

United Nations Development Programme Afghanistan
Enhancing Legal and Electoral Capacity for Tomorrow (ELECT)
Annual Progress Report – 2010



Voter, Afghan Parliamentary Elections, 18 September 2010, photograph courtesy of UNAMA

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ANDS Component:	Governance, Rule of Law and Human Rights
Total Budget:	USD 327 million
Responsible Agency:	Independent Electoral Commission, Electoral Complaints Commission

Enhancing Legal and Electoral Capacity for Tomorrow

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List of Acronyms

ANDS	Afghanistan National Development Strategy
ANSF	Afghan National Security Forces
CPAP	Country Programme Action Plan
DFC	District Field Coordinator
ECC	Electoral Complaints Commission
ELECT	Enhancing Legal and Electoral Capacity for Tomorrow
EUPOL	European Union Police Mission in Afghanistan
IDLG	Independent Directorate of Local Governance
IEC	Independent Electoral Commission
IFES	International Foundation for Electoral Systems
IOM	International Organisation for Migration
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
JEMB	Joint Electoral Management Body
PC	Polling Centre
PS	Polling Station
PSA	Public Service Announcement
SCR	Security Council Resolution
SRSG	Special Representative of the Secretary General
UNAMA	United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan
UNDAF	United Nations Development Assistance Framework
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
VR	Voter Registration

Executive Summary

This report provides an overview of the actions and achievements of UNDP ELECT from 1 January to 31 December 2010.

UNDP ELECT shares and contributes to the goals set out in the Afghan National Development Strategy (ANDS)¹, supporting the “strengthening of democratic processes and institutions, human rights, the rule of law, delivery of public services and government accountability.”

Since its inception in 2006, UNDP ELECT priorities have been revised² to better accommodate Afghanistan’s changing needs, challenges, capacities and assistance framework.

Drawing from lessons learned in past elections, UNDP ELECT supported Afghan electoral management bodies³ to organize and conduct the 2010 *Wolesi Jirga* (Parliamentary) Elections amid particularly challenging circumstances.

Throughout the election process United Nations Special Representative of the Secretary General, Steffan de Mistura was emphatic that while elections would not be perfect, they could very possibly be “better” than previous elections.

Election results have since been certified and publicly announced by Afghanistan’s Independent Electoral Commission (IEC); and recognized – officially and publicly – by stakeholders. While the process faced serious challenges, it is widely recognized to have been *better*. Key results include:

- **Result 1. More effective electoral support**

Locations of polling stations were confirmed ahead of time; materials procured, delivered and retrieved on time; and stakeholders better informed and assistance coordinated so that strategies, approaches, activities and statements were complementary. Overlap in assistance was avoided and the benefits of assistance were maximized.

¹ Articulated in the United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) in Support to the Afghan National Development Strategy; Country Programme Action Plan (CPAP); and UNDP Strategic Plan for 2008 – 2011

² 2006, 2008, 2009

³ Primarily the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) and the Electoral Complaints Commission (ECC)

- **Result 2. Better elections, technically and operationally**

In conducting elections, national authorities were more transparent; cases of fraud scrupulously investigated and addressed; and decided effort made to keep stakeholders informed throughout the entirety of the process. These factors, in and of themselves, indicate a significant level of progress in Afghanistan's democratic governance and – more specifically – in building and sustaining Afghan capacity.

- **Result 3. Increased Afghan leadership, visibility and responsibility**

In 2010, UNDP ELECT kept a low profile, limiting the scope of its assistance to technical and operational support. The lower profile of UNDP ELECT elicited a proactive approach from Afghan electoral authorities. Afghan electoral management bodies – primarily the Independent Electoral Commission and Electoral Complaints Commission – were responsible and accountable for the entire electoral process. Not only were they responsible for all key decisions; they served as both national and international spokespeople, making statements and briefing the media (independently of UNDP ELECT), and providing international stakeholders with regular information updates. Crucially, Afghan bodies were widely perceived and acknowledged to have fulfilled this role.

- **Result 4. Commitment of Afghan electoral management bodies to address fraud**

For the first time – and marking one of the main successes in Afghan's democratic history – impunity was addressed wherever it was found, consistently and without bias. Afghan electoral management bodies determined to fulfil their mandate, in accord with law and without bias. Independent but strong, the IEC and ECC acted complementarily; presenting a united front; and maintaining transparency both with the international community and with the public, at large. In spite of threat and intimidation, both authorities stood behind their decisions to address impunity and continue to do so. The commitment of electoral authorities to address fraud and inconsistencies thoroughly and without bias is testament to the will to develop credible electoral processes in Afghanistan.

I. Context

The primary objective of United Nations electoral assistance to Afghanistan is to support the efforts of Afghan electoral authorities to prepare and conduct credible elections in an insecure and socio-politically unstable environment. This objective is based on the assumption that credible leadership and strong institutions are necessary for stability and a precursor to reconstruction and development.

UNDP ELECT⁴ has been the main vehicle through which the international community has supported Afghan electoral authorities to plan and conduct the 2009 and 2010 elections.

In 2010, following a third substantive review, UNDP ELECT supported the preparation and conduct of the Parliamentary (*Wolesi Jirga*) elections. Specifically, UNDP ELECT supported Afghanistan's Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) and Electoral Complaints Commission (ECC) IEC through the provision of technical and operational assistance; and long-term capacity building.

Widespread fraud and allegations of irregularity had significantly undermined the 2009 Presidential and Provincial Council elections and raised serious doubts among stakeholders as to the viability of 2010 *Wolesi Jirga* elections. Both the UN Assistance Mission to Afghanistan (UNAMA) and UNDP ELECT had been perceived as implicitly responsible for the 2009 election process and were therefore widely blamed for its defects.

Compounding the situation, an attack on *Bakhatar* (a guesthouse predominantly occupied by UNDP ELECT staff in October 2009 led to a dramatic reduction of international staff and capacity.

At the start of 2010, the legal framework, election date, potential reforms to the IEC, structure of the ECC, role of the UN, and level of international support to the process had not been ascertained.

On 18 February, a presidential decree was signed, amending some provisions of the 2005 Electoral Law. The decree, *inter alia*, decentralized and "Afghanised" the Electoral Complaints Commission (ECC) and would see the appointment of five Commissioners, directly by the President. There were strong reactions to the decree, but in the absence of

⁴Established in 2006 at the request of the Afghan Joint Electoral Management Board (JEMB) and the Post-Elections Strategy Group

parliamentary approval, it remained unclear which electoral framework - the 2005 law or 2010 decree - would define the parameters of the 2010 elections.

Following a formal request to the UN by President Hamid Karzai in mid-March, support to the electoral process was included in *UN Security Council Resolution (SCR) 1917, 2010*, allowing for the continuation of the UNDP ELECT, in a revised form. The SCR mandated UNAMA to provide “technical assistance, coordinating other international donors, agencies and organizations providing assistance and channelling existing and additional funds earmarked to support the process.”

Following pressure from both national and international stakeholders, all five members of the ECC (including two internationals) were appointed by President Karzai; and IEC leadership was replaced with a new Chairman and Chief Electoral Officer in a decree dated 18 April 2010 – just 153 days prior to polling day.

In May, the SRSB issued guidelines for conduct within the electoral process. These guidelines emphasised the shared responsibility of all Afghans and the international community to ensure that elections strengthen Afghanistan’s democratic institutions and that all those involved:

“...must therefore adhere to the existing legal framework, including the Constitution, the Electoral Law, and all regulations, procedures and policies issued by the Afghan Independent Electoral Commission.”⁵

In the same month, a revised ELECT Project Document was approved by the Project Board, providing a strategic framework and specific objectives.

In the light of serious challenges and an extremely limited timeframe, the likelihood that Parliamentary elections could be better than those held the previous year were precarious.

By drawing on existing contractual agreements, accelerating procedures, and coordinating the activities of stakeholders to maximise benefits; UNDP ELECT supported the technical and operational preparation of national electoral bodies for Election Day.

⁵ Essential Guidelines Applicable to Conduct During the Electoral Process: Issued by the Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General for Afghanistan, 3 May 2010

Equally important, UNDP ELECT held frequent and frank discussions with stakeholders and spoke with a singular voice, through the SRSG to ensure clarity and strength of messaging.

National electoral bodies were committed to address fraud, consistently and without bias. Underlining this fact, the IEC and ECC made regular presentations of progress; sharing their challenges and opportunities with the international community and maintaining open dialogue. These elements were critical in establishing an atmosphere of partnership and trust and are widely considered a best practice.

Predictably, addressing fraud has elicited notable backlash. Not all players have been pleased by the final election results and some have attempted to use complaints lodged by losing candidates as a means to suggest that elections were flawed and/or fraudulent. A Special Court has since been established by the Office of the Attorney General, solely to continue investigation of winning candidates and, specifically, to target the IEC and ECC. Some consider this a way to maintain control over a Parliament that could otherwise counter the vision of the President.

On the other hand, throughout the entire electoral process and to date, the international community has been vocal and unwavering in its support of Afghan electoral bodies and its confidence in their commitment to conduct elections that are free from fraud and manipulation.

II. Results and Impact

Output 1: Support to the IEC to conduct a limited voter registration top-up as required for the 2010 election; and capacity-building through the provision of technical and operational assistance for the 2010 election

Indicators

In a limited voter registration top-up, the IEC registered 377,197 voters throughout all the provinces in Afghanistan. Of these 55% were male; 40% female; and 5% Kuchi.

Within the candidate nomination period, 2,667 candidates nominated themselves. Sixteen percent (16%) of these were female.

The IEC registered almost 270,586 candidate agents and observers, 31% of whom were female.

All voter registration materials (342 metric tonnes) were procured and delivered according to schedule.

In two notable instances, at the request of donors, ELECT extended the scope of its activities, beyond its mandate to accommodate challenges that might otherwise have undermined the 2010 electoral process. First, to encourage the participation of women in elections, ELECT paid the salaries of 7,545 female body searchers, identified by Afghanistan’s Independent Directorate of Local Governance (IDLG). Second, acknowledging precarious security conditions, ELECT funded the publication of a training manual for use by the European Union Police Mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL) in preparing additional Afghan security forces for Election Day.

The IEC conducted the *Wolesi Jirga* elections, as scheduled, on 18 September 2010. In spite of threats and a number of violent acts, 5,497 (95%) of polling centres were opened and an approximate 4.2 million voters cast their ballots. Of these, 59% were men; 39% women; and 2% Kuchi.

The public announcement of preliminary poll results was delayed (from 9 October as originally cited, to 20 October). Rather than being viewed as a fault, however, this evidenced the commitment of the IEC to thoroughly scrutinize results and to ensure both the accuracy and transparency of the tally process.

Predictably, some observers (including popular media) have been sceptical throughout the process. Nonetheless, it has been widely acknowledged that – at the very least in terms of administration – 2010 elections have been better organized than others in the post-Bonn era.

Target 2010: Support to the IEC to conduct a limited voter registration top-up as required for the 2010 election; and capacity-building through the provision of technical and operational assistance for the 2010 election		
Activity Result	Description of Results/Achievement	% Delivery
1.1 Facilitate the IEC to deploy temporary staff to carry	Procedures for recruitment of <i>Wolesi Jirga</i> elections staff were adopted and recruitment executed through a centralized database, to reduce opportunities for influence peddling and nepotism. To this end, ELECT supported the IEC to deploy Voter Registration	100%

out voter registration and <i>Wolesi Jirga</i> elections, by providing salaries and other staff payments.	Teams; Voter Educators; District Field Coordinators; Polling and Contingency Staff. Payment of staff salaries was interrupted only when Kabul Bank went into receivership, which led to a temporary delay in disbursement to the provinces.	
1.2 Support procedures, delivery and retrieval of assets, materials and logistical supplies for the voter registration top-up process and <i>Wolesi Jirga</i> elections.	Plans designed by the IEC and ELECT laid the foundation for the efficient procurement of materials and swift delivery to the field. With support from ELECT, the IEC was able to access and deliver voter registration kits, information packs and candidate nomination materials to all provinces; as well as contingency materials where necessary. With exception of six provinces, retrieval of electoral materials proceeded according to plan.	100%
1.3 Support to IEC to design and deliver appropriate training to voter registration and election workers.	On the basis of an IEC Training Plan, the electoral body trained provincial staff in candidate nomination procedures; conducted training for District Field Coordinators; Voter Educators, Polling and Contingency Staff. All Headquarters staff received training in gender sensitization.	100%
1.4 Provide technical and operational assistance to enable IEC upgrade its	The IEC data centre received server and software upgrades, including three new database applications (delimitation, quality control, and voter registration management modules). By June, the data centre had helped to complete the candidate nomination database; generate candidate nomination statistics;	100%

<p>Data Centre IT, software systems and capacity.</p>	<p>enter voter registry forms outstanding from the 2008/09 registration; enter candidate financial and asset information; complete development of application and establish systems for ballot entry; and update candidate nomination database with ballot order. In total, 4,733,961 voter registry forms (including 195,222 from the 2010 voter registry) were processed. In August, the data centre was reconfigured to operate as a tally centre with workstations for clerks and reconciliation and audit teams.</p>	
<p>1.5 Support IEC to plan and implement awareness-raising public outreach campaigns for voter registration and <i>Wolesi Jirga</i> elections.</p>	<p>Differently than the previous year, when outreach focused on print materials, great emphasis was placed on TV Public Service Announcements and film documentaries; radio PSAs and soap operas - specifically targeting women. In addition to these, the IEC was assisted to communicate through mobile theatre, to erect billboards and sign posts and – importantly – a toll-free call centre for voters to ask questions regarding the voting process and procedures. As a result, more than 95% of votes cast were valid.</p>	<p>100%</p>
<p>1.6 Support implementation of security safeguards for personnel and sensitive electoral materials.</p>	<p>As a standard procedure, Election Security Risk analysis was implemented, to better understand the nature and magnitude of threats, vulnerabilities and risks associated with the electoral process. A Security Concept of Operations and Plan was reviewed and endorsed by the Joint command as a framework for electoral security assistance. In addition, two ISAF Officers were embedded into the IEC to serve as direct links between the IEC and ANSF/ISAF Joint Command. Security arrangements for supporting the Candidate Nomination process were identified and communicated to ANSFs who provided escort services, as required. The provisional list of polling</p>	<p>100%</p>

	centres for the <i>Wolesi Jirga</i> election was shared with Afghan National Security Forces and ISAF; and assessments were received well before Election Day.	
1.7 Support to provide salaries for Media Commission Temporary Staff.	Provisions for Media Centre salaries were incorporated to the ELECT basket fund; and commission activities were executed by nine national staff and one international consultant.	100%
1.8 Support IEC to plan and conduct external relations events about the electoral process.	A comprehensive external relations strategy was adopted by the IEC and a formal Information Dissemination Plan revised and finalized in august. An on-site Media Centre was constructed and – apart from interviews, TV and radio events to communicate key messages – the IEC was proactive in holding Press Conferences throughout the election process, keeping both national and international media informed.	100%

Output 2: Capacity-building through technical and operational support to the ECC, to manage its responsibilities in the conduct of the 2010 election

Indicators

In response to very late changes to Afghanistan’s Electoral Law, UNDP ELECT supported the establishment of 35 ECC offices in 34 provinces; secured premises; procured equipment to locations throughout Afghanistan; hired and trained 600; and deployed Technical Advisors to all regions – in less than three months and well before Election Day.

During the candidate nomination period, the ECC received and addressed 432 challenges.

Before Election Day, 1,452 complaints had been received by the ECC and PECCs; and the majority had been adjudicated by polling day.

From Election Day to the last day on which electoral complaints were accepted, the ECC/PECCs received and adjudicated 7,850 complaints. Of these, 73 were referred to the

Attorney General’s Office for prosecution; and an additional six IEC officials referred to the AGO for prosecution and electoral fraud.

Target 2010: Capacity-building through technical and operational support to the ECC, to manage its responsibilities in the conduct of the 2010 election		
Activity Result	Description of Results/Achievement	% Delivery
2.1 Facilitate ECC to recruit qualified staff to carry out its Headquarters and provincial office functions.	The ECC Headquarters arbitrated challenges to candidate nominations. By July, Provincial Commissioners and support staff had been recruited with additional staff following in September, to accommodate anticipated need surrounding and following Election Day. ELECT supported this process through a contracted agent, specializing in human resourcing.	100%
2.2 Support the procurement and/or establishment of infrastructure, equipment, logistical supplies, IT and other facilities required for ECC functioning.	Logistic and operational requirements of the ECC were incorporated to ELECT Procurement Planning for 2010. Various and services were procured for the ECC, including field office rental, generators, vehicles, IT and other office equipment as well as maintenance fees. All offices were fully equipped and functioning.	100%
2.3 Support ECC to undertake public	ELECT supported the ECC to prepare a budget, strategy, broadcast schedule, and procurement documents for its public outreach campaign. Ultimately, radio and TV public service	100%

<p>outreach activities and events to improve public awareness about its functions, powers and procedures.</p>	<p>announcements were broadcast on a network of local and national stations; five different fact sheets were disseminated directly to the public and through the ECC website; and a series of public seminars were held for candidates and candidate agents. The ECC intensified its media conferences in the lead to and after polling.</p>	
<p>2.4 Support ECC in training temporary staff.</p>	<p>Trainings were held for ECC Headquarters staff, Investigators and Adjudicators. Many newly acquired skills were passed on to other provincial staff in cascade-style training, which was very closely monitored by National Commissioners.</p>	<p>100%</p>
<p>2.5 Support the ECC to establish security measures for its staff and facilities.</p>	<p>A Security Risk Assessment was carried out at the ECC Headquarters in March and necessary upgrades were implemented accordingly. A Security Analyst was embedded within the ECC to help undertake a risk assessment and mitigation measures, for the period leading up to and after elections. Provincial offices were assessed routinely and necessary upgrades implemented throughout the process.</p>	<p>100%</p>

Output 3: Support to long-term electoral reform and capacity-building of the electoral management bodies

Indicators

As the mandate for the ELECT project comes to an end, questions regarding post-ELECT international electoral support are of increasing interest and UNDP has been in close consultation with the IEC and other stakeholders on the matter.

Distinct from the first two outputs, which are operational, support to electoral reform is more ephemeral, occurring through ELECT’s capacity building approach, as skills were transferred to Afghans and practiced in each stage of implementation. Any substantive

electoral reform can occur only after elections and not as a direct result of ELECT activities but by extension and as a result of increased human capacity.

Major donors have expressed consensus on continuing to support the electoral authorities through a UNDP-managed basket-fund and an associated UNDP-led electoral assistance project. The IEC also welcomed the possibility of receiving continued support through a UNDP-managed electoral fund and technical assistance project.

At the request of stakeholders, UNDP ELECT drafted a concept note on future international electoral assistance in Afghanistan as a basis for discussion and planning.

The main long-term objectives of support in future project planning include:

- Allow the IEC to maintain a critical mass of technical and operational capacity during the post-electoral period, avoiding the loss of technical and operational know-how;
- Ensure electoral authorities consolidate and extend their capacity to prepare and conduct credible elections;
- Assist the IEC in becoming increasingly sustainable in terms of funding and technical/operational expertise; and
- Support electoral authorities, and other stakeholders, in providing substantive input into the electoral reform agenda, as required.

A subsequent international electoral assistance project should envisage long-term assistance to Afghan electoral authorities, and prioritise institutional strengthening and capacity consolidation. Special emphasis should be given to the sustainability of the electoral institution and its strengthened capacity to prepare and conduct elections in the future, gradually decreasing dependence on international support. As such, it will also act as a major vehicle for continued support, both financial and technical, to the IEC and any other electoral authority established in the period (such as an ECC, for example).

Target 2010: Support to long-term electoral reform and capacity-building of the electoral management bodies		
Activity Result	Description of Results/Achievement	% Delivery

<p>3.1 Advise IEC Commissioners and Secretariat on electoral policy development, issues analysis, and ethical (evidence-based) decision-making.</p>	<p>ELECT Technical Advisors were embedded in critical IEC Secretariat departments to support the conduct of the <i>Wolesi Jirga</i> process. By June, the IEC had adopted robust anti-fraud measures based on four principles: Highest quality materials; Strict controls on movement and handling of sensitive materials; Procedures that discourage fraud and ensure its detection; and Maximum transparency. Fraud detection measures embedded in the tally centre were vigorously implemented by IEC leadership. Detecting key triggers, the IEC ordered the audit and recount of 1,063 polling centres – approximately one fifth of the polling centres that opened on polling day.</p>	<p>100%</p>
<p>3.2 Provide technical assistance to review the legal and institutional framework for Afghan elections and inform a long-term electoral reform agenda.</p>	<p>A Legal Advisor was recruited to assist electoral authorities and build capacity to enable future electoral reform.</p>	<p>100%</p>
<p>3.3 Support IEC to undertake strategic planning process to inform the post-2010 Concept of Operations.</p>	<p>At the request of major donors, a Concept Note, drafted by ELECT's Chief Technical Advisor guided discussions of post-ELECT support to Afghan electoral authorities. In principle, stakeholders have expressed support for a project that would have as objectives:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Allow the IEC to maintain a critical mass of technical and operational capacity during the post-electoral period, avoiding the loss of technical and operational know-how; • Ensure electoral authorities consolidate and extend their capacity to prepare and conduct credible elections; 	<p>100%</p>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Assist the IEC in becoming increasingly sustainable in terms of funding and technical/operational expertise; and • Support electoral authorities, and other stakeholders, in providing substantive input into the electoral reform agenda, as required. 	
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Each of these activities contributes to the fulfilment of the goals outlined in the UNDP Country Programme Action Plan. Specifically, UNDP asserts to strengthen democratic governance by supporting an enabling environment and strengthening Afghanistan’s nascent democracy⁶.

A more detailed matrix may be found in Annex 1.

III. Implementation Arrangements

At the London Conference⁷, President Hamid Karzai and international leaders announced the Government of Afghanistan’s commitment to “ensuring the integrity of the 2010 parliamentary elections and to preventing any irregularities and misconduct.”

In mid-March, at the request of President Karzai, support to the electoral process was included in UN Security Council Resolution 1917, 2010, mandating UNAMA with the provision of “technical assistance, coordinating other international donors, agencies and organisations providing assistance and channelling existing and additional funds earmarked to support the process.”

The United Nations’ electoral mandate is implemented through UNAMA – a political mission – and the UNDP, which provides technical and operational assistance through the ELECT project. . ELECT is the vehicle through which stakeholders support Afghan elections. Drawing from lessons learned in previous years and in accord with the strategic direction expressed by Afghan and international leadership at the Kabul Conference:

“To achieve success in Afghanistan, the partnership between the Afghan Government and the international community should be based on the leadership and ownership of the Afghan Government... This partnership should include

⁶ Country Programme Action Plan, Afghanistan, 2009-2013, 4.1(b)

⁷ January 2010

coherent support by the international community, lending its resources and technical knowledge to the implementation of Afghan-defined programmes.”⁸

To this end, UNDP ELECT’s main partners are Afghanistan’s own electoral management bodies, the permanent Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) and the Electoral Complaints Commission (ECC). In accord with standard UN electoral assistance practice, UNDP ELECT employed a capacity-building approach throughout the entire 2010 electoral process. While supporting the IEC and ECC through technical and operational assistance; skills were also being transferred so that, ultimately, Afghanistan is better equipped to organise and conduct future elections without external assistance.

IV. Challenges/Risks/Issues

Reluctance of stakeholders

Widespread fraud and accusations of irregularities had significantly undermined the 2009 Presidential and Provincial Council elections and raised serious doubts among stakeholders as to the viability of 2010 *Wolesi Jirga* elections. Additionally, there were concerns about the involvement and support of the international community in general, and of the UN in particular. The United Nations (both UNAMA and UNDP ELECT) had been perceived as responsible for the 2009 election process and were, therefore, often blamed for its defects.

Lack of mandate, clarity of roles

The months following the 2009 electoral process were characterised by uncertainty. There was talk of electoral reform, but no clarity as to what measures could allow for a more credible election. At the start of 2010, the legal framework, election date, potential reforms to the IEC, structure of the ECC, role of the UN, and level of international support to the process had yet to be ascertained. Moreover, the feasibility of holding elections within a short and increasingly diminished timeframe was precarious.

Insecure environment and reduced UN capacity

Following a terrorist attack on a guesthouse occupied mainly by UN electoral staff (and the resultant death of five UN employees), many UN staff were temporarily relocated and a significant number of international staff had left the country. Without a clear mandate, the project continued to weaken and lose key staff, including senior administrative and security staff. Key posts such as the Chief Technical Advisor (CTA), Chief Operations Advisor, Head of Finance, or Security Advisor remained empty; and the lack of Finance Head was a particular

⁸ Article 7, Communiqué, Kabul International Conference on Afghanistan, July 2010

hindrance to UNDP's ability to provide a clear picture of the project's financial situation – at a time when donors were budgeting funds for 2010. The limited presence of ELECT staff was particularly apparent at the provincial and regional levels. Provincial electoral advisors (who were to function as regional advisors) did not return to Kabul until March/April and some were not deployed to the field until as late as July, due to issues surrounding secure accommodation in the regional capitals.

Substantive last-minute amendments to the nature and scope of the ECC

In February 2010, President Hamid Karzai issued an Electoral Degree, ushering important changes in the existing 2005 Electoral Law, including the notable *Afghanisation* of the Electoral Complaints Commission. Among other implications, this meant that ECC would be decentralized and offices would need to be established throughout Afghanistan's 34 provinces, imminently, in order to begin operating well before elections, which would take place in September. The reinstatement of the ECC and re-establishment of provincial ECCs were factored into the initial planning of the UNDP ELECT basket fund, but little could be done without the input and consent of the ECC Commissioners, who would only be appointed in April. However, the altered nature of the commission, its new mandate and structure made it complicated to foresee exactly what kind of support would be required. Adapting to a new decentralized structure (with PECCs as primary decision-making bodies) required an accelerated procurement process, imminent administrative support and a clearly defined operational and legal framework under which to carry out the 2010 complaints and appeals process.

For more detailed information, please refer to Annexes 4 and 5.

V. Lessons Learnt

ELECT played a support – not a lead – role.

In contrast to 2009 elections when UNDP ELECT assumed a strong and visible leadership role, the project played a support role to Afghan electoral authorities in 2010. UNDP ELECT kept a low profile and limited the scope of its assistance to technical and operational support. Afghan bodies – primarily the Independent Electoral Commission and Electoral Complaints Commission – led, were responsible and accountable for the entire electoral process. Moreover, they were widely perceived and acknowledged to have fulfilled this role. The lower profile of UNDP ELECT compelled Afghan electoral authorities to assume greater responsibility – arguably rendering capacity-building all the more meaningful.

Consequentially, increased Afghan-leadership can be seen to lower the costs associated with elections. 2010 Parliamentary elections were less costly than both the 2009 Presidential election and even the 2005 Parliamentary elections⁹.

Approach to support was “focused.”

In anticipation of 2010 elections, stakeholders, who wished to avoid the challenges of 2009, were extremely cautious and a number of alternative approaches to support were discussed. Eventually, UNDP ELECT adopted a “focused” approach, which was distinct from a minimalist approach: The Secretary-General was determined that the UN should not be seen to abandon its responsibilities. Utilitarian in nature, this approach sought the greatest results for the least possible investment. Support was directed exclusively to the core activities of electoral authorities. While targeting the support to core functions of the electoral authorities, the UN could ensure essential assistance, without with the distraction of other activities and would, at the same time, reduce its profile.

Approach to support was integrated.

Exacerbating the lack of confidence in electoral support in 2009 was the general perception of fragmented relationships among UN players. Decided effort was made to work as a unified body in 2010. There would be a single approach to elections, implemented by all relevant agencies; but each agency would define its own particular role and area of action and this would complement the others. UNAMA is, for example, is political while the UNDP is technical in nature. Once stakeholders observed this consolidated and coordinated approach, they gained confidence and were more willing to invest.

ELECT improved donor relationships.

In 2010, several conditions improved the tone of donor meetings. The presence of the SRSB and regular interaction at board level meetings raised the level of discourse. Addressing the international community on behalf of the UN in Afghanistan, the SRSB reinforced the idea that the UN speaks with a singular voice and from a unified perspective. In addition, an atmosphere of openness, paired with very frank information-sharing created a more interactive and less confrontational environment among stakeholders. The result was a united international front, each communicating similar messages to their missions and domestic media. Furthermore, this cooperative environment provided a dimension of consistency throughout a process that was at times unpredictable.

⁹ 2005 Parliamentary election cost an approximate USD 165 million; 2009 Presidential election an approximate USD 169 million; and 2010 Parliamentary election an approximate USD 130 million.

Partnerships were critical.

Throughout the electoral process, technical and operational support provided has been ascribed to UNDP ELECT, at large. However, it is important to note that this team comprises not only UNDP staff but also the IOM and the particularly invaluable UNOPS. Similarly, IFES and other non-UN implementing partners have played substantive roles. In fact, recognising the importance of coordination among implementing partners, UNDP ELECT facilitated several discussion fora to enable implementing agencies and donors to exchange information and to share their own strategies, to avoid duplication of effort and/or resources, over-funding some activities at the expense of others, or geographical imbalances.

Political support and technical support are complementary.

Both political and technical/operational support have been critical; efficient electoral assistance requires both elements. Throughout the 2010, UNAMA provided discreet political support while UNDP provided technical and operational support. There were many cases this year, in which challenges were addressed on both a political and practical level: Candidate vetting, early publication of polling centres, witness to the reliability of ink used in polling centres are only a few such illustrations. The successful resolution of issues that might otherwise have undermined the electoral process can be attributed to the integration of political and technical support.

Electoral authorities established a provincial presence.

Given the attack of a UNDP ELECT-occupied guesthouse in late 2009, the UN was reluctant to send staff to provinces, which they considered less secure than Kabul. At the same time, there was recognition that a provincial presence was necessary to support. As a solution, staff was based regionally. Local provincial actors assumed responsibility/accountability but, at the same time, were provided with a degree of support – tailored to their own needs and close in proximity. Regional Officers were provided with very rough guidelines and the flexible unofficial direction. The arrangement, which was certainly not perfect, ensured a presence that was supportive to local actors but which ensured their independence, demanded they play a lead role, and enabled them to carry out their duties more efficiently. This also provided a level of safety to regionally based UNDP ELECT staff.

Electoral authorities were supported to address fraud.

From the start, expectations of all players were realistic. While fraud is by no means acceptable, it is inconceivable that it could be prevented in the current context of Afghanistan; where intimidation, the use of arms, and the influence of warlords in every day politics is commonplace. Rather than aiming to prevent fraud, the goal of local electoral authorities was

to identify and appropriately address it. For the first time – and marking one of the main successes in Afghan’s democratic history – impunity was addressed wherever it was found. In spite of threat and intimidation, local authorities continue to stand behind their decisions to address impunity and continue to do so.

VI. Future Plan

At the London Conference (January 2010), President Hamid Karzai expressed the willingness of the Government of Afghanistan to work closely with the UN to improve the electoral process in 2010 and beyond. The Afghan-led 2010 election is a significant milestone.

However, Afghanistan does not yet have the capacity to sustain its electoral institutions, independently. In order that progress made during the project period (2006 – 2011) should not be “undone,” UNDP support will extend beyond the originally projected date of closure (31 March 2011) to 30 June 2011. While 2010 elections have been concluded and UNDP ELECT’s objectives broadly achieved, a “bridging” period between ELECT and subsequent assistance will ensure sufficient financial support to sustain the premises of the IEC Headquarters as well as staff salaries. In addition, UNDP ELECT will provide the IEC with technical expertise, on request and according to its own priorities and plans of action.

Beyond these activities and as a means to contribute to capacity consolidation and sustainability, stakeholders agree that in the first half of 2011, ELECT programming should:

- Build on the achievements made, to date, in establishing an efficient, Afghan-led Independent Electoral Authority;
- Support the IEC in the transition from internationally-supported institution to self-sustaining institution; and
- Provide technical and operational capacity-building assistance, with a view to sustain and transfer knowledge to Afghans.

In the meantime, the ECC, will close all offices by 31 January 2011, having achieved its purpose and according to mandate. All records will be archived within the IEC, so as to retain institutional knowledge; and two former ECC employees will be hired by the IEC, to maintain these archives and to ensure the practical transfer of knowledge between the two bodies.

Building on prior commitments, the Government of Afghanistan, with the support of its international partners, pledged¹⁰ to initiate¹¹ a strategy for long-term electoral reform. To this end, UNDP will support the process through continued technical assistance aiming to consolidate capacity and institutional strengthening.

Future plans will draw on the lessons learned by various stakeholders throughout the 2010 election process; an independently conducted project evaluation; and a needs assessment and project formulation¹².

¹⁰ Communiqué, Kabul Conference on Afghanistan, July 2010

¹¹ Within 6 months

¹² Team comprises EAD, IFES and UN staff; scheduled to commence exercises in February 2011

VII. Financial Information

Table 1
Total Income and Expenditure

Donor	INCOME			EXPENDITURES			BALANCE	Remarks
	Total Commitment (a)	Total Received (b)	Total Receivable c= (a-b)	Total Cumulative Expenditures as of Dec 2009 (d)	Current Year 2010 (e)	Total Expenditures f= (d+e)	Total Received minus Total Expenditures g=(b-f)	
Australia - AID	4,210	4,210	0	3,021	1,188	4,209	1	
Belgium	1,405	1,404	1	1,404		1,404	0	
CIDA	22,688	22,688	0	8,502	6,069	14,571	8,117	
CROATIA	50	50	0	50		50	0	
Denmark	5,141	5,140	1	3,434	189	3,623	1,517	
DFID	19,208	19,208	0	14,713	2,432	17,145	2,063	
ESTONIA	40	40	0	40		40	0	
EU	50,000	47,500	2,500		47,318	47,318	182	
Finland	1,042	1,042	0	702	340	1,042	0	
France	1,279	1,279	0	175	297	472	807	
Germany	27,000	27,000	0	17,730	8,130	25,860	1,140	
India	1,000	1,000	0	967	34	1,001	-1	
Irish Aid	66	66	0		66	66	0	
Italy	15,461	15,279	182	6,411	4,246	10,657	4,622	
Japan	56,161	56,161	0	36,600	14,242	50,842	5,319	
Luxembourg	106	106	0		106	106	0	
Netherlands	11,169	11,169	0	5,543	5,551	11,094	75	
Norway	13,272	13,272	0	9,603	3,538	13,141	131	

Republic of Korea	1,000	1,000	0	191	5	196	804
Sweden (SIDA)	8,055	8,055	0	2,498	2,843	5,341	2,714
Spain	1,943	1,943	0	1,713	203	1,916	27
Switzerland (SDC)	1,305	1,306	-1	911	378	1,289	17
Turkey	5,000	5,000	0	2,894	79	2,973	2,027
United Kingdom	10,042	10,042	0	10,327	-313	10,014	28
UNDEF	320	320	0	328	-7	321	-1
UNDP	1,268	1,268	0	1,272	-4	1,268	0
USAID	123,500	123,500	0	84,048	28,513	112,561	10,939
Grand Total	381,731	379,048	2,683	213,077	125,443	338,520	40,528

- i) Expenditure reported for 2010 is provisional.
- ii) Income received in currency other than USD is approximated to USD based on UN exchange rate.
- iii) all figures are in thousands (000,)

TABLE 2
Expenditure by Budget Category
For the period January to December 2010

(All amounts in thousands US\$ (ooo,))

Budget Category	Budget Item	Output	Output Description	Activity	Activity Description	Budget	Expenditure * Jan-Dec 2010	Balance
Wolesi Jirga Elections	In-Country Travel	Output 1	Support IEC - VR & Capacity-Building	Activity 1.1	Support IEC - Temp Staff Salary for VR & Election	883	808	75
	Temporary Staffing	Output 1	Support IEC - VR & Capacity-Building	Activity 1.1	Support IEC - Temp Staff Salary for VR & Election	27,650	22,491	5,159
	Election Material	Output 1	Support IEC - VR & Capacity-Building	Activity 1.2	Support IEC - Procurement, Assets, Materials, Logistics	6,708	6,317	391
	Transport & Infrastructure	Output 1	Support IEC - VR & Capacity-Building	Activity 1.2	Support IEC - Procurement, Assets, Materials, Logistics	54,405	45,807	8,598
	Voter Registration Update	Output 1	Support IEC - VR & Capacity-Building	Activity 1.2	Support IEC - Procurement, Assets, Materials, Logistics	573	61	512
	Public Outreach & Gender	Output 1	Support IEC - VR & Capacity-Building	Activity 1.5	Support IEC - Public Outreach Campaign	4,042	1,238	2,804
	Training	Output 1	Support IEC - VR & Capacity-Building	Activity 1.3	Support IEC - Design & Deliver Training	542	11	531
	Communications IT	Output 1	Support IEC - VR & Capacity-Building	Activity 1.4	Support IEC - Data Centre & Software System	6,283	2,698	3,585
	Security (IEC)	Output 1	Support IEC - VR & Capacity-Building	Activity 1.6	Security - Personnel and electoral Materials	1,023	64	959
	Media Commission	Output 1	Support IEC - VR & Capacity-Building	Activity 1.7	Support IEC - Media Commission	531	177	354
	External Relations	Output 1	Support IEC - VR & Capacity-Building	Activity 1.8	Support IEC - External Relations	1,363	1,003	360
	Female Searchers	Output 1	Support IEC - VR & Capacity-Building	Activity 1.10	Support IEC - Female searchers	740	522	218
	EUPOL training	Output 1	Support IEC - VR & Capacity-Building	Activity 1.11	Support IEC - EUPOL training	21		21

Wolesi Jirga Elections Total						104,764	81,197	23,567
ECC	Staffing	Output 2	Support ECC - Capacity Building	Activity 2.1	Support ECC - Staff Recruitment	4,851	3,895	956
	Infrastructure	Output 2	Support ECC - Capacity Building	Activity 2.2	Support ECC - Procurement, assets, logistics.	1,862	1,663	199
	Communication & Office Equipment	Output 2	Support ECC - Capacity Building	Activity 2.2	Support ECC - Procurement, assets, logistics.	1,702	1,688	14
	Transport	Output 2	Support ECC - Capacity Building	Activity 2.2	Support ECC - Procurement, assets, logistics.	3,035	198	2,837
	Public Outreach & Gender	Output 2	Support ECC - Capacity Building	Activity 2.3	Support ECC - Public Outreach	1,190	537	653
	Training	Output 2	Support ECC - Capacity Building	Activity 2.4	Support ECC - Training	159	133	26
	Security ECC	Output 2	Support ECC - Capacity Building	Activity 2.5	Support ECC - Security	611	643	(32)
ECC Total						13,410	8,757	4,653
PM & TA	PM National Staff	Output 4	Project Management Support	Activity 4.1	PMU - National Staff	3,650	3,161	489
	PM Internatlonal Staff	Output 4	Project Management Support	Activity 4.2	PMU - International Staff	10,022	9,896	126
	Infrastructure & Security (PM)	Output 4	Project Management Support	Activity 4.3	PMU - Security	6,711	2,489	4,222
	Infrastructure & Security (TA)	Output 4	Project Management Support	Activity 4.4	Security - Technical Assistance	660	(18)	678
	Technical Assistance	Output 4	Project Management Support	Activity 4.5	PMU - Technical & Operational Support	17,350	11,187	6,163
PM & TA Total						38,393	26,715	11,678
Sub Total						156,567	116,669	39,898

before GMS								
					General Management Services (GMS) - 7%	11,784	8,774	3,010
Grand Total						168,351	125,443	42,908

TABLE 3
Expenditure by Donor - ELECT Project
For the period January to December 2010
(All amounts in US\$ (000,))

Donor	Output	Output Description	ACTIVITY	Budget (AWP)	Expenditure to Dec 2010	Delivery Rates
AusAID	Output1	Support IEC - VR & Capacity Building	ACTIVITY 1.1		19	
	Output 1	Support IEC - VR & Capacity Building	ACTIVITY 1.2		-46	
	Output 2	Support ECC - Capacity Building	ACTIVITY 2.1		57	
	Output 2	Support ECC - Capacity Building	ACTIVITY 2.5		174	
	Output 2	Support ECC - Capacity Building	ACTIVITY 2.2		537	
	Output 4	Project Management Support	ACTIVITY 4.5		445	
	Output 4	Project Management Support	ACTIVITY 4.3		2	
AusAID Total				1,190	1,188	100
CIDA	Output 1	Support IEC - VR & Capacity Building	ACTIVITY 1.2		4,120	
	Output 1	Support IEC - VR & Capacity Building	ACTIVITY 1.3		-3	

	Output 1	Support IEC - VR & Capacity Building	ACTIVITY 1.4		14	
	Output 2	Support ECC - Capacity Building	ACTIVITY 2.1		1,624	
	Output 2	Support ECC - Capacity Building	ACTIVITY 2.2		205	
	Output 4	Project Management Support	ACTIVITY 4.2		58	
	Output 4	Project Management Support	ACTIVITY 4.5		51	
CIDA Total				14,185	6,069	43
DEN	Output 4	Project Management Support	ACTIVITY 4.2		3	
	Output 4	Project Management Support	ACTIVITY 4.5		186	
DEN Total				1,706	189	11
DFID	Output 1	Support IEC - VR & Capacity Building	ACTIVITY 1.9.5		17	
	Output 4	Project Management Support	ACTIVITY 4.2		1,158	
	Output 4	Project Management Support	ACTIVITY 4.5		1,257	
DFID Total				4,495	2,432	54
EU	Output 1	Support IEC - VR & Capacity Building	ACTIVITY 1.1		13,473	
	Output 1	Support IEC - VR & Capacity Building	ACTIVITY 1.2		25,806	
	Output 1	Support IEC - VR & Capacity Building	ACTIVITY 1.3		6	
	Output 1	Support IEC - VR & Capacity Building	ACTIVITY 1.5		1,166	
	Output 1	Support IEC - VR & Capacity Building	ACTIVITY 1.8		1,003	

	Output 1	Support IEC - VR & Capacity Building	ACTIVITY 1.9.1		154	
	Output 1	Support IEC - VR & Capacity Building	ACTIVITY 1.4		843	
	Output 2	Support ECC - Capacity Building	ACTIVITY 2.1		233	
	Output 2	Support ECC - Capacity Building	ACTIVITY 2.5		47	
	Output 2	Support ECC - Capacity Building	ACTIVITY 2.2		28	
	Output 4	Project Management Support	ACTIVITY 4.1		1	
	Output 4	Project Management Support	ACTIVITY 4.2		138	
	Output 4	Project Management Support	ACTIVITY 4.4		6	
	Output 4	Project Management Support	ACTIVITY 4.5		3,465	
	Output 4	Project Management Support	ACTIVITY 4.3		951	
EU Total				49,600	47,318	95
FIN	Output 1	Support IEC - VR & Capacity Building	ACTIVITY 1.10		340	
FIN Total				340	340	100
FRA	Output 1	Support IEC - VR & Capacity Building	ACTIVITY 1.1		-54	
	Output 1	Support IEC - VR & Capacity Building	ACTIVITY 1.2		6	
	Output 1	Support IEC - VR & Capacity Building	ACTIVITY 1.3		7	
	Output 1	Support IEC - VR & Capacity Building	ACTIVITY 1.5		-3	
	Output 1	Support IEC - VR & Capacity Building	ACTIVITY 1.4		1	

	Output 1	Support IEC - VR & Capacity Building	ACTIVITY 1.6		1	
	Output 2	Support ECC - Capacity Building	ACTIVITY 2.2		-4	
	Output 4	Project Management Support	ACTIVITY 4.1		13	
	Output 4	Project Management Support	ACTIVITY 4.2		281	
	Output 4	Project Management Support	ACTIVITY 4.5		50	
FRA Total				1,103	297	27
GER	Output 1	Support IEC - VR & Capacity Building	ACTIVITY 1.2		2,804	
	Output 1	Support IEC - VR & Capacity Building	ACTIVITY 1.10		142	
	Output 1	Support IEC - VR & Capacity Building	ACTIVITY 1.3		1	
	Output 1	Support IEC - VR & Capacity Building	ACTIVITY 1.9.7		858	
	Output 2	Support ECC - Capacity Building	ACTIVITY 2.2		-67	
	Output 4	Project Management Support	ACTIVITY 4.1		218	
	Output 4	Project Management Support	ACTIVITY 4.2		652	
	Output 4	Project Management Support	ACTIVITY 4.5		3,509	
	Output 4	Project Management Support	ACTIVITY 4.3		13	
GER Total				9,270	8,130	88
IND	Output 1	Support IEC - VR & Capacity Building	ACTIVITY 1.2		34	
IND Total				34	34	99
IRE AID	Output 1	Support IEC - VR & Capacity Building	ACTIVITY 1.2		23	

	Output 4	Project Management Support	ACTIVITY 4.5		43	
IRE AID Total				66	66	100
ITA	Output 1	Support IEC - VR & Capacity Building	ACTIVITY 1.2		14	
	Output 1	Support IEC - VR & Capacity Building	ACTIVITY 1.1		7	
	Output 1	Support IEC - VR & Capacity Building	ACTIVITY 1.3		1	
	Output 1	Support IEC - VR & Capacity Building	ACTIVITY 1.4		56	
	Output 1	Support IEC - VR & Capacity Building	ACTIVITY 1.5		63	
	Output 2	Support ECC - Capacity Building	ACTIVITY 2.1		320	
	Output 2	Support ECC - Capacity Building	ACTIVITY 2.5		193	
	Output 2	Support ECC - Capacity Building	ACTIVITY 2.2		1,060	
	Output 2	Support ECC - Capacity Building	ACTIVITY 2.3		117	
	Output 4	Project Management Support	ACTIVITY 4.1		-7	
	Output 4	Project Management Support	ACTIVITY 4.2		2,410	
	Output 4	Project Management Support	ACTIVITY 4.5		-12	
	Output 4	Project Management Support	ACTIVITY 4.3		24	
ITA Total				8,869	4,246	48
JPN	Output 1	Support IEC - VR & Capacity Building	ACTIVITY 1.1		7,059	
	Output 1	Support IEC - VR & Capacity Building	ACTIVITY 1.2		4,876	

	Output 1	Support IEC - VR & Capacity Building	ACTIVITY 1.4		2	
	Output 1	Support IEC - VR & Capacity Building	ACTIVITY 1.5		16	
	Output 1	Support IEC - VR & Capacity Building	ACTIVITY 1.9.3		11	
	Output 2	Support ECC - Capacity Building	ACTIVITY 2.1		12	
	Output 2	Support ECC - Capacity Building	ACTIVITY 2.2		795	
	Output 2	Support ECC - Capacity Building	ACTIVITY 2.4		133	
	Output 2	Support ECC - Capacity Building	ACTIVITY 2.3		404	
	Output 2	Support ECC - Capacity Building	ACTIVITY 2.5		214	
	Output 4	Project Management Support	ACTIVITY 4.2		512	
	Output 4	Project Management Support	ACTIVITY 4.3		17	
	Output 4	Project Management Support	ACTIVITY 4.5		192	
JPN Total				19,561	14,242	73
LUX	Output 4	Project Management Support	ACTIVITY 4.5		105	
LUX Total				105	105	100
NET	Output 1	Support IEC - VR & Capacity Building	ACTIVITY 1.1		1,530	
	Output 1	Support IEC - VR & Capacity Building	ACTIVITY 1.2		2,206	
	Output 1	Support IEC - VR & Capacity Building	ACTIVITY 1.4		50	
	Output 2	Support ECC - Capacity Building	ACTIVITY 2.1		0	

	Output 2	Support ECC - Capacity Building	ACTIVITY 2.5		21	
	Output 2	Support ECC - Capacity Building	ACTIVITY 2.2		49	
	Output 4	Project Management Support	ACTIVITY 4.1		973	
	Output 4	Project Management Support	ACTIVITY 4.5		562	
	Output 4	Project Management Support	ACTIVITY 4.3		161	
NET Total				5,625	5,551	99
NOR	Output 1	Support IEC - VR & Capacity Building	ACTIVITY 1.2		897	
	Output 1	Support IEC - VR & Capacity Building	ACTIVITY 1.1		2,522	
	Output 4	Project Management Support	ACTIVITY 4.2		119	
NOR Total				3,669	3,538	96
ROK	Output 1	Support IEC - VR & Capacity Building	ACTIVITY 1.1		1	
	Output 1	Support IEC - VR & Capacity Building	ACTIVITY 1.2		4	
ROK Total				809	5	1
SIDA	Output 1	Support IEC - VR & Capacity Building	ACTIVITY 1.2		2,373	
	Output 1	Support IEC - VR & Capacity Building	ACTIVITY 1.1		498	
	Output 1	Support IEC - VR & Capacity Building	ACTIVITY 1.5		7	
	Output 1	Support IEC - VR & Capacity Building	ACTIVITY 1.4		2	
	Output 4	Project Management Support	ACTIVITY 4.2		-67	

	Output 4	Project Management Support	ACTIVITY 4.5		0	
	Output 4	Project Management Support	ACTIVITY 4.3		31	
SIDA Total				5,542	2,843	51
SPA	Output 4	Project Management Support	ACTIVITY 4.3		0	
	Output 4	Project Management Support	ACTIVITY 4.5		203	
SPA Total				230	203	88
SWI	Output 1	Support IEC - VR & Capacity Building	ACTIVITY 1.1		-46	
	Output 1	Support IEC - VR & Capacity Building	ACTIVITY 1.2		156	
	Output 1	Support IEC - VR & Capacity Building	ACTIVITY 1.5		0	
	Output 4	Project Management Support	ACTIVITY 4.5		267	
SWI Total				394	378	96
TUR	Output 1	Support IEC - VR & Capacity Building	ACTIVITY 1.1		0	
	Output 1	Support IEC - VR & Capacity Building	ACTIVITY 1.10		79	
TUR Total				2,106	79	4
UKM- 00248	Output 1	Support IEC - VR & Capacity Building	ACTIVITY 1.1		-4	
	Output 1	Support IEC - VR & Capacity Building	ACTIVITY 1.2		-72	
	Output 1	Support IEC - VR & Capacity Building	ACTIVITY 1.4		3	
	Output 4	Project Management Support	ACTIVITY 4.5		-240	
UKM Total				-	-313	0

UNDEF	Output 1	Support IEC - VR & Capacity Building	ACTIVITY 1.2		-7	
	Output 1	Support IEC - VR & Capacity Building	ACTIVITY 1.3		0	
	Output 4	Project Management Support	ACTIVITY 4.5		0	
UNDEF Total				-	-7	0
UNDP	Output 1	Support IEC - VR & Capacity Building	ACTIVITY 1.2		-4	
UNDP Total					-4	0
USAID	Output 1	Support IEC - VR & Capacity Building	ACTIVITY 1.1		107	
	Output 1	Support IEC - VR & Capacity Building	ACTIVITY 1.2		13,178	
	Output 1	Support IEC - VR & Capacity Building	ACTIVITY 1.5		2	
	Output 1	Support IEC - VR & Capacity Building	ACTIVITY 1.9.1		29	
	Output 1	Support IEC - VR & Capacity Building	ACTIVITY 1.9.6		889	
	Output 1	Support IEC - VR & Capacity Building	ACTIVITY 1.4		104	
	Output 1	Support IEC - VR & Capacity Building	ACTIVITY 1.6		68	
	Output 1	Support IEC - VR & Capacity Building	ACTIVITY 1.7		-4	
	Output 1	Support IEC - VR & Capacity Building	ACTIVITY 1.9.7		3	
	Output 2	Support ECC - Capacity Building	ACTIVITY 2.1		1,844	
	Output 2	Support ECC - Capacity Building	ACTIVITY 2.5		5	
	Output 2	Support ECC - Capacity Building	ACTIVITY 2.2		1,308	

	Output 2	Support ECC - Capacity Building	ACTIVITY 2.3		17	
	Output 4	Project Management Support	ACTIVITY 4.1		2,201	
	Output 4	Project Management Support	ACTIVITY 4.2		5,372	
	Output 4	Project Management Support	ACTIVITY 4.4		-24	
	Output 4	Project Management Support	ACTIVITY 4.5		2,098	
	Output 4	Project Management Support	ACTIVITY 4.3		1,317	
USAID Total				39,452	28,513	72
EST	Output 4	Project Management Support	ACTIVITY 4.5		0	
					0	
Grand Total				168,351	125,443	75

Annexes

Annex 1

1. Detailed Reporting on Results and Impact

Output 1: Support to the IEC to conduct a limited voter registration top-up as required for the 2010 election; and capacity-building through the provision of technical and operational assistance for the 2010 election

Indicators:

- Number of eligible voters (disaggregated by sex and geographical location) issued with new voter registration cards;
- IEC ability to manage the voter registration and the election process with reduced international support;
- Proportion of the Afghan population (disaggregated by sex and geographical location) who view the 2010 elections as better than 2009 elections.

Target 2010:

- IEC has access to materials, equipment, logistical supplies and personnel required to register at least 600,000 new eligible voters;
- All electoral benchmarks – voter registration, candidate nomination, staffing, delivery and retrieval of polling materials; polling; processing and announcing of election results – are achieved in accord with standards and timelines prescribed by the IEC;
- A greater proportion of the Afghan public perceives the 2010 election as being better organized by IEC, compared with 2009;
- Increased confidence is exhibited by IEC staff in planning and conduct of 2010 electoral activities.

Gender Ratingⁱ of the Output: 2

Activity Result	Baseline information	Performance Target	Description of results/achievement	% of progress rate/delivery
1.1 Facilitate the IEC to deploy temporary	In 2009 elections, an approximate 27,000 staff	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Number of temporary staff recruited for voter 	Procedures for recruitment of <i>Wolesi Jirga</i> elections staff were	100%

<p>staff to carry out voter registration and <i>Wolesi Jirga</i> elections, by providing salaries and other staff payments.</p>	<p>were engaged by the IEC for voter registration.</p> <p>Of these, 38% were female.</p>	<p>registration and <i>Wolesi Jirga</i> elections</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Timeliness of temporary staff payments • Proportion of female IEC temporary staff (ideally 50%) recruiting and attending on polling day 	<p>adopted and recruitment executed through a centralized database, to reduce influence opportunities for peddling and nepotism.</p> <p>The IEC recruited:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 340 temporary voter registration staff • 1,513 Voter Educators • 3,020 District Field Coordinators • 86,575 polling staff • 2,240 contingency staff <p>All temporary staff was trained in polling and counting procedures, through a cascade training system.</p> <p>Females comprised:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 38% of voter registration staff • 39% of temporary election staff 	
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			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 31% Voter Educators • 19% District Field Coordinators <p>The receivership of Kabul Bank resulted in delays in disbursement of staff salaries to provinces.</p>	
<p>1.2 Support procedures, delivery and retrieval of assets, materials and logistical supplies for the voter registration top-up process and <i>Wolesi Jirga</i> elections.</p>	<p>Movement Plans were approved by IEC before 2008/09 voter registration and Presidential/provincial council elections.</p> <p>In 2009/09, distribution of voter registration materials was slightly behind schedule. In some cases (9 provinces), security posed a particular challenge and delays were more significant.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Availability of Movement and Procurement Plans approved by IEC and UNDP, respectively • Type and quantity of equipment and materials procured • Percentage of polling centres that received amount of electoral materials specified in the Procurement and Movement Plans • Percentage of polling centres that retrieved polling materials within 	<p>The IEC drafted a Movement Plan to ensure that materials, once procured, would be swiftly delivered to the field.</p> <p>The UNDP ELECT Procurement Plan detailed specifications for candidate nominations, voter registration and the <i>Wolesi Jirga</i> elections. It also included ECC and ELECT PMU requirements.</p> <p>The IEC accessed and delivered to all provinces:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 139 voter registration kits 	<p>100%</p>

		<p>timelines specified in the Movement Plan</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 7,200 information packs to launch the candidate nomination • 174,000 packs of candidate nomination materials <p>On Election Day, 255 polling centres received contingency electoral materials to meet shortfalls of sensitive materials.</p> <p>The retrieval of electoral materials from districts to provincial warehouses, and from provinces to the national tally centre proceeded according to plan, with the exception of six provinces.</p>	
<p>1.3 Support to IEC to design and deliver appropriate training to voter registration and election workers</p>	<p>In 2008/09, the IEC organized and conducted more than 200 training sessions for 952 District Field Coordinators; 110 Provincial Public Outreach Officers; and 1,600 Civic</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Number and type of training courses delivered • Number of staff trained • Level of IEC staff 	<p>Having formulated a Training Plan, the IEC trained 249 staff in candidate nomination procedures.</p> <p>Two five-day training sessions</p>	<p>100%</p>

	<p>Educators.</p> <p>No post-training evaluations were carried out.</p> <p>Reports from domestic and international observers revealed widespread disregard for electoral guidelines, procedures and regulations by IEC Voter Registers and election workers.</p> <p>The IEC sanctioned 6,000 election workers for misconduct.</p>	<p>compliance with guidelines and procedures</p>	<p>were held in July and August for 190 IEC provincial trainers</p> <p>Training of 3,020 District Field Coordinators by was conducted in August</p> <p>Cascade training for 86,575 polling officials was undertaken in September</p> <p>2,240 contingency polling staff was trained in September</p> <p>1,513 Voter Educators received training on various public outreach and education methods in August</p> <p>Gender sensitization training was carried out for all Headquarters staff</p>	
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			<p>114 District Field Coordinators were dismissed due to misconduct</p>	
<p>1.4 Provide technical and operational assistance to enable IEC upgrade its Data Centre IT, software systems and capacity</p>	<p>The 2009 data centre was furnished with 550 computers and 12 sets of data scanning equipment. 292 entry clerks were trained and engaged to perform data entry.</p> <p>Only 3.5 out of 4.5 voter registration records for 2008/09 were scanned by the end of 2009, while data entry had been completed for approximately 1.5 million scanned forms.</p> <p>Biometric and automatic fingerprint identification technology became</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Number and type of Data Centre software upgrade modules and other facilities installed • Number of Voter Registration records scanned and entered • Timeliness and quality of the processing of Voter Registration, candidate nomination and tallying of election results 	<p>The IEC data centre received upgrades, including server and software upgrades and three new voter registration database applications:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Delimitation module; 2. Quality control module; 3. Voter registration management module <p>By June, the data centre had helped to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Complete the Candidate Nomination database; • Generate candidate nomination statistical reports; • Carry out data entry of the remaining voter registry forms from 2008/09 registration; 	<p>100%</p>

	<p>operational in 2009, but its effectiveness was never formally assessed.</p> <p>Tally of 2009 Presidential election results was completed according to schedule. However, the anti-fraud triggers embedded in them were disregarded.</p>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Data entry of financial and asset information of candidates; • Complete development of application and setting up systems for the ballot lottery; and • Update the candidate nomination database with ballot order. <p>Cumulatively, 4,733,961 voter registry forms (including 195,222 from the 2010 voter registry) were processed.</p> <p>The data centre was reconfigured into a national tally centre in August, including 109 workstations for data entry clerks, and 10 workstations for reconciliation and audit teams.</p> <p>300 staff was hired to accommodate the tally process.</p>	
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			<p>SQL and application server for the tally process and their backups were installed and test-run on tally databases and applications.</p> <p>93% of tamper-evident bags had been used in the "intake" process at the IEC national tally centre.</p>	
<p>1.5 Support IEC to plan and implement awareness-raising public outreach campaigns for voter registration and <i>Wolesi Jirga</i> elections.</p>	<p>In 2008/09, public outreach included a very wide distribution of print information materials.</p> <p>In addition, text messages were mass distributed via mobile telephones; short documentaries and TV/radio spots produced.</p> <p>Billboards were erected</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Category and quantity of public outreach events and materials used by IEC • Proportion of voters (disaggregated by sex), who cast their votes properly 	<p>Public outreach messaging included:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 26 1-minute TV PSAs (in Dari and Pashto), via 10 TV stations: estimated broadcast time of 168,000 seconds • 26 1-minute radio PSAs (in Dari and Pashto), via 30 national and local radio stations: estimated broadcast time of 1,740,000 seconds • Two 10-minute TV film documentaries, featuring 	<p>100%</p>

	<p>throughout the country.</p> <p>And an IEC toll-free data centre received more than 100,000 calls every month, on average.</p> <p>About 3% of the votes cast on polling day were invalid.</p>		<p>election procedures: broadcast 150 times on 7 TV channels</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 30 episodes of radio soap operas, specifically targeting women: broadcast 480 times via 10 national and local radio stations • Approximately 6,000,000 outreach materials including leaflets, brochures, sample ballots, stickers, etc. • Mobile theatre • 400 billboards • 5,000 sign posts • Toll-free Call Centre, jointly funded by ELECT and IFES. <p>More than 95% of votes cast were valid.</p>	
<p>1.6 Support implementation of security safeguards for personnel and sensitive electoral materials</p>	<p>In 2009, the IEC shared polling centre location information with Afghan National Security Forces, according to plan. The ANSF was to have responded with an assessment of its own ability</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Level and quality of security investments/measures at electoral offices and staff accommodation facilities • Adequacy and 	<p>Security upgrades were completed at all IEC offices.</p> <p>A Security Concept of Operations and plan was reviewed and endorsed by the Joint Command</p>	<p>100%</p>

	<p>to ensure the safety of these locations. However, this response was received much too late and, as a result, many polling centres were opened in insecure areas.</p> <p>A commercial guest house (mainly occupied by UN electoral staff) was attacked, leading to the death of 5 international staff members.</p> <p>Information-sharing mechanisms were generally ineffective.</p>	<p>timeliness of information sharing between IEC/EECT and ANSF/ISAF; and between IEC Headquarters and the field</p>	<p>as a framework for electoral security assistance.</p> <p>Two ISAF Officers were embedded into the IEC to serve as direct links between the IEC and ANSF/ISAF Joint Command.</p> <p>Security arrangements for supporting the Candidate Nomination process were identified and communicated to ANSFs who provided escort services, as required.</p> <p>The provisional list of polling centres for the <i>Wolesi Jirga</i> election was shared with Afghan National Security Forces and ISAF; and assessments were received in a timely manner.</p> <p>The National Movement Plan</p>	
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			<p>included a security component.</p> <p>A regular Election Security Risk analysis was implemented, to better understand the nature and magnitude of threats, vulnerabilities and risks associated with the electoral process.</p>	
<p>1.7 Support to provide salaries for Media Commission Temporary Staff</p>	<p>In 2009, 14 staff members were paid through ELECT (five Commissioners and nine members of staff)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Number of temporary Media Commission Staff receiving payment from the ELECT basket fund 	<p>Provisions for Media Centre salaries were incorporated to the ELECT basket fund.</p> <p>Commission activities were:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Executed by four IEC national staff (1 Officer; 2 Assistants; and 1 Photographer); • S supported by an (international) IFES Audio Visual Consultant; • Under the leadership of 5 (national) Media Commissioners. 	<p>100%</p>

<p>1.8 Support IEC to plan and conduct external relations events about the electoral process</p>	<p>Information and communications on the 2009 elections were guided by an External Relations plan. Press conferences were held weekly, bi-weekly, daily, bi-daily and every second day.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Availability of External Relations Strategy and Plan • Number and category of External Relations events undertaken • Timeliness of IEC regulations on accreditation 	<p>A comprehensive external relations strategy was adopted by the IEC.</p> <p>Various press conferences, interviews, TV and radio round-table discussions, candidate/political party fora were conducted to communicate key messages to local and international media.</p> <p>The IEC Information Dissemination Plan was revised and finalized in August.</p> <p>Regular meetings with observers, candidates and their agents, media conferences and press interviews.</p> <p>On-site Media Centre constructed and equipped.</p>	<p>100%</p>
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			<p>IEC reviewed, updated and translated almost 30 documents into local languages, burned them onto 4,000 CDs and distributed them.</p> <p>Responsibility for the accreditation of observers was decentralized to provinces; and nearly 400,000 individuals and 2,000 entities obtained accreditation to observe the <i>Wolesi Jirga</i> process.</p>	
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Output 2: Capacity-building through technical and operational support to the ECC, to manage their responsibilities in the conduct of the 2010 election

Indicators:

- Ability of the ECC to adjudicate electoral complaints; Level of professional independence of the ECC

Target 2010: E

- CC is able to receive and arbitrate electoral complaints associated with candidates' nomination, political campaign, polling and processing of election results without any biases and within prescribed timelines.

Gender Rating of the Output: 2

Activity Result	Baseline information	Performance Target	Description of results/achievement	% of progress rate/delivery
<p>2.1 Facilitate ECC to recruit qualified staff to carry out its Headquarters and provincial office functions</p>	<p>In 2009, the ECC recruited 40 staff members at Headquarters, while about 200 ECC provincial posts were filled by the CTG (contracted company).</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Number of staff recruited by the ECC • Timeliness of the recruitment process 	<p>Core ECC staff in provinces were not hired in time to arbitrate candidate nomination challenges. However, the ECC Head Office was able to assume this function.</p> <p>The recruitment of 114 Provincial Commissioners and 399 support staff was completed in July.</p> <p>ECC Commissioners created 75 additional posts, which were filled in September.</p>	<p>100%</p>
<p>2.2 Support the procurement and/or establishment of infrastructure,</p>	<p>Assorted equipment, IT, vehicles and other facilities were procured for the ECC in 2009.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Type, quantity, and timeliness of procurements 	<p>Logistic and operational requirements of the ECC were incorporated to ELECT Procurement Planning for 2010.</p>	<p>100%</p>

<p>equipment, logistical supplies, IT and other facilities required for ECC functioning.</p>	<p>34 provincial offices implemented ECC activities.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Number of provinces with functional ECC facilities and structures 	<p>Assorted goods and services were procured for the ECC, including generators for ECC field offices, IT and other office equipment, vehicular maintenance, rentals for ECC offices.</p> <p>Although an approximate half were delayed, all 334 PECC offices became operational.</p>	
<p>2.3 Support ECC to undertake public outreach activities and events to improve public awareness about its functions, powers and procedures.</p>	<p>The ECC remained relatively unknown to the general public (its function, responsibilities, power of authority, processes and procedures), largely because there was not adequate time to implement public outreach.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Category and quantity of public outreach events and materials employed by the ECC • Level of public awareness of the ECC, its functions and procedures 	<p>UNDP ELECT supported the ECC in preparation of a budget, strategy, broadcast schedule, and procurement documents for the ECC's public outreach campaign.</p> <p>Due to time constraints arising from the appointment of commissioners and late hiring of public outreach began after the candidate challenge period:</p>	<p>100%</p>

			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Radio and TV public service announcements were broadcast on a network of local and national stations. • At least five different fact sheets were disseminated directly to the public and through the ECC website. • A series of public seminars were held for candidates and candidate agents. <p>The ECC intensified its media conferences in the lead to and after polling.</p>	
2.4 Support ECC in training temporary staff	All ECC staff received intense training in complaints procedures, ahead of the campaign period.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Number and type of training courses delivered • Number of staff (disaggregated by sex) trained 	<p>A two-day session on complaints arbitration procedures was held in August for 147 ECC Headquarters and PECC representatives.</p> <p>A training of ECC investigators and Adjudicators was held, ahead of cascade training.</p> <p>Cascade trainings took place at the provincial level, closely monitored</p>	100%

			<p>by ECC national commissioners.</p> <p>Training was held for intake staff at both Headquarters and PECCs.</p>	
<p>2.5 Support the ECC to establish security measures for its staff and facilities.</p>	<p>Security guards, anti-blast doors, armoured vehicles, and other physical enhancements are some of the security measures implemented by the ECC in 2009.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Type of security measures in place 	<p>A Security Risk Assessment was carried out at the ECC Headquarters in March and necessary upgrades were implemented accordingly.</p> <p>A Security Analyst was embedded within the ECC to help undertake a risk assessment and mitigation measures, for the period leading up to and after elections.</p> <p>Provincial offices were assessed routinely and necessary upgrades implemented as required.</p>	<p>100%</p>

Output 3: Support to long-term electoral reform and capacity-building of the electoral management bodies

Indicators:

- Willingness and capacity of the IEC to contribute to the long-term electoral reform and institutional strengthening process.

Target 2010:

- IEC is able to contribute to electoral reform, if required, based on the experience of the 2009 and 2010 electoral processes, exposure to international experience and participation in capacity-building programmes.

Gender Rating of the Output: 2

Activity Result	Baseline information	Performance Target	Description of results/achievement	% of progress rate/delivery
<p>3.1 Advise IEC Commissioners and Secretariat on electoral policy development, issues analysis, and ethical (evidence-based) decision-making</p>	<p>There were no mechanisms for policy support to IEC Commissioners in 2009.</p> <p>The independence of the IEC during the 2009 elections was cast in doubt after the Commissioners decided to disregard antifraud triggers embedded in the National Tally Centre.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Availability of a Chief Technical Advisor to support the IEC Board of Commissioners, if required • Level of professional independence of the IEC and its Media Commission • Willingness of the IEC to formulate and enforce anti-fraud measures 	<p>Technical Advisors remained embedded in critical IEC Secretariat departments to support the conduct of the <i>Wolesi Jirga</i> process.</p> <p>By June, the IEC had adopted robust anti-fraud measures based on four principles:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Highest quality materials; • Strict controls on movement and handling of sensitive materials; • Procedures that discourage fraud and ensure its detection; and 	<p>100%</p>

	<p>The Media Commission performed its functions independently in 2009, but could not enforce compliance with the media code of conduct owing to lack of institutional and political support.</p>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Maximum transparency. <p>Fraud detection measures embedded in the tally centre were vigorously implemented by IEC leadership. Detecting key triggers, the IEC ordered the audit and recount of 1,063 polling centres – approximately one fifth of the polling centres that opened on polling day.</p> <p>The IEC Media Commission vibrantly discharged its functions, conducting regular media monitoring, and arbitrating media complaints.</p>	
<p>3.2 Provide technical assistance to review the legal and institutional framework for Afghan elections and inform a long-term electoral reform agenda</p>	<p>There was no formal electoral reform process in 2009.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Presence of a functional Electoral Reform Task Force 	<p>A Legal Advisor was recruited to assist the IEC.</p>	<p>100%</p>
<p>3.3 Support IEC to undertake strategic</p>	<p>The IEC produced Concept of Operations and</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Outline of the post-2010 agenda for the IEC 	<p>Donors initiated discussions on a post-ELECT agenda.</p>	<p>100%</p>

<p>planning process to inform the post-2010 Concept of Operations</p>	<p>Operational Plans for 2009 and 2010. However, it did not engage in institutional development planning.</p>		<p>A Concept Note, drafted by ELECT’s Chief Technical Advisor guided further discussions and stakeholders have unofficially expressed support for a project that would have as objectives:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Allow the IEC to maintain a critical mass of technical and operational capacity during the post-electoral period, avoiding the loss of technical and operational know-how; • Ensure electoral authorities consolidate and extend their capacity to prepare and conduct credible elections; • Assist the IEC in becoming increasingly sustainable in terms of funding and technical/operational expertise; and • Support electoral authorities, and other stakeholders, in providing substantive input into the electoral reform agenda, as required. 	
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Annex 2

2. Risk log

Project Title: UNDP ELECT				Award ID: 0050324		Date: 31 December 2010	
#	Description	Date Identified	Type	Impact & Probability	Countermeasures / Mgmt response	Last Update	Status
1	Anti-Government Elements (AGEs) vow to disrupt the electoral process, threaten those involved in elections.	05/10	Environmental , operational	<p>Potential effect on project: Harm to voters, candidates and those involved in organizing and implementing elections; reduced voter participation – particularly among women and vulnerable groups.</p> <p>Impact: Up to 5</p> <p>Probability: Up to 5</p>	One thousand (1,000) polling centres were cited by the IEC as likely targets of violence and removed from the list of centres before Election Day. An approximate 290 additional polling centres, scheduled for opening were not opened or were closed, prematurely.	12/10	Complete
2	Electoral fraud and irregularities undermine credibility of elections.	05/10	Operational, organizational	<p>Potential effect on project: Election results inaccurate; authenticity of new Parliament subject to suspicion.</p>	IEC blacklisted nearly 6,000 individuals implicated in previous election; fraud deterrence measures integrated to voter registration, polling, counting and transfer of results.	12/10	Complete

				<p>Impact: 5</p> <p>Probability: 3</p>	<p>IEC Anti-Fraud Measures based on four principles: Highest quality materials; Strict control over movement and handling of sensitive materials; Procedures that discourage fraud and ensure its detection; and Maximum transparency.</p> <p>Robust fraud detection triggers embedded in tally centre procedures. Consequently, 1,330,782 fraudulent votes were excluded during the tally process.</p> <p>From Election Day up until the last day on which electoral complaints were accepted, the ECC/PECCs received an approximate 6,000 complaints, close to half of which had potential implications on final election results. Aside from disqualification of candidates as warranted; some IEC officials were banned from working in electoral institutions for periods of six to ten years; and some referred to the Attorney General's Office for</p>		
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					prosecution on account of criminal offense.		
3	IEC is perceived as biased, nepotistic.	05/10	Operational, organisational	Potential effect on project: Credibility of elections is compromised. Impact: 5 Probability: 3	IEC has reformed recruitment procedures to ensure closer management oversight to the process. On-line application procedures were implemented in June 2010.	12/10	Complete
4	IEC fails to recruit key staff – particularly women.	05/10	Operational, organisational	Potential effect on project: Election is less efficient; women marginalized. Impact: 5 Probability: 3	The IEC established as its goal the recruitment of 50% women; and began recruitment earlier than in past years. In addition, it engaged local leaders (including members of the <i>Ulema</i> and Mullahs) to encourage qualified females to work with the IEC.	12/10	Complete
5	Neutrality of ECC questioned.	05/10	Operational, organisational	Potential effect on project: Credibility of elections is compromised.	A robust public outreach and external relations campaign sought to clarify investigation procedures; ECC Commissioners proactively engaged with stakeholders, aiming for transparency at every stage.	12/10	Complete

				Impact: 5 Probability: 3			
6	Procurement of election materials is late.	05/10	Operational	Potential effect on project: Election is less efficient; credibility is compromised; opportunity for fraud increased. Impact: 5 Probability: 3	The IEC and ECC were supported to finalise all specifications for goods and services and on this basis a Procurement Plan was approved in April. While actual requests for procurement/quotations could not commence before the approval of a Project document, all preparatory processes were completed well in advance so that UNDP ELECT could act immediately, on approval of a revised Project Document.	12/10	Complete
7	Security impedes access, transportation to/in provinces.	05/10	Security	Potential effect on project: Credibility of election is compromised; potential voters marginalized; safety risks increased. Impact: 5 Probability: 5	The IEC was proactive in engaging the ANSF and ISAF, and provided inputs for the formulation of the ANSF Security Concept of Operations for the <i>Wolesi Jirga</i> . The IEC shared information with both parties on planned movement of personnel, sensitive materials, and other goods in a timely, well-	12/10	Complete

					<p>coordinated manner and maintained close liaison with security partners.</p> <p>In addition, the IEC used District Field Coordinators to cross-reference security assessments and ensured that polling materials were sent only to polling centres located in secure areas.</p>		
8	UNDP procedures are not conducive to expedited implementation.	05/10	Operational	<p>Potential effect on project: Timeliness reduced; opportunity for fraud increased; security reduced; credibility of elections compromised.</p> <p>Impact: 5 Probability: 3</p>	UNDP ELECT made provision for longer lead times in procurement; sought waivers in cases where existing procedures could not possibly accommodate immediate needs.	12/10	Complete
9	Suitable, secure office space and accommodation for UNDP ELECT staff lacking.	05/10	Security, Operational	<p>Potential effect on project: Reduced security; reduced efficiency; increased opportunity for fraud; credibility of elections compromised.</p> <p>Impact: 5</p>	<p>ELECT undertook security upgrades at offices and guest houses in regional hubs.</p> <p>In Kandahar and Jalalabad, where security could not be ensured, there was no international presence after June.</p>	12/10	Complete

				Probability: 5			
10	Funding shortfalls impede operations.	05/10	Operational	Potential effect on project: Efficiency reduced; credibility of elections compromised; failure to support Afghan electoral institutions. Impact: 5 Probability: 1	Although funding was sufficient throughout the process, the possibility of shortfall (and correlated risks) were made clear to donors from the start.	12/10	Complete

Annex 3

3. Issues Log

ISSUES LOG						Date: 31 December 2010
Award ID: 0050324			Project: UNDP ELECT			
ID	Type	Date Identified	Description	Status/Priority	Status Change Date	Author
1	Procurement	07/10	Delivery of some office materials to the IEC were late, temporarily reducing efficiency.	5	08/10	
2	Procurement	08/10	Movement of voting materials in some provinces was hampered by security.	5	08/10	
3	Finance	09/10	Receivership of Kabul Bank led to delayed payment of IEC staff salaries.	5	09/10	

4	Management,	10/10	Commitment to transparency and high volume of votes recounted led to a delay in results	5	11/10	
5	Finance	02/10	Payment to recruitment contractor delayed, as a result of increased staffing needs of newly structured ECC.	5	09/10	
6	Security	07/10	According to PECC Commissioners, some of the leased offices were insecure, not easily accessed.	5	08/10	
7	Operations	08/10	ECC had no formal procedures for reviewing decisions made by PECCs.	5	09/10	
8	Management,	02/10	Contract of HR provider had not been amended to allow hiring to accommodate new Electoral Law.	5	05/10	
9	Management,	08/10	It was realized that the ECC workforce of 516 would not be sufficient; an additional 75 were necessary.	5	09/10	

ⁱ **Gender Ratings:**

0= Output is not expected to contribute to gender equality in a noticeable way

1= Gender equality is not one of the reasons for having this output. Nevertheless, some aspects of the output- perhaps one of the activities- is expected to promote gender equality.

2= Gender equality is not the main objective of the output, but the output is expected to promote gender equality in a significant way.

3= Achievement of the gender equality is an explicit objective of the output and the main reason that this output was planned.