

United Nations Development Programme Afghanistan

Anti-Personnel Mine & Ammunition Stockpile Destruction (APMASD)

ANNUAL PROJECT REPORT 2008



Artillery rounded up from Onaba District in Panjshir Province in August.

Project ID: 00043536

Duration: December 2004 – January 2009

Strategic Plan Component: Crisis Prevention and Recovery

Total Budget: USD 21,510,508

Unfunded: Nil

Implementing Partners: Ministry of Defence, The HALO Trust, Weapons Removal and Abatement (WRA)

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Executive summary

The Anti-Personnel Mine and Ammunition Stockpile Destruction (APMASD) project made considerable progress in 2008 towards the expected outcomes and the outputs. Government institutions involved in APMASD were strengthened and able to provide greater security to many parts of Afghanistan by reducing the amount of mines and ammunition outside the Government's control.

The output on joint planning support to the Government was accomplished through the provision of technical assistance to the Ammunition Working Group, upgrading the Explosive Ordnance Disposal Frontline database, and preparing an exit strategy for the handover of all project responsibility to the Ministry of Defence (MoD) in January 2009.

The second output on identifying, moving, and destroying mines and ammunition was advanced by the Ammunition Survey Teams and the implementing partners. Most of the surveying and sorting of ammunition occurred in the northern and northeastern regions of Afghanistan due to security issues in other parts of the country. By the end of 2008, APMASD had surveyed in total nearly 37,000 metric tons of ammunition and destroyed approximately 20,000 metric tons. Over half a million anti-personnel mines have been destroyed, which significantly reduces the chances of dismemberment or death of the population.

The progress in APMASD for the year is due in great part to more effective communication and coordination among stakeholders, namely MoD, Afghanistan's New Beginning Programme (ANBP), and the implementing partners. Also, MoD's capacity for surveying ammunition, organising its transport, and collecting data was significantly enhanced by the training of Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (ATL) officers.

However, a few issues affected the implementation of APMASD. In particular, the unfavorable security situation in the South meant that no ammunition surveys occurred in that region. Also, the standoff with the governor of Panjshir continued, with the governor refusing to allow APMASD activities until ANBP's Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups (DIAG) project completed its work. Significant amounts of ammunition therefore remain outside of MoD control. Another issue arising during the year was the lack of policy from MoD for the destruction of serviceable ammunition that cannot be used with the current weapon delivery systems. Finally, the transfer of trained ATL officers to other posts within the ministry challenges the sustainability of APMASD activities after ANBP transfers all responsibility to the Government.

Technical and logistical support (as requested by MOD) from ANBP for mines and ammunition will continue under ANBP's DIAG project to ensure the smooth transition of APMASD into MoD hands. ANBP should ensure that effective lines of communication are established between MoD and the Ministry of Interior (Mol) for coordinating ammunition transfers under DIAG. ANBP can monitor the quality of this communication and cooperation between the two ministries. Additionally, the Ammunition Working Groups at central and regional levels should continue after ANBP hands over APMASD to MoD. These working groups have been highly effective at coordinating activities.

This annual report contains six sections. It begins with the background and context of APMASD, followed by a performance review focusing on progress, implementation, and project management. Next, the main results are highlighted along with implementation challenges. The fifth section delineates key lessons learned and recommendations for the project. The final section presents the financial status of the project and how funds have been utilised.

I. Context

Decades of armed conflict in Afghanistan left a legacy of vast quantities of anti-personnel mines (APMs) and ammunition. The presence of APMs and ammunition throughout the country poses a major threat to the security and well-being of the population. Significant amounts of explosive remnants are outside the control of the legitimate security forces and need to be brought under the Government's control. Moreover, a great deal of the loose ammunition is deemed surplus to requirements or does not match the current weapons systems used by the Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police. Securing this ammunition and destroying it will reduce the chances of it falling into the hands of insurgents.

The Anti-Personnel Mine and Ammunition Stockpile Destruction (APMASD) project was designed to alleviate the threat of explosive ordnance and enable the Government of Afghanistan to meet its treaty obligations of destroying all stockpiles of APMs under the Ottawa Convention. The objective of APMASD is to support strategic policy and planning for peace and stability in Afghanistan and to contribute to the establishment and maintenance of an enabling environment for development activities.

The project contributes to the achievement of Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS) benchmark 1.06 Mine Action and Ammunition.¹ APMASD supports the realization of the UNDAF Outcome 2 on Governance, Rule of Law and Human Rights² in cooperation with the United Nations Assistance Mission for Afghanistan (UNAMA) and the United Nations Mine Action Center for Afghanistan (UNMACA). Project resources have been applied toward the achievement of CPAP Outcome 2³ and CPAP Output 2.2⁴, and this is accomplished through the project's two outputs: (1) joint planning support to Government established and the capacity of Government to ensure compliance with international treaty obligations and enhanced community security through the destruction of anti-personnel mines and destruction/collection of other ordnance concentration; and (2) caches of APMs identified, moved and destroyed; legitimate ammunition stockpiles sorted; and actions taken to destroy unsafe ammunition and transfer serviceable ammunition under Government control.

The specific development challenge of the project is to build up the capacity of the Ministry of Defence (MoD) to survey, consolidate, and safely destroy or store ammunition stockpiles so that MoD can implement and manage these activities on its own. As the target for the capacity building, MoD is the primary beneficiary, but the whole population of Afghanistan benefits from a safer environment. The project is implemented in cooperation with MoD, Ministry of Interior (MoI), National Directorate of Security, UNMACA, HALO Trust, and Weapons Removal and Abatement (WRA). As a security sector reform initiative, APMASD stakeholders include communities

¹ ANDS Benchmark 1.06 Mine Action and Ammunition: By end-1389 (20 March 2011), in line with Afghanistan's Millennium Development Goals and Afghanistan's Ottawa Convention obligations, the land area contaminated by mines and unexploded ordnance will be reduced by 70%; all stockpiles of anti-personnel mines will be located and destroyed by end-1386 (20 March 2008); and by end-1389 (20 March 2011), all safe, unserviceable and surplus ammunition will be destroyed.

² UNDAF Outcome 2: By 2008, an effective, more accountable and more representative public administration is established at the national and sub-national levels, with improved delivery of services in an equitable, efficient and effective manner.

³ CPAP Outcome 2: The democratic state and government institutions strengthened at national and sub-national levels to govern and ensure the delivery of quality public services, including security, with special attention to marginalised groups.

⁴ CPAP Output 2.2: Law and order institutions at national and sub-national level strengthened and physical security of the population improved.

threatened by illegally stored ordnance and the international community interested in a stable Afghanistan.

II. Performance review

Progress review

1. Overall progress towards the CPAP outcome and output(s)

Rounding up APMs and ammunition from the previous security forces, Illegal Armed Groups (IAGs) and other sources and consolidating them under the control of MoD creates a safer, more stable security environment for the population. Additionally, the project's outputs strengthen the legitimacy of the State and its right to maintain a monopoly on force. In turn, a more secure and stable environment permits better delivery of public services. APMASD supports the achievement of the CPAP outcome and output in parallel with UNDP's Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups (DIAG) project, whereby ordnance acquired through the DIAG process is transferred to MoD via APMASD.

2. Capacity development

The Government's capacity was built up throughout 2008, particularly at MoD. Picking up from the previous year, ANBP continued training the designated staff of MoD on the use and maintenance of the Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Frontline database. Additionally, these staff members received English language and computer training to enhance their use of the database.

The core capacity building activity for the year commenced in June, whereby ANBP provided 28 Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (ATL) officers and two other MoD officers with a three-month training course on English, computer skills, data collection software (EOD Frontline), and technical aspects of ammunition surveys and safety standards. The implementing partner HALO Trust conducted the technical training, whereas the remaining topics were covered by ANBP. Sixteen of these ATL officers have been assigned to the ANBP regional offices and the remaining 14 to the central MoD office. Following the training in basic ammunition rules, regulations and safety procedures, the officers were to be re-integrated into the ANBP regional offices where they undergo on-the-job training (OJT) with ANBP Ammunition Survey Teams.

ANBP also provided capacity building for Ammunition Survey Teams, field officers and other ANBP staff. Early in 2008 ANBP hosted a workshop on standard operating procedures (SOPs) for ammunition collection. Furthermore, continued exposure to the day-to-day activities of APMASD has ensured the transfer of knowledge at the regional office level.

As a result of these capacity building initiatives, MoD is prepared to assume full control of the project at its closure in January 2009. As indicated in the exit strategy, ANBP will provide technical and logistical support as requested from MoD from that point onwards to facilitate continued success.

3. Impact on direct and indirect beneficiaries

MoD has benefitted greatly from the project's capacity building initiatives and is now capable of running the project on its own. Staff are equipped to carry out ammunition surveys, coordinate logistical arrangements for the safe transfer of ammunition by the implementing partners, and record the information into the database.

The indirect beneficiaries, namely the communities which were exposed to APMs and ammunition, are progressively safer with the removal and consolidation of ammunition under the control of MoD. Fewer lives will be lost to accidents due to stockpiles of mines and ammunition, and overall security is enhanced through the process of collecting APMs and ammunition from IAGs.

Implementation strategy review

1. Participatory/consultative processes

APMASD has continuously involved the various stakeholders in defining priorities, resolving operational issues, and coordinating activities. The Ammunition Working Group has been the main forum for engaging the stakeholders as no Steering Committee meetings have been convened since 2006. The Ammunition Working Group comprises MoD/Afghan National Army (ANA), the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), HALO Trust, WRA, UNMACA, the Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A), UNDP, and ANBP, and it holds meetings approximately two to four times a month to develop plans and coordinate operations. These frequent meetings ensure involvement of the major stakeholders in decision-making and resolving operational issues.

In the field, all operations are conducted jointly by teams comprised of MoD officers, implementing partners, and ANBP staff. MoD is involved in all the surveys and sorting of ammunition, and this is made possible by the advanced training for officers in the Afghan National Army.

2. Quality of partnerships

APMASD maintains excellent partnerships with oversight bodies and implementation organisations. The core partnership is between ANBP and MoD in terms of capacity building and knowledge transfer. ANBP and MoD have worked closely throughout the project at the planning level and implementation in the field. ANBP has effective implementation partnerships with HALO Trust and WRA for the identification, removal, and destruction of mines and ammunition. These strong relationships and active coordination are responsible for the smooth implementation of activities throughout 2008. Additionally, ANBP has an agreement with UNMACA for oversight, quality assurance, and accreditation of the implementing partners.

3. National ownership

MoD has always led APMASD in terms of defining strategy, identifying priorities, and delivering project outputs. National ownership is demonstrated in the Ammunition Working Group, which is chaired by General Hotak, the Chief of Logistics at MoD. Furthermore, MoD has been preparing itself to assume full control and responsibility for APMASD activities when the project closes by assigning officers for the various ANBP capacity building initiatives. MoD has indicated its readiness by approving the ANBP exit strategy for APMASD, which will turn over full control and responsibility to the Government.

4. Sustainability

Sustainability has been at the forefront of APMASD since the beginning. MoD has taken the lead in decision-making and made its staff available for capacity building. Also, the Ammunition Survey Teams have included MoD personnel to ensure their capabilities in carrying out the project's activities.

ANBP, at the request of MoD, will continue to provide technical assistance at the regional and central level, in addition to external monitoring of MoD personnel.

Management effectiveness review

1. Quality of monitoring

The central office of ANBP monitors the project in all its aspects. This includes oversight of the implementing partners, the Ammunition Survey Teams and recording statistics on ammunition collected and destroyed.

Regional Officer Managers (ROMs) and Ammunition Survey Team associates who initiate field assessments will monitor the progress of the trained ATL officers. The results will be passed to the central office of ANBP so that senior management is updated accordingly.

In early 2008 ANBP's Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) section completed the evaluation of APMASD that began in late 2007. The internal evaluation was necessary due to the late withdrawal of the selected external consultant. The evaluation highlighted several achievements and the key challenges facing the project. The evaluators put forth several recommendations such as additional capacity building for MoD, aligning APMASD with DIAG's timeline, and developing a consensus among stakeholders on the disposal of unsafe ammunition. The capacity building recommendation led to ANBP and MoD agreeing to a three-month training course for ATL officers in the field.

The Terms of Reference for an external evaluation were prepared and disseminated during the second quarter to MoD, the implementing partners, and the donors. The external evaluation was scheduled for the fourth quarter but encountered delays necessitating its postponement.

2. Timely delivery of outputs

The first output, joint planning support and compliance with international treaty obligations, was achieved through ANBP's continuous support to the Ammunition Working Group. ANBP organized the meetings, prepared the agendas, and provided technical assistance to MoD for identifying priorities and decision-making. The treaty obligations were achieved in late 2007 and were no longer relevant in 2008. The Annual Work Plan called for completing the project and transferring all control to the Government. The exit strategy enables ANBP to complete its role in the project and turn over all responsibility to the Government by the end of January 2009.

The second output, destroying APMs and transferring ammunition to government control, continued throughout 2008 at varying speeds. Work done by the survey teams slowed down during the harsh winter months, but efforts were redoubled in March and the subsequent months to make up for the slow pace.

The most notable exception to the second output is Panjshir Valley. Activities in Panjshir Valley ceased early in 2008 and the area has yet to be completely surveyed due to the governor of Panjshir not allowing simultaneous implementation of DIAG and APMASD. This region is known for its vast amounts of ammunition due to previous conflicts and is expected to produce considerable amounts of ammunition.

3. Resources allocation

The development activities of APMASD comprised 44.8% of the programmable budget in 2008. This proportion includes the two development activities: Anti-Personnel Mines and Ammunition Surveys and APM & Ammunition Collection / Transportation/ Security. The reason that development costs were lower than other costs combined is that APMASD's capacity building costs were budgeted under project management instead of allocated to the development activities.

4. Cost-effective use of inputs

APMASD resource utilisation achieved cost-effectiveness by sharing project management costs with DIAG. For the year, additional cost-effectiveness was achieved by minimising new capital purchases and renting space to ELECT at the ANBP regional offices.

However, project management costs for APMASD are relatively high and reduce cost-effectiveness of outputs. It is likely that some overhead costs need to be re-directed towards more APM and ammunition surveys, as the costs of finding caches of APMs and ammunition will likely increase as fewer and fewer caches exist.

III. Project results summary

Output 1 – Joint planning support to Government established and the capacity of Government to ensure compliance with international treaty obligations and enhance community security through destruction of anti-personnel mines and destruction/collection of other ordnance concentrations.

Activity 1.1 – Assistance to Ammunition Steering Committee to plan, coordinate policies and priorities and mobilise resources for the APM/ammunition programme.

No Ammunition Steering Committee meeting has taken place since August 2006 due to conflicting schedules of senior officials. A planned Steering Committee meeting for July 2008 had to be postponed because of the attack on the Indian Embassy. However, project issues have been handled by the Ammunition Working Group.

Activity 1.2 – Assistance to Ammunition Working Group for operational-level facilitation and implementation of APM/ammunition programme.

The Ammunition Working Group convened regularly during the year under the chairmanship of General Hotak, Chief of MoD Logistics Section. The Ammunition Working Group coordinates the implementing partners, handles operational matters, and formulates policies and priorities for the Steering Committee. ANBP backstopped these meetings by planning, providing technical assistance, and circulating minutes.

Activity 1.3 – Creation and maintenance of Government-owned ‘EOD Frontline’ database.

ANBP maintained and upgraded the EOD Frontline database while simultaneously providing capacity building to MoD for the transfer of the database at project’s end. MoD is now capable of operating and maintaining the database.

Activity 1.4 – Consultation and liaison with key government ministries.

Following Afghanistan’s compliance with the Ottawa Convention in 2007, ANBP’s activities have focused on MoD and Mol and no longer require liaison with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Engaging Mol remains important because of the ammunition recovered from illegal armed groups under the DIAG project. The recovered ammunition is transferred to MoD for sorting, collection, and destruction, if appropriate.

Activity 1.5 – Handover of all responsibility from ANBP to MoD.

ANBP’s exit strategy lays out the steps for transitioning APMASD to complete Government control and responsibility. The exit strategy contains four phases: (1) continue with capacity building for MoD; (2) on-the-job training for MoD’s ATL officers in the regional offices; (3) monitoring the

regional offices to ensure operational outputs; and (4) complete handover of operations and assets. The exit strategy is scheduled for completion by the end of January 2009, but the on-the-job training for ATL officers is likely to continue after that time. To ensure a smooth transition, ANBP will continue to offer technical support as required by MoD under Activity 2 (collecting weapons and ammunition) of the DIAG project.

Output 2 – Caches of APMs identified, moved and destroyed. Legitimate ammunition stockpiles sorted; actions taken to destroy unsafe ammunition and transfer good ammunition under Government control.

Activity 2.2⁵ – Implementation support to Government for identification of ammunition caches, destruction of APMs and movement/destruction of legitimate ordnance types.

The Ammunition Survey Teams in the regional offices assist MoD in the identification of ammunition caches and coordinating their transportation to safe locations. The implementing partners transport and destroy any APMs recovered and unserviceable ammunition, while MoD and ANBP verify the amounts moved and destroyed. Serviceable stocks of ammunition are transported to MoD ammunition sites using ANBP vehicles from the regional offices.

Activity 2.3 – All APM and ammunition stocks and caches surveyed for APMs (illegitimate ordnance) and other ordnance types in varied condition.

The Ammunition Survey Teams and ANBP’s implementing partners surveyed 2,779 caches since the start of APMASD until the end of 2008. These caches have been sorted, and the serviceable and legitimate ammunition have been consolidated. All stocks of APM found in these caches have been destroyed.

Activity 2.4 – Provision of ammunition survey teams to meet operational tempo.

ANBP provided seven Ammunition Survey Teams to conduct surveys as well as for the oversight and coordination of ordnance transportation. The teams are comprised of an ANA/MoD team leader, an ANA/MoD deputy team leader, an ANBP international advisor, an ANBP associate/translator, implementing partners’ staff (HALO Trust and WRA), and drivers. The actual destruction of ordnance is done by the implementing partners.



Ammunition turned over to ANBP in Baghlan, February 2008

Activity 2.6⁶ – Ammunition stockpiles sorted, legitimate ammunition in serviceable condition moved and stored under central Government control in Ammunition Consolidation Points. Stockpiles of APMs and ammunition deemed unsafe destroyed.

The Ammunition Survey Teams assessed and sorted numerous caches of ammunition in 2008, with most of the activity occurring in the northern and northeastern regions. Usable ammunition was transferred to regional Ammunition Consolidation Points and then onwards to permanent

⁵ In order to align with the activity numbering in the original project document, there is no Activity 2.1 under Output 2.

⁶ Activity 2.5 on international advisory and oversight capacity established was completed earlier in the project.

MoD sites. Unserviceable ammunition and APMs were destroyed in the field. Due to the security situation, no caches of ammunition were surveyed or collected in the southern provinces in 2008. Table 1 below summarizes the achievements made in 2008 and the cumulative totals.

Table 1. Mine and ammunition collected and destroyed

Item	2008	Cumulative
Number of ammo caches surveyed	598 ⁷	2,779
Tonnage of ammo surveyed	1,262	36,896
Tonnage of ammo moved	100	9,671
Tonnage of ammo destroyed	2,362	21,069
Number of APMs destroyed	62,441	505,125
Number of anti-tank mines destroyed	1,214	22,536

It should be noted that the amount of ammunition surveyed does not necessarily exceed the amount of ammunition destroyed because of the gap between the time ammunition is surveyed and the time until it is destroyed. Some of the ammunition destroyed in 2008 had been surveyed in 2007.

Activity 2.8⁸ – Provision of detailed and timely information related to APM destruction to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs via UNMACA.

ANBP provided monthly reports on APM destruction to UNMACA.

Activity 2.10⁹ – In the final months, completion of full transfer from ANBP to MoD with APMASD staff, services and equipment made redundant.

As noted earlier, ANBP developed an exit strategy to prepare MoD for the complete transfer of APMASD in January 2009. The exit strategy delineates how ANBP will continue to provide guidance and mentoring to MoD on the implementation of APMASD after the transfer.

IV. Implementation challenges

Project risks and actions

Security

The security situation is unfavorable in many parts of the country, and this inhibits the conduct of ammunition surveys and transportation of ordnance. Even areas in which APMASD activities were initiated are subject to security conditions, as seen in the suspension of activities in Logar and Gardez provinces. As a result of some areas being inaccessible, APMASD focused its efforts in areas that are suitable for the project's activities. ANBP staff were affected by two armed incidents in mid-2008, one involving an ANBP DIAG convoy and the other an APMASD mission. In response, ANBP revised the SOPs for emergency cases and risk management, along with other measures such as strengthening the warden system, restocking trauma kits, and having staff complete the Safer and Secure Access to Field Environment and communication training.

⁷ If DIAG ammunition surveys are included, the total for 2008 would be 970.

⁸ Activity 2.7 on obligations under the Ottawa Convention was achieved in 2007.

⁹ Activity 2.9 on clearing toxic Scud missile fuel was completed in 2007.

Transfer of ATL officers (sustainability)

Some of the ATL officers from MoD who were trained under APMASD have been reassigned to other, non-related duties at MoD. ANBP has been negotiating with MoD to prevent trained ATL officers from being reassigned with positive results.

Panjshir Valley

The governor of Panjshir is resolute that APMASD activities cannot commence until all DIAG activities are completed. Furthermore, he disputes the rightful ownership of the ammunition, thereby preventing the collection of ammunition in the province. This stalemate leaves one of Afghanistan's largest remaining caches of ammunition (and possibly APMs) outside of MoD's control. The top level of government will attempt to negotiate with the Panjshir governor on allowing access to the ammunition caches.

Top level guidance and decision-making

Several attempts were made to convene a Steering Committee meeting in 2008. The lack of a Steering Committee in 2007 and again in 2008 could preclude oversight and decision-making at the highest level. Nonetheless, all stakeholders agree that the issues facing the project were adequately dealt with at the Ammunition Working Group meetings. The absence of a Steering Committee meeting does not appear to have affected the implementation and coordination of the project activities.

Project issues and actions

Project mandate

The Government, UNDP and the donor community agreed to extend ANBP from May 2008 to March 2009. Although the extension was granted until March 2009, ANBP and the Government decided to close the project at the end of January due to the budget and readiness of the Government to assume full responsibility.

Unusable ammunition

Due to the wide variety of weapons systems used by combatants in Afghanistan over the decades, several types of ammunition collected under APMASD cannot be used with current weapons systems of the Afghan National Army. Nonetheless, MoD lacks a policy to destroy such ammunition. MoD is not inclined to destroy serviceable ammunition of which the Afghan Defence Forces do not have a weapon delivery system. This issue is currently being addressed at the Ammunition Working Group and a positive outcome is expected to occur in the near future. NATO has also expressed interest in helping to resolve this issue.

Safety/communication

Safety was at the forefront of APMASD throughout the year. Sorting and transporting mines and ammunition is extremely dangerous and technical work requiring highly skilled professionals. Various steps related to communication were taken to enhance safety in APMASD. First, an increase in the number of regional Ammunition Working Group meetings took place in 2008 to foster better communication among the stakeholders and implementing partners, namely ANBP, UNMACA, HALO Trust, and WRA. Second, ANBP and UNMACA coordinated their central plans and respective tasks for cleaning up mine and ammunition sites. Third, greater communication occurred between ANBP and the implementing partners to ensure ANBP was aware of the field activities undertaken by the implementing partners. More frequent and effective communication aided the clearing of sites with ordnance and ensured a high record of safety.

V. Lessons learnt and next steps

Lessons learnt

A key lesson learned during the year is the importance of strong communication among stakeholders and implementing partners to improve safety. As noted above, several actions were taken to improve communication, and as a result, no accidents occurred related to APMASD during the year.

Also related to safety is the sequence for exposing MoD officers to APMs and ammunition. Complete training for handling ammunition before officers encounter APMs and ammunition in the field has been a successful approach for ensuring safety.

Training is most appropriate during the winter months, whereas operations are best conducted in the spring and summer months. Afghanistan's harsh winters cause ammunition collection to decline considerably, whereas the warmer months experience a higher operational tempo. Thus, in order to increase efficiencies, training should occur in winter months.

Another lesson is that assurances should be given from ministries that officers involved in capacity building programmes will work in the relevant jobs that the training intends to address. The experience with MoD and the trained ATL officers who were transferred to other roles shows the importance of receiving a commitment from the government so that the training is not wasted.

Recommendations

Technical support from ANBP for APMs and ammunition will continue under the DIAG project to ensure the smooth transition of APMASD into MoD hands. Additional technical assistance to MoD could come under DIAG's Activity 2: Weapons and Ammunition Collection. A related recommendation is for ANBP to ensure that effective lines of communication are established between MoD and MoI for coordinating ammunition transfers under DIAG. ANBP can monitor the quality of this communication and cooperation between the two ministries.

As MoD will be responsible for APMASD after January 2009, the ministry should formally adopt ANBP's SOPs and methods for ammunition surveying and transportation.

Finally, the Ammunition Working Groups have served as effective forums for the stakeholders at the central and regional levels. The regions are able to articulate their requirements through the Ammunition Working Groups, and the stakeholders can coordinate effectively and deal with policy issues. The Ammunition Working Groups should therefore continue after ANBP turns over full responsibility for APMASD.

VI. Financial status and utilization

Financial status

Table 2: Contribution overview [2004 – December 2008]

DONOR	CONTRIBUTIONS		CONTRIBUTION
	Committed	Received	
Canada	5,132,038	5,132,038	-
CIDA	1,472,031	1,472,031	-
Netherlands	2,409,639	2,409,599	40
UK	3,000,000	3,000,000	-
EC	1,785,605	1,785,605	-
EC	7,633,588	6,400,000	1,233,588
Norway	317,965	317,965	-
UNDP Core Fund	493,270	493,270	-
Ministry of Finance	500,000	500,000	-
Total	22,744,136	21,510,508	1,233,628

Table 3: Funding status (as of the end of 2008)

DONOR NAME	RECEIVED	EXPENDITURES		TOTAL	PROJECT BALANCE	EARMARKED	AVAILABLE FUNDING (As of 1 Jan 2009)	REMARKS
		Period Prior to the Reporting Year (2004 - 2007)	Reporting Year Only (2008)					
Canada	5,132,038	4,360,172	341,404	4,701,576	430,462	-	430,462	-
CIDA 550	1,472,031		2,004,156	2,004,156	(532,125)		(532,125)	
EC UNMAS	1,785,605	1,703,713	-	1,703,713	81,892	-	81,892	-
EC	6,400,000	2,945,089	726,448	3,671,537	2,728,463	-	2,728,463	-
MoF	500,000	476,190	-	476,190	23,810	-	23,810	-
UK	3,000,000	2,772,574	136,167	2,908,742	91,258	-	91,258	-
Norway	317,965	94,277	179,749	274,025	43,940	-	43,940	-
Netherlands	2,409,599	749,783	1,652,028	2,401,811	7,788	-	7,788	-
UNDP-12	493,270	477,671		477,671	15,599	-	15,599	-
TOTAL	21,510,508	13,579,468	5,039,952	18,619,421	2,891,087	-	2,891,087	-

Negative figures will be adjusted in the next budget revision. The figures in Table 3 are only preliminary. The Combined Delivery Report (CDR) released in April will provide the official expenditure figures. Also, Table 3 does not include the General Management Support costs for UNDP, which is why the expenditures and balance in Table 3 do not match those of Table 4 below.

Financial utilization

Table 4: Annual expenditure by activity [1 January – 31 December 2008]

Activity	BUDGET [2008]	EXPENDITURES	BALANCE	DELIVERY (%)
Activity 1 [Project Management]	3,296,087	2,809,840	486,247	85%
Activity 2 [Anti-Personnel Mines (APM's) / Ammunition Survey]	801,209	452,710	348,499	57%

Activity 3 [APM & Ammunition Collection / Transportation/ Security]	2,293,953	1,635,696	658,257	71%
Activity 5 [Integrated Technology Systems]	513,934	141,706	372,228	28%
UNDP GMS 5% (based on donor agreements)	291,024	159,779	131,245	55%
UNDP GMS 7% (based on donor agreements)	103,550	150,850	-47,301	146%
Total	7,299,756	5,350,582	1,949,175	73%

Negative figures will be adjusted in the next budget revision. The figures in Table 4 are only preliminary. The Combined Delivery Report (CDR) released in April will provide the official figures.

Table 5: Annual expenditure by donor [1 January – 31 December 2008]

DONORS	ACTIVITY (as in ATLAS)	BUDGET [2007]	EXPENDITURES	BALANCE	DELIVERY RATE (%)	REMARKS
Canada	Activity 1: Project M	461,859	442,896	18,963	78%	
	Activity 2: Anti-Per	52,546	10,551	41,995		
	Activity 3: APM &	131	131	0		
	Activity 5: Integrate	-74,402	-112,174	37,772		
	GMS 5% [see donor agreement]	23,165	17,969	5,196		
	Subtotal [Canada]	463,299	359,373	103,926		
CIDA	Activity 1: Project M	754,421	1,078,912	-324,491	146%	
	Activity 2: Anti-Per	166,998	215,278	-48,280		
	Activity 3: APM &	371,632	622,028	-250,395		
	Activity 5: Integrate	82,679	87,939	-5,260		
	GMS 7% [see donor agreement]	103,550	150,850	-47,301		
	Subtotal [CIDA]	1,479,280	2,155,006	-675,726		
Netherlands	Activity 1: Project M	801,240	949,302	-148,062	103%	
	Activity 2: Anti-Per	178,517	157,070	21,447		
	Activity 3: APM &	463,480	498,457	-34,977		
	Activity 5: Integrate	155,144	47,199	107,945		
	GMS 5% [see donor agreement]	84,125	86,949	-2,824		
	Subtotal [Netherlands]	1,682,506	1,738,977	-56,470		
UK	Activity 1: Project M	105,048	106,623	-1,575	102%	
	Activity 2: Anti-Per	7,641	7,641	0		
	Activity 3: APM &	20,798	23,783	-2,985		
	Activity 5: Integrate	404	-1,880	2,284		
	GMS 5% [see donor agreement]	7,047	7,167	-120		
	Subtotal [UK]	140,938	143,334	-2,396		
EC	Activity 1: Project M	1,172,383	230,971	941,412	23%	
	Activity 2: Anti-Per	391,289	57,952	333,337		
	Activity 3: APM &	1,362,762	434,429	928,333		
	Activity 5: Integrate	222,065	3,097	218,968		
	GMS 5% [see donor agreement]	165,710	38,234	127,476		
	Subtotal [EC]	3,314,210	764,683	2,549,527		
Norway	Activity 1: Project M	1,136	1,136	0	86%	
	Activity 2: Anti-Per	4,218	4,218	0		
	Activity 3: APM &	75,149	56,869	18,280		
	Activity 5: Integrate	128,044	117,526	10,518		
	GMS 5% [see donor agreement]	10,976	9,460	1,516		
	Subtotal [Norway]	219,523	189,209	30,314		
	TOTAL	7,299,756	5,350,582	1,949,175	73%	