGs in 2008 was 117, bringing the total to 402. DIAG has collected 42,460 weapons since its inception. Table 1 compares the disarmament results in 2007 and 2008.

Table 1. Statistics on disbandment and weapons collection

	2007	2008
Targeted districts	53	51
DIAG compliant districts (cumulative)	21	48
IAGs disbanded (cumulative)	285	402
Weapons collected under DIAG (cumulative)	37,057	42,460

Activity 1.2 – Disarm targeted illegal armed groups, collect weapons and transfer weapons to Government control.

Indicative activities (as per the Project Document)

1. At the central level, ANBP has fully staffed the Joint Secretariat and the ANBP Central Office supports the GoA in all aspects towards the DIAG process.

The Joint Secretariat was fully staffed in 2008. ANBP's central office backstopped the Government and provided technical inputs covering all components and activities of DIAG. The central office is assisted in the field through ANBP's seven regional offices.

2. Provision of weapons collection teams, as required, to meet operational tempo.

ANBP's Weapons Collection Teams (WCTs) continued to be active in the regions negotiating with authorities and IAGs. These teams oversee the handover of weapons from commanders and their units and then transfer the weapons to Government control. Currently there are eight WCTs operating around the country.

3. International advisory and oversight capacity established.

Bodies such as the D&RC, DIAG Steering Committee, and the Joint Secretariat contain international representatives from embassies, UNAMA, and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to ensure sufficient international advice and oversight. These bodies functioned throughout the year.

4. Weapons collected, stored under central government control and destroyed unserviceable weapons and ammunition.

ANBP continued to assist MoI (and MoD under the APMASD Project) in collecting weapons and ammunition from IAGs and other sources and bringing them under the Government's control. Weapons and ammunition are transported to regional depots by ANBP vehicles. In 2008, 5,406 light and heavy weapons were collected under DIAG and transferred to MoD. To date under DIAG, 30,868 metric tons of ammunition have been collected or destroyed, and 42,460 weapons



collected. MoD's policy position to not destroy non-serviceable weapons has limited the number of weapons destroyed.

Weapons turned in by IAGs in Wardak Province

Activity 1.3 – Change general public perceptions, values and behaviour regarding illicit weapons possession and misuses through a public awareness campaign.

Indicative activities (as per the Project Document)

1. Structured public information exchanges with communities on all aspects of illegal arms possession and uses through a media campaign, workshops, round table discussions and information tool kits, etc.

ANBP utilises a multi-faceted approach in its public relations. Press releases, documentaries, broadcasts and printed materials were produced throughout the year to disseminate knowledge and awareness of DIAG. Radio and television coverage, including interviews with key DIAG officers, helped to extend the reach of ANBP. Among the media outlets covering ANBP activities were Voice of America, BBC World Service News, Aljazeera Television, Tolo TV, and Radio Television Afghanistan. Additionally, a 25-minute documentary on DIAG's achievements was produced early in 2008 and translated into Dari. Printed materials for distribution included DIAG posters, brochures, and calendars. Other public information activities included preparations for radio and television public service announcements (PSAs). The PSAs, expected to be launched in early 2009, will be designed to widen public awareness and support for DIAG compliance.

To further disseminate information about DIAG, ANBP upgraded its DIAG and ANBP websites with new content, a new interactive format, and updated information. Efforts are ongoing to translate the web sites into Dari and Pashto.

In a strategic move to mobilise support for DIAG from clerics, ANBP commenced cooperative relations with the Ministry of Hajj and Islamic Affairs (MHIA). HE Minister Niamatullah Shahrani endorsed a workshop in June for 75 senior clerics from Kabul. This 'training of trainers' workshop enabled clerics to communicate DIAG messages at mosques during their Friday sermons. The success of this workshop led to a second training workshop in August for 34 top religious scholars from around the country.



The emerging partnership with MHIA was further demonstrated when MHIA agreed to intensify its efforts in support of DIAG by monitoring the frequency and efficacy of the DIAG messages in the clerics' sermons.

Clerics at the DIAG national workshop for religious scholars in August

Public information efforts were also directed at schools by means of a Peace Day School Symposium in cooperation with the Ministry of Education and provincial chiefs of education. Thousands of school children participated in Peace Day activities, and the media provided extensive coverage of the various events. Additionally, ANBP organised round table discussions on the relationship between peace and DIAG in four provinces. Participants in these round table discussions included education experts, students, and provincial chiefs of education.

ANBP regional offices were also active in the local communities. Many of these efforts were tailor made for the particular region, such as a DIAG poetry contest in Kandahar.

2. Public awareness programme and negotiations with illegal armed groups and local communities to challenge the culture of weapon possession and armed violence.

Every ANBP Regional Office has rolled out a programme of public information activities referred to as a 'roadshow.' Roadshows comprise a basket of innovative community-oriented outreach initiatives – mobile film shows, distribution of DIAG items at weekend family congregation spots, studio discussions around DIAG themes, quiz and symposia competitions for high school students, DIAG presentations in Provincial Committee meetings, and sponsorship of popular local sporting events such as football tournaments. Taken together, the idea is to step up at the ground level the awareness of DIAG in order to build up popular pressure for the IAGs to disarm.

Activity 1.4 – Handover of all responsibilities from ANBP (DIAG) to the GoA.

The handover did not take place in 2008 because of the extension of ANBP's mandate to March 2009. Nonetheless, ANBP supported GoA to take a significant step towards the eventual handover of DIAG with the launch of the Mol capacity building action plan. The training of Mol's DIAG Unit and the eventually the regions and provinces will prepare the Government to assume full responsibility for DIAG.

Output 2 – Identification and monitoring of socio-economic community development and governance interventions fully supported.

Activity 2.1 – Community development consultative mechanisms established in each of the 34 provinces to cover up to 364 districts.

This activity was subsumed under Activity 1.1 in 2007.

Activity 2.2 – Deliver socio-economic community development projects; improve governance structure; involve disbanded group members in the participation of community development and social affairs.

Indicative activities (as per the Project Document)


1. Elicit community-based priorities for socio-economic rehabilitation through consultative mechanisms.

The Joint Secretariat continued its work with DIAG-compliant districts to identify appropriate development projects. In 2008, the Joint Secretariat engaged with DDAs in discussions regarding which community development projects were priorities and appropriate for the district. Once the DDA identifies prospective development projects, the Joint Secretariat/D&RC selects one for a feasibility study by MRRD.

2. Engagement, through the Joint Secretariat, with development programmes to implement projects.

The development component of DIAG is implemented through MRRD's NABDP. In order to improve coordination and the completion rate of DIAG development projects, in July MRRD hired eight engineers to work exclusively on DIAG development projects and a coordinator was engaged at MoI. After a development project has been agreed by the Joint Secretariat's development team, MRRD engineers conduct a feasibility study to assess whether or not the project is feasible and within the maximum cost allowed.

The status of DIAG development projects is demonstrated in Figure 1. Four projects were completed in 2008, raising the cumulative total to five. The pace of initiating projects increased during the second half of 2008 due to the new MRRD engineers working on DIAG projects. Planning for 10 new projects began in the fourth quarter alone.



3. Monitoring and evaluation on progress and impact.

In 2008 ANBP conducted three baseline surveys for DDI rounds 2, 3, and 4. One post-compliance survey was undertaken for districts under DDI round 1. The survey focused on security, good governance, and popular support. Over 650 people were surveyed, and 73% responded that there are no more IAGs in their districts. Nearly 80% stated that security had improved after DIAG was implemented in their district. The socio-economic impact was much less, according to the survey, with only half the people saying that socio-economic conditions had improved. The reasons for the relatively low rating of socio-economic conditions derive from the fact that DIAG development projects take several months (up to a year) to complete, and development in general requires a medium to long-term perspective.

Activity 2.3 – Establish District Development Assemblies (DDAs) in DIAG targeted districts (if not already established). DDAs are used for DIAG project identification and implementation.

The Joint Secretariat assists MRRD with establishing DDAs in DIAG-targeted districts. The DDAs conduct needs assessments for district-level development projects. Out of the 104 DIAG-targeted districts, 94 have DDAs. The total number of DDAs in Afghanistan now stands at 308, covering nearly 85% of all districts.

IV. Implementation challenges

Project risks and actions

Security

The most critical risk is the deteriorating security situation in many parts of Afghanistan. In some regions ANBP is not able to implement DIAG in terms of negotiating with IAGs and rounding up weapons because the districts are deemed to be insurgent districts and UNDP policy prohibits activities in those areas. ANBP has therefore targeted districts in which DIAG is more likely to be successfully implemented. This approach enables the most efficient use of resources, but unfortunately it leaves the most unstable districts untouched. Even in some areas where DIAG has been implemented, namely Logar and Gardez provinces, ANBP had to suspend operations in 2008.

Political will

DIAG requires the full support of government at all levels, but this support has not always been forthcoming. Most notable is governors and district chiefs who refused to cooperate with the remapping decree issued by the Second Vice President. The remapping procedure intended to provide more complete and updated information on IAGs throughout the country, such as their strength, estimated number of weapons, level of threat, and activities. Only 15 out of 34 provinces completed the remapping on time. Eight provinces had no compliance with the remapping, and the remainder were only partially complete. Fortunately the senior level government officials (e.g., President, Second Vice President and Vice Chair of DR&C) remain committed to DIAG. Also, the Independent Directorate for Local Governance (IDLG) is now engaging governors who have not fulfilled the remapping requirement.

Government capacity

The central government is unable to exert its authority in some parts of the country and to provide security for local populations. This inability affects implementation of DIAG and restricts it to areas less affected by insurgency. The government is not prepared to implement and manage DIAG on its own due to limited human resources and a dependence on donor funds. The human resources aspect is being addressed by the Mol capacity building action plan that will transfer the knowledge and skills required for Mol to conduct DIAG without UNDP/ANBP support. However, the financial aspect of the government's capacity to run DIAG does not have any apparent solutions on the horizon.

Re-arming of militias

A debate has arisen within government about the proposed re-arming of militias to help deal with the declining security situation in Afghanistan. Clearly re-arming militias contradicts the D&RC's policies and objectives of DIAG, and H.E. Minister Stanekzai has pointed this out. In response, assurances have been made that the militias will be under proper control and have their weapons registered.

Project issues and actions

Extension of DIAG

Incomplete efforts to build the Government of Afghanistan's capacity to manage and implement the DIAG project suggested the need to extend ANBP beyond its current timeline. The Government of Afghanistan and UNDP therefore proposed to extend DIAG from 1 April 2009 until 31 March 2011 to build upon the achievements made thus far, complete the capacity building within respective government ministries, and undertake initiatives for enhanced security in the country. A project extension document has been prepared along with a strategic framework. The

two-year extension of ANBP is estimated to cost USD 25 million, and efforts are underway to mobilise support from the donor community.

Development gap

There is a widening gap between DIAG implementation and the delivery of the development projects that generates frustration in the communities where compliance is achieved. The major impediments to implementation have been a lack of technical staff, the procurement process (i.e., regulations against community contracting) and problems associated with determining the cost of projects. To resolve this development gap, several measures were undertaken to increase the delivery of community projects. First, MRRD agreed to prioritize DIAG development projects under NABDP. Second, MRRD hired staff to work exclusively on DIAG development projects. Third, MRRD prepared a list of feasible projects for the DDAs in order to facilitate the project identification process. Fourth, rather than waiting until a district became fully compliant with DIAG, the project identification process is now started when a district nears compliance. Fifth, the ceiling was raised for DIAG development projects from USD 150,000 to USD 300,000. Sixth, PDCs and MRRD provincial staff received training on project identification and their roles in implementation. Furthermore, ANBP in late 2008 proposed to hire a strategic development advisor who would provide policy advice, technical inputs, increase coordination with other agencies, and manage the expectations of the communities. Also, a proposal for a waiver on community contracting was submitted for presidential approval.

Resistant IAGs and old and unserviceable weapons

Several IAGs continue to resist disarmament and disbandment. In order to address this problem, DIAG stepped up its efforts to have Provincial Committees negotiate further with IAG commanders and encourage them to comply. A related issue to this resistance is that many IAGs turn in old and unserviceable weapons under the DIAG process instead of the more modern and functional weapons. For this reason, DIAG set forth strict criteria and conditions for weapons under DDI. Since DDI round 4 the new criteria include higher compliance of handing over weapons and turning in serviceable weapons.

Lack of cooperation from provinces

In some provinces, the provincial authorities fail to cooperate in the DIAG process. This problem was addressed by having more frequent communication from IDLG, Mol and D&RC with the uncooperative authorities and exerting more pressure for them to implement DIAG.

V. Lessons learnt and next steps

Lessons learnt

Several key lessons were learned in 2008 about DIAG development projects which should facilitate the delivery of such projects into 2009 and beyond. Of critical importance is the need to clearly delineate the roles and responsibilities of the various agencies and organisations involved. It is imperative that the central MRRD and the provincial MRRD officials have a division of responsibility and that these lines of responsibility are understood by all parties. A second lesson learned is that the DIAG development projects are essentially infrastructure projects, but they do not provide a 'comprehensive package' such as equipment and teachers for schools, and supplies and medical professionals for health clinics. Hence, the infrastructure projects might not have the full impact that is expected and partnerships should be exploited to provide a holistic approach to a development project in its entirety. Third, DIAG development projects are typically implemented in district centers away from where many of the IAGs are, and thus these projects are not necessarily sufficient incentive for IAGs to disband.

Other lessons learned about the development component will facilitate more effective implementation in the future. First, there is a greater need to manage the expectations of communities where DIAG development projects are being planned and implemented. The process of identifying, planning, procuring, and completing the development projects is time consuming, but the populations in DIAG-compliant districts have unrealistic expectations about the timeframe for delivering projects. Second, ANBP's regional offices can play a more instrumental role in the coordination of development work in a district. Multiple initiatives by other development partners occur simultaneously, but many of these efforts are not coordinated very well. ANBP's regional offices are ideally structured for a leading coordination role in localities where DIAG development projects are occurring. Third, the regional offices have the capacity to help improve the technical capabilities of DDAs, and more engagement between the regional offices and DDAs is necessary.

A critical lesson on capacity building is that strong leadership is required from the government to initiate capacity building. The new minister at Mol made a firm commitment to the capacity building action plan which previously had been delayed. The DIAG capacity building programme for Mol commenced quickly after the decree was issued by the new minister. Similarly, support at the highest level of government and from the leading ministry facilitates the execution of DIAG and ensures that the project remains relevant to the country's needs.

As DDI progressed into the fifth round, it became apparent that more strategic annual planning is required. DDI has thus far launched rounds on prevailing conditions instead of setting forth annual targets for how many districts should be covered and how many IAGs to target. The remapping initiative and enhanced planning at the central level (through the acquisition of a Geographical Information System) should aid ANBP in its strategic annual planning for future DDI rounds.

As the more difficult IAGs remain to be disbanded, a key lesson learned is the need for DIAG's Regional Offices Managers (ROMs) to engage more proactively with IAGs. This will require more frequent field negotiations in cooperation with the district and provincial authorities. Negotiations with these resistant IAGs will be more protracted and the ROMs will need regular contact with them to encourage disbandment.

With several national and international actors involved with security sector reform (SSR) in Afghanistan, DIAG needs to have more synergies with other SSR programmes and governance bodies such as IDLG, ASGP, PDCs, and PRTs. Security improvements require effective coordination and cooperation among SSR programmes and actors at the central and field levels. DIAG forums are effective in disseminating information about the project to various actors, but greater scope exists for making explicit linkages among SSR activities. Such measures will be pursued in 2009.

A key lesson on public information is the successful engagement with tribal leaders, clerics, scholars, and schools to disseminate messages of peace and disarmament. The most effective public information campaigns in 2008 took place in collaboration with these groups, and this approach should continue. ANBP's regional offices will need to emphasize regular contact and cooperation with these groups at the regional and local levels.

Recommendations

The Government and ANBP must ensure that the Mol capacity building action plan is implemented as planned and on schedule. By completing the capacity building in March 2010, the Government will be able to assume most of the responsibility for DIAG with ANBP serving in a supervisory and technical role. To improve sustainability and effectiveness, the Government should commit to retaining the trained Mol officers in the DIAG Unit and provinces in their positions at least until March 2011.

DIAG needs to explore more opportunities for synergy with other players in SSR such as UNAMA and ISAF. The initiative should come from ANBP through an outreach strategy that will integrate DIAG more closely with the activities of UNAMA and ISAF.

The IAG and GOLIAG database contains valuable information for the security sector in Afghanistan. ANBP needs to ensure that the database serves not only its current functions but also for vetting electoral candidates and assisting the Government in counter-narcotics. Any necessary modifications to the database should be made to support these functions, and Mol should be properly trained to apply the database in these areas.

A development advisor should be hired under DIAG to improve the coordination and delivery of community projects under DDI. The keys functions of the development advisor would include: (1) assessing issues at the regional level and provide advice on improving the delivery of development projects; (2) providing advice to the regions on coordinating development activities among various local stakeholders; (3) managing the expectations among the local populations through an effective public information campaign; and (4) enhancing the technical capacity of the District Development Assemblies with the assistance of the ANBP regional development staff. Also, the development advisor could design and oversee the social outreach packages for individuals targeted in the swing districts phase.

On the government side, decentralisation of the procurement process for DIAG development projects would eliminate one of the main bottlenecks in initiating projects. Currently all tendering and procurement is conducted by MRRD at the central level, but decentralising this function to the provincial level would greatly aid the implementation of projects.

VI. Financial status and utilization

Financial status

Table 2: Contribution overview [February 2005- December 2008]

DONOR	CONTRIBUTIONS		CONTRIBUTION BALANCE
	Com mitte d	Rece ived	
Japan	10,237,867	10,237,867	-
UK	4,711,770	4,711,770	-
Canada	3,623,544	3,623,544	-
CIDA	1,472,031	1,472,031	-
Switzerland	1,500,000	1,500,000	-
Denmark	1,362,916	1,362,916	-
Italy	1,317,523	1,317,523	-
Netherlands	1,204,819	1,204,819	-
Norway	722,064	722,064	-
UNDP Core	476,716	476,716	-
USA	200,000	200,000	-
TOTAL	26,829,250	26,829,250	-

Table 3: Funding status (as of the end of 2008)

DONOR NAME	RECEIVED*	EXPENDITURES			PROJECT BALANCE	EARMARKE D*	AVAILABLE FUNDING (as of 1 Jan 2009)	EARMARKE D*
		Period Prior to the Reporting Year (2005 & 2007)	Reporting Year Only (2008)	TOTAL				
Canada	3,623,544	3,238,570	246,962	3,485,532	138,012	-	138,012	-
CIDA	1,472,031	-	1,736,387	1,736,387	-264,355	-	-264,355	-
UK	4,711,770	3,981,219	237,974	4,219,193	492,577	-	492,577	-
Denmark	1,362,916	1,179,585	65,008	1,244,593	118,323	-	118,323	-
Netherlands	1,204,819	1,146,532	1,123	1,147,655	57,164	-	57,164	-
Switzerland	1,500,000	1,540,627	7,747	1,548,374	-48,374	-	-48,374	-
Italy	1,317,523	886,174	460,291	1,346,465	-28,942	-	-28,942	-
Japan	10,237,867	3,280,076	4,763,270	8,043,346	2,194,521	-	2,194,521	-
USA	200,000	25,818	98,765	124,583	75,417	-	75,417	-
Norway	722,064	344,128	383,054	727,182	-5,118	-	-5,118	-
UNDP	476,716	476,716	0	476,716	0	-	0	-
TOTAL	26,829,250	16,099,444	8,000,581	24,100,024	2,729,226	-	2,729,226	-

Negative figures will be adjusted in the next budget revision. The figures in Table 3 are only preliminary. The Combined Delivery Report (CDR) released in April will provide the official expenditure figures. Also, Table 3 does not include the General Management Support costs for UNDP, which is why the expenditures and balance in Table 3 do not match those of Table 4 below.

Financial utilization

Table 4: Annual expenditure by activity [1 January – 31 December 2008]

Activity	BUDGET [2008]	EXPENDITURES	BALANCE	DELIVERY (%)
Activity 1 [Project Management]	2,792,086	2,673,112	118,975	96%
Activity 2 [Arms and Ammunition Collection]	1,290,619	1,136,871	153,749	88%
Activity 3 [Regional Development Capacity]	1,667,860	1,646,582	21,278	99%
Activity 5 [Integrated Technology Systems]	413,153	306,272	106,881	74%
Activity 7 [Public Information]	528,033	507,217	20,816	96%
Activity 8 [D & R Commission]	1,534,098	1,730,526	-196,428	113%
UNDP GMS (based on donor agreements) 5%	360,533	329,694	30,838	91%
UNDP GMS (based on donor agreements) 7%	103,550	130,696	-27,146	126%
Total	8,689,933	8,460,971	228,962	97%

Negative figures will be adjusted in the next budget revision. The figures in Table 4 are only preliminary. The Combined Delivery Report (CDR) released in April will provide the official figures.

Table 5: Annual expenditure by donor [1 January – 31 December 2008]

DONORS	ACTIVITY (as in ATLAS)	BUDGET [2008]	EXPENDITURES*	BALANCE	DELIVERY RATE (%)	REMARKS*
Canada	Activity 1: Project Management	106,657	240,524	-133,867		
	Activity 2: Arms and Ammunition Collected	27,392	4,117	23,275		
	Activity 3: Regional Development Capacity	448	410	38		
	Activity 8: D & R Commission	1,911	1,911	0		
GMS 5% [see donor agreement]		7,179	12,998	-5,819		
Subtotal [Canada]		143,587	259,960	-116,373	181%	
Japan	Activity 1: Project Management	1,428,381	1,208,363	220,018		
	Activity 2: Arms and Ammunition Collected	0	219	-219		
	Activity 3: Regional Development Capacity	1,497,890	1,475,807	22,083		
	Activity 5: Integrated Technology System	386,828	280,258	106,570		
	Activity 7: Public Information	500,507	480,322	20,186		
Activity 8: D & R Commission	1,348,272	1,318,302	29,970			
GMS 5% [see donor agreement]		271,678	250,698	20,979		
Subtotal [Japan]		5,433,556	5,013,969	419,587	92%	
Netherlands	Activity 2: Arms and Ammunition Collected	1,033	1,033	0		
	Activity 8: D & R Commission	467	90	377		
GMS 5% [see donor agreement]		79	59	20		
Subtotal [Netherlands]		1,579	1,182	397	75%	
Italy	Activity 2: Arms and Ammunition Collected	152,466	231,644	-79,179		
	Activity 3: Regional Development Capacity	10,527	10,527	0		
	Activity 5: Integrated Technology System	5,600	5,600	0		
GMS 5% [see donor agreement]		19,401	24,226	-4,825		
Subtotal [Italy]		388,011	484,517	-96,507	125%	
UK	Activity 1: Project Management	184,805	109,977	74,828		
	Activity 2: Arms and Ammunition Collected	316,725	123,020	193,705		
	Activity 3: Regional Development Capacity	-934	-608	-326		
	Activity 8: D & R Commission	5,585	5,585	0		
GMS 5% [see donor agreement]		26,641	12,525	14,116		
Subtotal [UK]		532,822	250,499	282,324	47%	
Switzerland	Activity 2: Arms and Ammunition Collected	12,825	7,747	5,079		
GMS 5% [see donor agreement]		675	408	267		
Subtotal [Switzerland]		13,500	8,155	5,346	60%	
USA	Activity 1: Project Management	96,057	96,057	0		
	Activity 2: Arms and Ammunition Collected	68,601	2,708	65,893		
GMS 5% [see donor agreement]		8,666	5,198	3,468		
Subtotal [USA]		173,324	103,963	69,361	60%	
Denmark	Activity 1: Project Management	45,685	38,685	7,000		
	Activity 2: Arms and Ammunition Collected	72,746	26,323	46,423		
GMS 5% [see donor agreement]		6,233	3,421	2,812		
Subtotal [Denmark]		124,664	68,430	56,234	55%	
Norway	Activity 1: Project Management	127,346	151,074	-23,728		
	Activity 2: Arms and Ammunition Collected	214,062	193,459	20,603		
	Activity 3: Regional Development Capacity	37,944	37,944	0		
	Activity 5: Integrated Technology System	0	300	-300		
	Activity 7: Public Information	155	155	0		
Activity 8: D & R Commission	122	122	0			
GMS 5% [see donor agreement]		19,980	20,161	-180		
Subtotal [Norway]		399,609	403,215	-3,606	101%	
CIDA	Activity 1: Project Management	603,138	615,912	-12,774		
	Activity 2: Arms and Ammunition Collected	424,770	546,601	-121,831		
	Activity 3: Regional Development Capacity	121,986	122,502	-516		
	Activity 5: Integrated Technology System	20,725	20,115	611		
	Activity 7: Public Information	27,371	26,741	630		
Activity 8: D & R Commission	177,741	404,517	-226,776			
GMS 7% [see donor agreement]		103,550	130,696	-27,146		
Subtotal [CIDA]		1,479,280	1,867,082	-387,803	126%	
TOTAL		8,689,933	8,460,971	228,962	97%	

*Remarks provided in the last column of this table should pertain to any notable aspects of utilization/delivery % vis-à-vis the relevant donor(s)