



Afghanistan

**United Nations Development Programme
Afghanistan**

**Enhancing Legal and Electoral Capacity for Tomorrow (ELECT)
3rd Quarter Project Progress Report – 2010**



IEC staff count election results after the 18 September poll, under the keen watch of political agents and observers

Project ID: 0050324

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Strategic Plan Component: Goal 2 / Service line 2.1

CPAP Component: Output 1 – Democratic assemblies and electoral institutions strengthened at national and sub-national levels

ANDS Component: Governance, rule of law & human rights

Total Budget: \$173,094,000

Responsible Agencies: UNDP, Independent Election Commission, and Electoral Complaints Commission

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
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
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List of Acronyms

ANA	Afghan National Army
ANDS	Afghanistan National Development Strategy
ANP	Afghan National Police
ANSF	Afghan National Security Forces
CPAP	Country Programme Action Plan
CN	Candidate Nomination
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
DFC	District Field Coordinator
ECC	Electoral Complaints Commission
ELECT	Enhancing Legal and Electoral Capacity for Tomorrow
FEFA	Free and Fair Elections Foundation of Afghanistan
HR	Human Resources
IFES	International Foundation for Electoral Systems
IOM	International Organization for Migration
IRI	Independent Republican Institute
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
JEMB	Joint Electoral Management Body
JSPG	Joint Security Planning Group
MoD	Ministry of Defence
MOI	Ministry of Interior
MoWA	Ministry of Women Affairs
MP	Member of Parliament
NDI	National Democratic Institute
NDS	National Directorate for Security (Intelligence Unit)
PC	Polling Centre
PESG	Post-Election Strategy Group
ProDoc	Project Document
PS	Polling Station
PSA	Public Service Announcement
SRSG	Special Representation of the Secretary General
TAF	The Asia Foundation
UNAMA	United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan
UNDAF	United Nations Development Assistance Framework
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
VR	Voter Registration

Executive Summary

This report provides an overview of the support of UNDP/ELECT to Afghan electoral bodies, the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) and Electoral Complaints Commission (ECC) in the third quarter of 2010.

It has been in this quarter that the *Wolesi Jirga* (parliamentary) elections have been held and, although final results are yet to be announced, this is a significant achievement in the democratic governance of Afghanistan.

To this end, UNDP/ELECT provided technical and operational support to the IEC and ECC to:

- Register new voters;
- Register candidates;
- Accredite agents, observers and media;
- Procure and distribute voting materials;
- Train polling staff and trainers-of-trainers;
- Construct a media center;
- Hold regular meetings between electoral bodies, observers and stakeholders;
- Carry out election day procedures;
- Collect and tally votes;
- Process and adjudicate electoral challenges, complaints and appeals;
- Provide media and stakeholders with regular updates; and
- Sustain collaborative efforts between the IEC and ECC at national and provincial levels.

In spite of extensive preparations, security remained a primary concern throughout the entirety of the process. Similarly, in spite of measures to counter fraud, it was widely acknowledged that elections would likely be imperfect.

Nonetheless, the international community was extremely supportive and electoral bodies operated on the assumption that while elections might not be perfect, they could most certainly be “better” and - above all else - should be credible to Afghan people.

Despite Election Day violence, electoral irregularities and fraud, the general perception among observers is that – technically and operationally – the *Wolesi Jirga* elections were indeed better organized than previous elections. Both local and international stakeholders applauded IEC leadership for its commitment to identify and exclude fraudulent ballots.

The announcement of preliminary results was 11 days late – due to rigorous auditing. While this drew some criticism, it has more commonly been understood to exemplify the commitment of the IEC to ensure that every stage of the election process is credible. To this end, results from almost 15 percent of polling stations were excluded and, when preliminary announcements were made, they were arguably more accurate than if they had been made in haste.

Having received more than 5,000 complaints since election day – 55% of which, if proven, could affect election results – the ECC has been equally diligent, implementing standard procedures throughout the country before publicising final decisions.

Accelerating the rate at which results are ascertained, the ECC has announced that it will not challenge IEC decisions on ballot exclusions.

The process of adjudication of complaints is on-going before final results can be certified. At the risk of further delays in announcement of final election results, credibility is paramount and must not be compromised.

Among stakeholders, there is consensus on the need to review the existing electoral system, which was specifically designed to accommodate a period of transition. That period is now complete.

The gains made in the preparation and conduct of the 2009 presidential and provincial council elections and the 2010 Wolesi Jirga elections– most notably the establishment of the IEC and its offices throughout Afghanistan – should not be undone. UNDP is currently in dialogue with stakeholders, to determine the most effective means to support electoral reform and build capacity of the IEC.

I. Context

In 2010, UNDP, in close consultation with Afghan electoral authorities (Independent Election Commission and Electoral Complaints Commission) substantively revised the ELECT Project Document (3rd substantive revision). The substantive revision was catalysed by the Afghan government's request for international technical and logistical support to conduct the *Wolesi Jirga* election; and was pursuant to the UN Security Council Resolution 1917 of 22nd March 2010 which mandated the UN Assistance Mission to Afghanistan (UNAMA) and the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) to coordinate international electoral assistance to Afghanistan.

Approved by the Project Board in May 2010, the revised ELECT Project Document (ProDoc) provides a strategic framework for achieving three overarching outputs:

- Output 1: Support to the IEC to conduct a limited voter registration top-up as required for the 2010 election; and capacity-building through the provision of technical and operational assistance for the 2010 election;
- Output 2: Capacity-building, through technical and operational support to the ECC, to manage their responsibilities in the conduct of the 2010 election;
- Output 3: Support to long-term electoral reform and capacity-building of the electoral management bodies.

The strategic focus of UNDP/ELECT in 2010 is to support Independent Election Commission and the Electoral Complaints Commission to accomplish their respective mandates of organising various processes of the *Wolesi Jirga* election. These included voter registration, candidate nomination and vetting, procurement, delivery, and retrieval of electoral materials; recruitment; training and deployment of electoral staff; polling; tallying and announcement of election results; and, arbitration of challenges and complaints associated with various electoral activities. ELECT's strategic focus is aligned with pillar (2) of the Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS)¹; and directly contributes towards the achievement of Output (1)² of Outcome (1)³ for UNDP's Country Programme Action Plan (CPAP).

In pursuit of its mandate, UNDP/ELECT closely collaborates with, and receives high-level political support from UNAMA and the SRSG. ELECT also closely collaborates with other international electoral support institutions, especially the USAID-funded project of International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) to ensure a more coherent, concerted, coordinated, and effective IEC and ECC institutional capacity strengthening mechanism.

¹ Governance, Rule of Law and Human Rights

² Democratic assemblies and electoral institutions strengthened at national and sub-national levels

³ State capacity enhanced to promote responsive governance and democratization

II. Status of the progress towards the achievement of output/outcome

Output 1: Voter Registration and Capacity Building for *Wolesi Jirga* Elections

Over the reporting period, UNDP/ELECT supported IEC to accomplish three critical electoral milestones, namely 1) voter registration; 2) candidate vetting; and 3) polling, tallying and announcement of election results.

Voter Registration

According to the IEC, 16,783,349 voters were registered in the last four voter registration phases of 2003, 2004, 2005 and 2008/09. However, it was acknowledged that since the last registration, several people could have attained the minimum voting age of 18 years; some eligible voters could have recently returned to Afghanistan; while others may have lost their voter cards since the last elections; or wanted to transfer from one voter location to another. Therefore, IEC, with logistical support from UNDP/ELECT, conducted a limited voter registration exercise to enable those who needed a new voter's card receive one prior to the *Wolesi Jirga* election.

Between 12 June and 12 August, IEC registered 377,197 voters in all thirty four provinces of Afghanistan. These included 207,014 male (55%); 152,147 female (40%); and 16,920 (5%) Kuchis. IEC deployed 85 teams (comprising of four officials) to set up voter registration centres at provincial capitals only. However, IEC agreed to provide one voter registration team for Marja district in Helmand province, which had formally been under insurgent control. The voter registration team for Marja district operated between 17 and 23 August; enabling 1,330 people to register for voting. All those registered were male.

Requests by various stakeholders – including the ECC – for an extension of voter registration period through mobile registration teams were firmly rejected by IEC on grounds that any such mobile registration would be operationally untenable, and could lead to an escalation of multiple registrations. The international community supported IEC's decision not to extend voter registration through mobile registration teams or any other means.

Finalisation of Candidate Lists

During the last quarter, the IEC completed candidate nomination as its first significant milestone for the *Wolesi Jirga* election. By 6 May when the candidate nomination ended, IEC confirmed that 2667 candidates, including 417 females had nominated themselves to contest the *Wolesi Jirga* election. However, these candidates needed to be vetted by the Vetting Commission for their possible links with Illegal Armed Groups (IAGs); and would also be subjected to a challenge process to determine whether they met all the pre-requisites for nomination. The Vetting Commission was obliged to forward their findings to the ECC – which would make a final decision to exclude the vetted candidates from the list of candidates.

Although the challenge period had been scheduled to end on 18 June, concerns expressed by various stakeholders, necessitated that challenged candidates were given more time to respond to challenges against them. Concerns about the lack of procedural rigor in the candidates' vetting process were also raised by the international community, which prompted the President's Office to request that the vetting process be re-opened. Accordingly, the appeal period for the vetting process was further extended, giving candidates until 5 July to submit any new evidence for consideration by the Vetting Commission.

While ECC reserved the right to continue evaluating and deciding on evidence of non-compliance with the nomination criteria as it emerged, the IEC, after excluding vetted out candidates and those who had withdrawn, announced the final list of candidates for Provincial constituencies comprising 2556 candidates; of which 2150 were male and 406 female. The final list also included 52 candidates for the national Kuchi constituency, comprising of 42 male and 10 female.

Despite delays regarding candidate vetting, the IEC decided that the campaign period would officially commence as scheduled on 23 June and run until midnight of 15 September 2010. Delaying the start of the campaign period would have contravened the provisions of the 2010 Electoral Law, which specify that the campaign period should commence 120 days prior to polling day.

For the purpose of guaranteeing transparency and fairness of the candidates' electoral campaign process, the IEC adopted specific campaign regulations and ensured that all candidates complied with them. Candidates who flouted the regulations were referred to the ECC for further investigation and reprimand/penalty.

Planning for Fraud Mitigation

Aware of the likelihood of electoral fraud perpetuated by unfavourable political and security conditions, IEC formulated a mitigation strategy with various measures to deter and detect, but certainly not eliminate fraud. The anti-fraud measures were built on international best practices and specific lessons learned from the 2009 presidential and provincial council elections.

Every stage of the election process was subjected to an array of procedures designed to ensure the effectiveness and transparency of the election. These included, for example, ensuring sensitive materials are adequately accounted for at all stages of distribution and retrieval; that counting is standardized and conducted in a transparent manner; and that tallying is not manipulated by any individual. Anti-counterfeiting measures and safeguards, including serial numbers, barcodes, and tracking systems, were adopted to ensure materials are more tightly controlled.

Moreover, EC embedded fraud detection triggers in national tally centre to help identify suspicious ballots that would then be quarantined and subjected to a systematic audit and/or recount. To ensure maximum observance of all stages of the electoral process, the IEC planned to accredit at least thousands of international and domestic election observers.

The criteria for opening polling centres would be more strict in 2010, to avoid planning polling stations in insecure areas where fraud and 'ghost stations' would be more likely. IEC planned to finalise the list of polling centres at least one month prior to Election Day, following an assessment by Afghan National Security Forces (ANSFs), followed by an a verification conducted by IEC's District Field Coordinators (DFCs).

The ANSF assessment recommended that out of the 6,835 polling centres initially proposed by IEC, 6,038 could be opened and secured, while 797 would not be secured for opening. However, the verification carried out by DFCs led to a further reduction of polling centres that were deemed secure enough to open for polling. On August 18, the IEC released the final list of polling centres for the 18 September election; showing that only 5,897 polling centers with 18,762 polling stations would be opened. A total of 938 centers with 1,183 polling stations were removed from the preliminary list. IEC reaffirmed that no electoral materials would be sent to polling locations that cannot be secured by ANSFs.

IEC reserved the right to further downscale the number of polling centres to open if the security situation deteriorated further in the lead to polling day. On the other hand, IEC would not, under any circumstances, increase the number of polling centres to be opened as that would have serious logistical and administrative implications.

Polling and tallying of election results

Amidst immense security and logistical challenges, the IEC with support from UNDP/ELECT conducted the *Wolesi Jirga* elections as scheduled, on 18 September 2010. Based on the security assessment for polling centres that could be secured for polling, IEC had prepared and distributed electoral materials to about 5800 polling centres. However voting took place at 5,497 polling centres (PCs) with 17,744 polling stations (PSs). This represented almost 95% of the planned polling locations.

Tallying of results at the national tally centre took one month, enabling IEC to announce preliminary results on the 20 of October. In the course of the tallying process, IEC made an effort to audit only, recount only, or both audit and recount cases where results seemed questionable or suspicious. Based on the audits and/or recounts, the IEC decided to exclude results from 2,543 PSs (14.33% of all PSs). Of these, 604 PCs were completely excluded (all the PSs of the PC excluded, representing 1,723 PSs) and 584 PCs were the object of partial exclusion (some, but not all PSs of the PC were excluded, representing 820 PSs). In this context, the preliminary results published referred to 15,201 PSs in all 35 electoral constituencies. Of these, 266 PSs reported no votes at all (meaning the stations opened but no-one voted) and 511 PSs, reported opened, had no results forms attached.

While the number of valid votes reported by the tally center was 4,271,908; the total number of valid votes reported in the IEC press release was 4,265,347. The difference of 6,561 votes roughly corresponds to the votes invalidated because the candidates had been excluded from the final list of candidates, although their names and details still existed on the ballot papers. The total number of votes excluded was 1,330,782. IEC noted that based on the 4,265,347 valid votes announced, the country-wide voter turn-out was 44.7 percent⁴. These results will remain provisional, pending arbitration of all the major electoral complaints by the Electoral Complaints Commission of Afghanistan.

UNDP/ELECT support towards attainment of the above electoral milestones was delivered through the following activities:

(i) Facilitate IEC to deploy temporary staff to carry out VR and *Wolesi Jirga* elections by providing salaries and other staff payments

IEC completed recruitment process for 1,513 voter educators and deployed them throughout the country on 2nd August. These comprised 936 males (62%); 475 females (31%), and 102 Kuchis (7%). IEC was not able to recruit any female voter educators for Nooristan and Paktika provinces, but at least 18 other provinces achieved more than 30% female staffing.

The recruitment of 3,020 District Field Coordinators (DFCs) was also completed as scheduled. These included 2,272 (75%) male; 572 (19%) female; and 176 (6%) Kuchis. Only three provinces had more than 30% female staffing. For polling day, IEC recruited 86,575 polling staff and 2,240 contingency staff. To improve transparency in the election process and discourage fraud, IEC also decided to recruit and deploy 75 Polling Center Monitors to monitor at least 157 polling centers in 14 provinces. As with recruitment for other staffing positions, IEC encountered shortages of willing females enrolling as polling officials. As a mitigation measure, IEC decided that it would deploy respectable village elders to help fill in at polling stations where there were insufficient female polling staff.

⁴ This could be a bit of a controversial figure, as it is based on the estimated maximum number of voters in the reported opened PSs (minus the PSs excluded in the exclusion of PCs).

In line with IEC’s strategic intent of ensuring integrity of the electoral process, 114 District Field Coordinators were subsequently dismissed due to misconduct. Further, 65% of all District Field Coordinators (DFC) teams were reshuffled within the districts to reduce chances of collusion and being compromised by political candidates, agents, and other local power brokers; and in so doing ensure the impartial implementation of procedures at the polling stations. This affected all provinces except Nuristan - where the reshuffle would be too complex owing to security reasons.

All staff recruitments were centrally coordinated through a web application to allow automated short listing and reduce influence peddling. At headquarters level, UNDP/ELECT supported the IEC to design a DFC recruitment database to ensure quality control over the recruitment process. Applicants’ details including their photos were entered into this database at Provincial level. Standard selection criteria were used to shortlist applicants from the database at IEC Headquarters and a list of shortlisted applicants was sent to the respective provinces where written exams and oral interviews were conducted. To enhance transparency of the recruitment process, FEFA, Human rights groups, and UNAMA were invited to observe the interview process.

Salaries for IEC staff were paid out of the ELECT basket fund through IEC in line with a Letter of Understanding between UNDP and IEC. However, the slip into receivership of Kabul Bank – which served as the intermediary bank – triggered significant administrative challenges with regard to timely payment of staff salaries. More than USD 1.5 million was trapped in Kabul Bank at the time its assets were attached. IEC, with high-level political support from UNAMA and the SRSG, requested support from the Afghan Central Bank to ensure that the cash was immediately made available, to avoid paying staff after elections as this would cause substantial logistical and security challenges for IEC. As it turned out, Kabul Bank could not release all the funds for all the provinces ahead of the September 18 poll. As a consequence, IEC was forced to effect payments for at least two provinces (Nuristan and Badghis) only after the elections. Local “money dealers” (*Hawala*) were used to transfer all subsequent payments to the provinces.

(ii) Procure, and support IEC to deliver and retrieve assets, materials, and logistical supplies for the VR top-up process and the *Wolesi Jirga* Elections:

Procurement, intake and delivery of various electoral materials was completed during the reporting period (see table 1 below).

Table 1: Some of the election materials procured for *Wolesi Jirga* elections

Description	QTY
Printing, installation, rental, and maintenance of Billboards in flux (4 colors). For IEC	400
Printing, installation, rental and maintenance of flux poll signs - wind and water resistant, 4 color image /graphics and text.	5,000
Trainers Guide-Polling counting for IEC.	4,000
Training flip charts for IEC	27,000
Quick Reference Guide	5,000
Frequently asked questions sheets	34,000
Staff duty sheet ballot paper issuer for IEC.	22,000
Code of conduct for IEC	139,000
Reconciliation/Result forms - one set for IEC.	9,275
Reconciliation/Result form - Two set for IEC.	2,225
Polling and counting procedures Kabul	6,445
DFC Guidelines	3,500

Staff duty sheets.	22,000
Wolesi jirga Mock Ballots - One sheet	253,490
Wolesi Jirga Mock ballots -Two sheet	208,575
Ballot papers	12,581,400
Training forms packing envelops.	2,400
Training Flipcharts.	4,600
Voting screens for polling day.	22,000
Brochures.	1,100,000
Leaflets	2,200,000
Factsheets	1,500,000
Posters	510,000
Stickers	400,000
Reconciliation result form.	18,560
Reconciliation result form(four set form).	2,440
Materials transfer form from PCM to chairperson before polling.	22,300
List of polling day voters form	22,300
Envelop for Packing of polling station forms.	22,300
Plastic Tables	10,000
Plastic Chairs	10,000
Card punch	22,000
Indelible ink bottles	44,000
Stamp pads	17,500
Rubber bands	17,500
Batteries	44,000
Rulers	22,000
Tunics(Polling Staff)	88,000

The printing of 12,581,400 ballot papers for different constituencies was executed in Dubai. A joint team of IEC and ELECT staff monitored the process at the printing facility. All ballot papers were delivered in August after some delays. The production of training kits, polling centre kits and polling station kits which included 44,000 indelible ink bottles, 22000 star-shaped hole punchers, security scotch tape, seals, tamper evident bags, 17500 stamp pads, 44000 batteries, and others, was undertaken in China and delivered to Kabul in the middle of August.

The procurement of 20,000 pieces of plastic furniture for use at polling centres and stations was associated with serious delays precipitated by late issuance of a Certificate of Exception by the Afghan Government authorities. Their arrival in Kabul, a few weeks before the election caused considerable operational anxiety within the IEC.

Some electoral materials – especially the hole-punchers were reported defective on Election Day, prompting polling officials to use scissors to mark voter cards that had been used. There were also reports of indelible ink being easily washed off, although both biological and physical tests on the ink, prior to the election demonstrated the ink was of a good quality.

All blue boxes that were used to deliver polling centre materials from Kabul to the provinces last year were retrieved to IEC Hqs and reused to deliver polling centre materials for *Wolesi Jirga* elections. Other than the Central Region, where road transport was used, all deliveries of Blue Boxes with sensitive materials to regions and provinces were made by air. Onward distribution of the materials from provincial warehouses to district polling centers commenced on 12 September also by road and air. IEC had foreshadowed that at least 80 locations (in 69 districts) would require air support, with a possibility that this number could increase if security conditions deteriorated. Ultimately, ISAF flew over 10,000 Blue Boxes (222,345 kg of electoral materials). To facilitate transportation of

election materials, UNDP had by end of July, issued transportation contacts to several companies to transport electoral goods as well as IEC personnel.

The movement of materials in some provinces was seriously hampered by security threats. It was difficult to get materials into many districts. ANSF and ISAF assisted to move polling materials into Waygal and Nurgram districts to allow a sufficient number of polling centers to be opened. Ghazni also posed considerable distributional problems to the IEC due to the difficulty of reaching Ajristan districts where security forces repeatedly tried to fly into but failed due to bad weather.

To improve tracking of sensitive electoral materials and consequently reduce fraud, IEC adopted a computerised system for bar-coding the packing of electoral materials. All the electoral materials were first delivered to the IEC provincial office, then to the districts and to polling centers. The transportation process was observed and controlled by IEC officials with the support of security institutions. Thirty-four Provincial Operation Centers (one for each province) were instituted by IEC to monitor the movement of materials from provincial warehouses to the districts. This enhanced oversight and coordination between IEC Hqs and the field.

On Election Day, 255 polling centers received contingency sensitive electoral materials to meet shortfalls of electoral materials. However, hard-to-reach areas such as Jawand District (Badghis) and Darwaze Bela Mamai district (Badakshan) could not be supplied, owing to logistical and security constraints. The tracking system for sensitive materials enabled Hqs to maintain strict control over contingency materials.

The retrieval of electoral materials from districts to provincial warehouses, and from provinces to the national tally centre proceeded reasonably well. However, retrieval from some provinces such as Laghman, Wardak, Nooristan, Ghazni, Baghlan and Badghis was constrained by security threats as many flights were shot at by insurgents, while trying to land in some districts. The significance of these delays from an operational stand-point was minor. Retrieval of tamper evident bags to the provincial offices had been completed by end of September, with the exception of only six tamper-evident bags (four from Baghlan and two from Sar-i-Pul provinces); but even these were expected to be delivered to Kabul within the first week of October.

In pursuit of its mandate to strengthen IEC's operational capacity and independence, and in view of the inevitable closure of ELECT Project soon after conclusion of all *Wolesi Jirga* electoral activities, UNDP/ELECT initiated a process for handover of most ELECT assets to IEC. Over the reporting period, asset inventories were completed in Kabul and at HQs, paving way for handover of ownership of 8700 assorted assets to IEC with a total estimated value of USD 7.4 million (see table 2 below). Asset inventories in other provinces had commenced or underway by September, which will result in more assets being aligned for transfer to IEC over the next quarter.

Table 2: Assets handed over to IEC

DESCRIPTION	QUANTITY	AMOUNT (USD)	Transfer Date
Soft skin vehicles	16	763,200.00	13/07/2010
Media Centre Equipment	267	121,399.10	13/07/2010
Thuraya Phones	600	532,650.00	05/08/2010
Projectors	34	1,325,445.12	05/08/2010
Meeting Tables		4,025.00	10/08/2010
Office Chairs		11,290.00	10/08/2010
Book Shelves		1,980.00	10/08/2010
Canon Powershot Photo Cameras	12	5,126.00	30/09/2010

CISCO Catalyst 3560G-48PS	6	29,784.00	30/09/2010
Colour Laser Jet s	4	7,520.00	30/09/2010
Dell Laptop Computers	4	4,626.60	30/09/2010
Desktop Computers	496	445,387.26	30/09/2010
Digital Cameras	2,455	1,733,475.30	30/09/2010
Digital Sender	1	3,695.00	30/09/2010
D-Link Print Servers	4	340.00	30/09/2010
D-Link Switch	2	1,500.40	30/09/2010
Office Armchairs	310	36,475.00	30/09/2010
File Cabinet (book shelves)	5	1,040.00	30/09/2010
Flat Screen Monitors	391	36,136.00	30/09/2010
Hp proliant ml350r05	3	31,350.00	30/09/2010
HP Storage Works 60 Modular Smart array	1	4,175.00	30/09/2010
Laser Prints	4	1,400.00	30/09/2010
Multiwire Broadband Dipole	1	1,123.44	30/09/2010
Paper Shredder	1	630.00	30/09/2010
Photo Copier	1	1,670.00	30/09/2010
Photo Printers	2774	1,974,102.14	30/09/2010
HP Printers	15	16,225.00	30/09/2010
Safe (80h*40*60cm, appr 50kg)	2	1,240.00	30/09/2010
Thuraya Phone	1	920.00	30/09/2010
Scanners	11	170,325.87	30/09/2010
Servers	3	47,475.00	30/09/2010
Solar Batteries	19	2,850.00	30/09/2010
Solar Panels	6	6,740.64	30/09/2010
UPSs	658	48,273.36	30/09/2010
Weight Scale	1	600.00	30/09/2010
Office Desks	78	12,530.00	30/09/2010
TOTAL COST		7,386,725.23	

(iii) Support IEC to design and deliver appropriate training to voter registration and Wolesi Jirga election workers

Appropriate training to various categories of IEC staff is recognized as a critical catalyst for generating skill levels and professional readiness required for sound election planning and conduct. Within this context, UNDP/ELECT supported IEC to design and deliver several staff training events over the course of the reporting period. The events targeted Provincial Electoral Officers, District Field Coordinators, polling officials, as well as Hq staff.

Three briefing sessions were organised for IEC provincial & regional staff in July and August, to create awareness about the electoral process. They focused on activities surrounding pre-polling, polling and post polling phases; and covered multiple topics, including:

- Polling Centre finalization and conditions for opening them;
- National Movement Plans/Air Operations (delivery schedule, packing of material);
- Delivery and retrieval of materials to provincial offices;
- Air operations;
- Delivery and retrieval of materials to Kabul;
- Recruitment of polling staff and payment;
- Contingency election materials: storage and release, staff and vehicles, security updates;

- Gender-related issues in the electoral process;
- Public outreach activities;
- Accreditation of observers and party agents;
- Polling and counting simulation;
- Intake procedures;
- Election results, national tally centre operations and intake database;
- Role of PECCs in the electoral process;
- Administration/finance modalities – including payment systems for animal traction and verification of way-bills for verifying transportation services for election materials.

In readiness for roll-out of DFC training programme, IEC Hqs delivered two, five-day training sessions between 27 July and 6 August. These targeted 190 IEC provincial trainers who would train DFCs through cascade sessions at province level. The training of 3,020 DFCs by Provincial Trainers was subsequently conducted between 15 and 25 August 2010 to make district staff aware of the procedures and guidelines for *Wolesi Jirga* elections. They covered broad operational aspects such as the steps involved in opening and closing polling centres and stations; polling and counting procedures; opening and closure of polling, completion of reconciliation/results forms; announcement of results at polling centres; and how to prepare ballots and ballot boxes for transportation to provincial headquarters.

In turn, District Field Coordinators helped to cascade and supervise training for 86,575 polling officials – comprising of Polling Centre Managers, Queue Controllers, Polling Station Chairpersons, Identification Officers, Ballot Paper Issuers, and Ballot Box Controllers. The training for polling officials was organised in two phases. During the first phase, key polling day staff such as Polling Station Chairpersons; Polling Center Managers; and Identification Officers were trained at provincial levels, between September 2 and 11. The second phase; which targeted Queue Controllers, Ballot Paper Issuers, and Ballot Box Controllers took place between 16 and 17 September, and was facilitated by Polling Centre and Station chairpersons. Both training phases focused on all procedural aspects of the polling, counting and announcement of results; and stressed the associated roles of responsibilities of polling officials.

On 12 September, Kabul province started trainings for contingency polling teams. These teams would remain on standby for a possible quick deployment to polling centers on Election Day, if there was a need for establishment of extra polling stations. Contingency team trainings for all other provinces were combined with the regular training programme and were finalised on 15 September. All together, 2,240 contingency polling staff were trained and readied for emergency deployment.

Before being deployed on 2 August, all the 1,513 Voter Educators received training on various public outreach and education methods – including use of flip charts, manuals, and other audio-visual training aids.

As part of its quest to mainstream gender in all IEC operational and administrative units, the IEC gender unit organised appropriate gender sensitisation sessions for all staff at Hqs. Four groups were trained as follows:

- IEC provincial Gender Focal Points (GFPs) attended a three-day session to review the work of GFPs; gender issues; gender mainstreaming and budgeting; and gender in the workplace. All provincial GFPs attended except six.

- About 40 IEC Hq female staff participated in a three day training session focusing on work skills; management and communication; personal management; empowerment; and gender issues at work. The group also made a study tour to the Ministry of Women’s Affairs and met with the Minister who commended the IEC for its strong support to female staff and commitment to Gender mainstreaming.
- A session was also organised for 15 Hq female cleaners and cooks on behavior at work; interpersonal skills; communication skills; and gender issues.
- Three sessions were organised for IEC Commissioners to discuss gender issues at work; gender policy; gender budgeting and planning.

(iv) Provide technical and operational assistance to enable IEC upgrade its Data Centre IT and software systems and capacity:

The data centre played a central role in the management of candidate nomination data; design of ballot papers templates; and intake and analysis of candidates’ financial reports during the campaign period. Early in the quarter, the data centre continued to serve as a processing hub for voter registry forms – both for the outstanding 2008/2009 and those for 2010. To improve capture and processing of voter registry data, the data centre was upgraded with three new voter registration database applications, namely 1) delimitation module; 2) quality control module; and 3) Voter Registration management module. Cumulatively, 4,733,961 voter registry forms (of which 195,222 are from the 2010 voter registry update) were processed.

Towards the end of August, processing of voter registry forms was wrapped up to allow the data centre be reconfigured into a national tally centre ahead of the September 18 elections. The reconfiguration involved establishment of 109 workstations for data entry clerks, and up to 10 workstations for reconciliation and audit teams. Servers for the tally process and their backups were installed and test-run on tally databases and applications such as:

- Data entry module;
- Intake module for provincial offices;
- Intake module for tally centre;
- Clearance module; and
- Batching and scanning module.

The tallying of election results at the National Tally Centre – still ongoing by end of quarter, is in consonance with Tally Procedures, and Clearance and Audit Procedures for the Tally Center – which the IEC Board of Commissioners approved in August. Working in two shifts, IEC deployed 300 staff at the data centre to expeditiously perform the following seven critical functions:

- a) Intake – this involves conducting an integrity check of the temper-evident bags against the handover form; ensuring that the tamper evident bags are untainted and that the serial number of the seals of the tamper evident bags and transport boxes are identical to the ones reported through the web-based entry by the IEC provincial offices. Any suspicious or incomplete deliveries are quarantined and investigated.
- b) Data Entry Batch Preparation – this involves inspecting each tamper evident bag to identify potential tampering and to determine whether it contains completed and correct forms. All forms included in a tamper evident bag are processed as one batch.

This leaves a paper trail that can be investigated in the case of any future irregularities. All the forms are scanned and stored in case the original copies are spoiled or lost. Scanned forms are also posted online throughout the results processing period.

- c) Data Entry of Result Forms – The results are entered in a database using software that automatically performs mathematical and quality control checks. The data entry clerk is notified if any data is invalid or incorrectly entered in the results sheet.
- d) Duplicate Entry – results forms that pass through the previous three steps are re-entered – a process referred to as a “double blind data entry system.” For quality control purposes, the reentered data is saved as a duplicate of the existing data.
- e) Forms Review and Correction — the database software compares entries from the last two stages, and flags any forms that do not match. The forms are reviewed and errors can only be corrected by a supervisor who must choose one of the two entered versions. If neither version is correct, the entire entry process must be redone.
- f) Quality Control – all the processed data is reviewed manually against the actual results sheets and corrections are carried out accordingly.
- g) Archive – a verification process is conducted to ensure that each batch of forms has followed each step. If the procedure has been followed correctly, the data is accepted in the database and the forms are archived in a safe storage area.

Any irregularities detected during the first two steps result in tamper evident bags being sent to a clearance section. If problems are corrected, tamper evident bags are allowed to be brought back in the process. If not, they are investigated further by an audit team. Once the audit is completed, teams pass the data to a management group, which then makes final recommendations on all audit cases that will be submitted for decision to the Board of Commissioners. If irregularities are detected by the audit team, the management group calls a recount at the provincial level. The management group also checks all the results before presenting them to the IEC Board of Commissioners for endorsement.

(v) Support IEC to plan and implement awareness-raising public outreach campaign for VR and Wolesi Jirga elections

The IEC commenced the public outreach campaigns on 18 July, and sustained them well beyond the Election Day. To conduct these campaigns, 1,513 Civic Educators comprising 936 males (62%); 475 females (31%), and 102 Kuchis (7%) were hired, trained and deployed across the country to disseminate printed public outreach materials.

The IEC provided Civic Educators with various educational materials including loudspeakers, posters, brochures, flyers, flipcharts and an accompanying manual, mock ballots, mock ballot stickers, and leaflets. As shown in table 3, IEC produced more than six million

Billboards	400
Poll signs	5,000
Trainers Guide	4,000
Flip charts (Type A)	27,000
Booklets.	4,600
Quick Reference Guide	5,000
Frequently asked questions sheets	34,000
Mock Ballots – Type A	253,490
Mock ballots –Type B	208,575
Brochures.	1,100,000
Leaflets	2,200,000
Factsheets	1,500,000
Posters	510,000
Stickers	400,000

assorted public outreach materials were distributed and/or posted in all provinces.

IEC deepened its public outreach programming through local and nationwide radios and televisions, as well as print media. With logistical support from UNDP/ELECT, the IEC produced 26 types of one-minute TV public service announcements (PSAs) – 13 in Dari and 13 in Pashto language. These were broadcast to the nation through 10 national TV channels for at least 168,000 seconds. ISAF helped to further disseminate these TV PSAs by broadcasting them for free on its TV network. The TV PSAs contained various messages covering candidate nomination; the challenge period; voter registration; women participation in elections; secrecy of the vote; the role of observers and candidates' agents on election day; how to cast a vote; counting procedure; the complaints process, etc. IEC complemented this messaging with two, 10-minute TV Election Documentaries (one in Dari, one in Pashto) which were broadcast at least 150 times, on seven TV channels to inform the electorate about various aspects of the election. RTA – the national TV channel offered to broadcast the documentaries for free.

In addition, IEC developed 26 types of radio PSAs (13 in Dari and 13 in Pashto), which were disseminated through 30 national radio channels for at least 1,740,000 seconds. Also, ISAF complemented this by disseminating the radio PSAs for free on its radio network. In addition, 30 episodes of radio soap opera (15 in Dari and 15 Pashto) were produced and broadcast through 10 national radio channels for at least 480 times, again ISAF offered to compliment dissemination on a *pro-bono* basis.

Among other information components, the radio soap opera stressed the election date; the importance of female involvement in the elections and the fact that there will be separate voting facilities for male and female; general information about the importance of holding the *Wolesi Jirga* elections, the role the and responsibilities of the *Wolesi Jirga*; role of observers and candidates' agents; the election process; the complaints mechanism; and procedure for counting and announcement of election results.

Mobile theatres, face-to-face seminars, and sms messaging were also widely used to educate and inform the public about the elections. About 60 operators supported by four supervisors received and responded to public inquiries at the IEC toll-free call centre. The operators worked in three shifts, from 7am to 11pm every day per week. The IEC Call Centre processed an average of 1800 calls every day. As expected, the call-in rate significantly increased towards the election date, receiving and processing almost 2000 daily calls.

At least 400 billboards and 5000 poll signs were installed all over the country to display electoral information.

Figure 1: Examples of IEC Public Outreach Materials



(vi) Support implementation of security safeguards for personnel and sensitive electoral materials

The planning and conduct of *Wolesi Jirga* electoral activities was fraught with daunting security challenges. By so many undisputable accounts, the level of insecurity in 2010 degenerated to its highest levels since the overthrow of the Taliban regime. Anti-Government Elements (AGEs) consistently vowed to disrupt the electoral process; and unleashed various forms of terror and intimidation to individuals and institutions engaged in the electoral process.

During the quarter, UNDP/ELECT provided technical and logistical assistance to enable IEC install, or continue to improve security measures for its staff, facilities, and goods. In particular, UNDP/ELECT supported the IEC with the development of the security aspect of the National Movement Plan, to ensure that sensitive electoral materials are delivered and tracked from the IEC Headquarters to the Regional and Provincial IEC Offices. Following the release of the final Polling Centre list on 18 August, provincial movement plans were reviewed and amended as appropriate. In addition, ELECT supported IEC to undertake an Election Security Risk Analysis to better understand the nature and magnitude of threats, vulnerabilities and risks associated with the electoral process. This was regularly up-dated in the lead-up to elections.

To better coordinate security mitigation measures, IEC worked very closely with, and received considerable support from both ISAF and ANSFs. A security concept of operations and plan was reviewed and endorsed by the Joint Command as a framework for providing electoral security assistance. On 7 and 8 August, ANSF and ISAF staged an election security rehearsal exercise to assess the efficacy of the security plan. The rehearsal revealed several disconnects between Command and Control structures of the two organizations, paving way for a refining process well ahead of the elections.

In particular, the rehearsal revealed a critical and urgent need to improve communication between IEC and the Joint Command. Consequently, two ISAF Officers (a Security Specialist and a Logistics Specialist) were embedded into the IEC to serve as direct links between the IEC on the one hand, and ANSF/ISAF Joint Command on the other hand, and thereby substantially facilitate expeditious requisitions for security support by IEC. Moreover, ISAF agreed to install communications systems within the IEC for the critical period between 16 and 20 September. This would facilitate and enable the ISAF Specialists

embedded in IEC to have a direct and seamless contact with the ISAF Operations and Control Center.

UNDP/ELECT provided logistical and technical assistance to upgrade physical security measures at IEC offices. Barricades, CCTV cameras, and police guard shelters were installed as requested by IEC Management.

(vii) Support the IEC Media Commission

The Electoral Media Commission was established under article (60) of the Electoral Law, and is mandated to monitor fair reporting and broadcasting by the media during the electoral campaign. In accordance with a Letter of Agreement between IEC and UNDP, ELECT continued to provide Media Commission staff salaries, Media Centre equipment and logistical supplies, and infrastructure development. The contracted works for the construction of a Media Centre at IEC Hqs were completed, enabling IEC to use its Media Centre facilities for the first time on 31 July 2010. The Media Centre was equipped with assorted audio-visual/conference facilities and furniture to ensure it effectively serves as a locus for IEC media conferences and interviews.

During the reporting period, Media Centre staff carried out weekly monitoring of media outlet and regularly published their reports on the IEC website. Eight Media monitoring reports covering the political campaigns between July and August 2010 were compiled and published on the website. A detailed statistical report was also uploaded covering the same period. The Media Commission activities were executed by four IEC National Staff (1 Officer, 2 Assistants and 1 Photographer), supported by an IFES Audio Visual Consultant (international) and under the leadership of five Media Commissioners (all national).

The Media Commission signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with RTA – the national TV and Radio service to launch an election program giving candidates a platform to introduce themselves and their agendas to the public. Candidates were entitled to eight free minutes of airtime (five minutes on radio; three minutes on television) to present their manifestos through recorded, un-moderated shows. Coverage of the candidates who took up the free airtime opportunity was generally balanced, with only a few candidates speaking slightly longer than their allotted time.

On their own initiative, some other media outfits provided opportunities for candidates to campaign. For instance on 29 July, ARIANA TV launched a free program in which Kabul nominees could appear on the station to present their recorded biography and campaign spots to its viewers. TOLO TV also provided free airtime to Kabul nominees during its "Election 89" program to enable the candidates present their manifestos to the public. But unlike the RTV of ARIANA, TOLO's programme was hosted by a journalist who posed questions to the nominees. CHANNEL 1 TV launched a talk show entitled "Election 1389" that featured candidates. The show was unique from other media stations because it featured a studio audience that posed questions to invited candidates. NOORIN TV's "Rai" (Vote) programme featured Kabul Nominees. A number of radio stations such as Kileed, Salam Watandar, and Da Soli Pigham were applauded by the Media Commission for providing opportunities to enable candidates publicize their agendas.

Unfortunately, most of these free programmes favored Kabul contenders. Far fewer province-based TV and Radio outfits offered free airtime as those in Kabul. Despite the availability of these free opportunities, the Media Commission reported that a proportionately small number of candidates appeared in these free TV and radio programmes. Coverage of the female candidates was generally limited across television, print and radio, compared with their male counterparts. Owing to AGE threats, it appears that the majority of candidates preferred low profile campaigning options.

A number of complaints were received and adjudicated by the Media Commission over the campaign period. These ranged from inaccurate reporting, malicious misrepresentation of fact, slander and marginalization. Some female candidates were victims of negative and/or smear campaigns. For instance, NOORIN TV's satirical program, "Talak," frequently ridiculed several female candidates for being concerned with cosmetics and fashion; alluding to their images in campaign posters and billboards. Further, it was often mentioned or inferred on some media outfits that it was immoral for female candidates to display their posters in public.

Despite the increased coverage of political campaign-related events by media outfits, the Media Commission noted that few stations dedicated original programming to the importance of the election; the promotion of democracy; or encouraging political participation. Overall though, the Media Commission expressed satisfaction with the manner in which the mass media engaged in the electoral process; describing it as generally "acceptable." The Media Commission noted that serious cases of violation such as propagating national division and hostility; giving space to ethnic, regional, linguistic and religious prejudices; insults and malicious accusations were less systematic compared with the past electoral periods.

(viii) Support IEC to plan and conduct External Relations events

The IEC Information Dissemination Plan was revised and finalized on 25 August. The new plan foreshadowed regular meetings with observers; candidates and their agents; media conferences and press interviews. These external relations events became a regular feature, and were intensified into in the lead up to elections. IEC conducted at least one daily External Relations event in the week before and after the election. An on-site Media Centre constructed and equipped with logistical support from UNDP/ELECT served as a convenient and effective locus for press conferences and media interviews.

To bolster information dissemination and clarity of public messaging, IEC reviewed, updated, and translated into local languages, nearly 30 documents (including fact sheets from 2009-2010; media and tally centre access policies; and accreditation guidelines). With logistical support from both UNDP/ELECT and IFES, these were burned onto CDs and distributed to candidates and political parties (3000 CDs), observers (500 CDs) and the media (500 CDs). The documents were also uploaded on the IEC website for public viewing and access.

The IEC website was re-designed to integrate user-friendliness, easy access to information and freshness. A dedicated *Wolesi Jirga* election results page elections on which partial results were uploaded as they became available from the Tally Centre.

As a demonstration of IEC's commitment to transparency and fairness on the 2010 electoral process, IEC shared its tally centre anti-fraud triggers with observers, Electoral Complaints Commission, media and stakeholders after commencement of the tally process. Given the sensitivity of the matter, the anti-fraud triggers were not shared before polling or the start of the tally process to protect the process from manipulation.

A key external relations function of the IEC was to establish procedures to streamline access to polling centres, media events, and tally centre by election observers,

Table 4: Final Accreditation Statistics, 2010

Type of entity	No/Entity	No/Individual	Gender	
			Male	Female
Parliamentary Candidates	1,911	368,708	279,950	88,754
International Observers	33	1,171	1,042	132
Domestic Observers	15	7,462	6,552	910
International Media	56	340	311	29
Domestic Media	43	463	430	33
Political Parties	10	1,209	1,011	199
Special Guests	2	63	63	
TOTAL	2,070	379,416	289,359	90,057

candidates, candidates' agents, and other guests. IEC had determined that entities and/or individuals interested in observing any electoral aspect would have to seek accreditation as a pre-condition. Based on 2009 forecasts, IEC had projected that perhaps 300,000 individuals would seek accreditation for the *Wolesi Jirga* election. However, and notwithstanding the deterioration of security, IEC was pleasantly surprised that nearly 400,000 individuals and 2000 entities obtained accreditation (see table 4). Parliamentary candidates and their agents constituted the majority of those accredited. FEFA - the umbrella organisation of domestic election observers submitted accreditation documentation to IEC provincial offices on 13 September for their nearly 7,000 observers. In essence, there were three times more agents, observers, and media than polling staff – which necessitated that IEC had to put in place measures to avoid observer stampede at polling centres and stations.

Unlike last year when the accreditation process was centralized, IEC decided that for 2010, observers, candidates, candidates' agents, media representatives, and special guests could as well obtain accreditation through IEC Provincial offices. This eased the process for interested entities and individuals based in remote provinces.

(ix) Support Complementary Activities

During the 3rd substantive revision of the ELECT Project Document, UNDP and donors agreed that ELECT will focus its approach towards supporting implementation of core electoral activities of the IEC and ECC. The focused approach required UNDP/ELECT to divest itself any responsibility for supporting non-core complementary activities – including media capacity building; media monitoring; domestic observation; civil society empowerment for civic education; and police training – as was the case in 2009.

However, ELECT was required to facilitate and coordinate stakeholders supporting and/or implementing complementary activities. In this context, ELECT organised several discussion forums to enable implementing agencies and donors exchange information and to chart out well coordinated strategies devoid of duplication of effort and/or resources; over-funding some activities at the expense of others; and geographical imbalances. Most complementary activities such as domestic observation, media monitoring, and sponsored advertising secured donor funding through bi-lateral arrangements to ensure their continuity.

However, it would soon become apparent that two non-core activities, namely police capacity building and female searchers for female polling stations required special attention since there weren't any appropriate bilateral funding modalities for them despite their criticality for the success of the *Wolesi Jirga* electoral process.

Accordingly, some UNDP/ELECT donors requested that they would be willing to fund these two complementary activities provided the ELECT basket fund offered a conduit through which funds would be dispensed. This request was presented to the ELECT Project Board for discussion, and was granted during the Project Board meeting of 5 September. Progress on supporting these complementary activities was as explained below.

a) Female Searchers

A Joint Directive for female searchers was signed on 8 September by both the Independent Directorate for Local Governance (IDLG) and Ministry of Interior (MoI). Under the agreement, the IDLG assumed responsibility for the recruitment and payment salaries for female body searchers; while the Ministry of Interior would take charge of training and deployment.

Although UNDP was not a signatory to the directive, it was generally understood by all parties that it would be UNDP’s responsibility to disburse funds to Governor’s offices, and follow up with the necessary accountabilities.

UNDP/ELECT triggered transfers for the payments of female searchers in all 34 provinces. The total number of female body searchers deployed on polling day was given as 7,333 (see table 5); and the total amount which UNDP/ELECT transferred to ILDG for their payments was US\$500,380. By end of September, UNDP/ELECT was still awaiting fulfilment of accountability requirements by IDLG as agreed.

Table 5: Female Body Searchers Deployed

Province	No.	Province	No.
Badakshan	416	Khost	49
Badghis	38	Kunar	120
Farah	298	Kunduz	334
Ghazni	352	Logar	120
Ghor	330	Paktika	124
Helmand	32	Paktya	166
Herat	711	Samangan	129
Jawzjan	152	Zabul	34
Baghlan	100	Daikundi	246
Kapisa	50	Nuristan	88
Faryab	368	Wardak	93
Laghman	164	Panjshir	122
Uruzgan	18	Sarepul	154
Kandahar	40	Nimroz	35
Balkh	309	Nangarhar	505
Parwan	172	Bamyam	306
Takhar	179	Kabul	979

b) Police Engagement

Forty thousand copies of the Police Training booklet developed by European Union Police Mission and Ministry of Interior in 2009 were re- printed and delivered to Kabul on 28 August. Elaborating responsible electoral policing protocols for the election, the booklets were distributed to all Provincial Police Units by the Ministry of Interior. UNDP also provided a modest top-up lunch allowance to police officers who were engaged in providing election security.

Output 2: Technical and Operational Support to ECC

The Electoral Complaints Commission (ECC) is an independent Afghan body established under Article 61 of the Electoral Law. The ECC has two functions: in the first place it considers challenges to the eligibility of nominated candidates and challenges to the eligibility of voters. It also arbitrates complaints regarding electoral offences as defined in Article 63 of the Electoral Law during campaigning period (23 June-16 September 2010), polling day (18 September 2010), and counting and tallying period (18 September onwards). The structure for processing and adjudicating the electoral challenges and complaints includes ECC and provincial structures known as Provincial Electoral Commissions (PECCs) which the Electoral Law empowers to be the primary arbitration points for challenges and complaints. During the reporting, UNDP/ELECT continued to support ECC to undertake its mandate.

After the end of the candidate nomination process, ECC adjudicated over 400 candidate nomination challenges to enable IEC towards end of June, to release a final list of 2556 *Wolesi Jirga* candidates. This included 2,150 were male and 406 females. The final list also included 52 candidates for the national Kuchi constituency, comprising 42 male and 10 female.

Even though IEC had released a final list of *Wolesi Jirga* candidates, ECC reserved the right to investigate any new evidence of candidate nomination challenges or complaints as it emerged; and to render decisions as appropriate. This implied that candidates could still be disqualified even after the commencement of the campaign period.

Since the publication of the final list of *Wolesi Jirga* candidates, ECC challenged and disqualified 91 candidates (see table 6) in accordance with Articles 12(7) of the Electoral Law barring members of Illegal Armed Groups (IAGs); Article 13(1)5 of the Electoral Law obliging any persons holding civil service positions to resign before they nominate themselves; and Article 12(2)2 of the Electoral Law which prohibits persons with a history of particular criminal convictions. In all cases, the ECC promptly informed IEC about disqualified candidates, and requested that relevant measures be taken to inform the electorate accordingly.

Table 6: Candidates disqualified after IEC's announcement of "final" list

Challenge	No. disqualified
Prior criminal conviction	2
Failure to resign state job	58
IAG membership	31
TOTAL	91

ECC also imposed fines to 68 candidates who had affixed their posters, photographs and other things in prohibited locations in breach of Article 9(1)(c) and (d) of the IEC Regulation on Electoral Campaigns. Transgressing candidates were fined 8,000 Afs and ordered to remove offending materials within ten days.

Table 7: Complaints received before polling day

Complaints against...	No. Complaints
Candidates	970
IEC Staff	200
State security bodies	75
ECC and PECC staff	15
Others	8
TOTAL	1,268

In all, ECC and PECCs received 1,268 campaign complaints before polling day; the majority of those being against candidates and IEC staff (see table 7). Most of these complaints were adjudicated before polling day, with the exception of only 137.

Fifty-six appeals against PECC decisions on complaints were received at the ECC HQ. Of these, three were upheld while 53 were dismissed.

To ensure that full attention was given to adjudication of complaints related to polling and counting after polling day, PECCs were instructed by HQs to leave all pending pre-polling cases in abeyance until all "A"-prioritized polling/counting complaints (i.e., those which might affect the election results) have been processed. Re-prioritisation of adjudications in favour polling and counting complaints was critical to ensure adherence to electoral timelines regarding announcement of results.

At the end of the reporting period, ECC and PECCs had received 4,169 post-election complaints, of which 4,000 (96%) had been triaged: 2,213 (55%) as A (where the allegation if proved may affect the election result), 1,157 (29%) as B (where the allegation even if proved cannot affect the election result) and 630 (16%) as C (where the complaint does not merit further investigation). Decisions on some of these complaints were already made at both ECC and PECC levels.

The standard procedure that is being used by PECCs is that receipt, intake, triage and scanning of each complaint; followed by data entry, investigation and obtaining a response from the person(s) complained about, all have to be completed before a PECC adjudicates a complaint, notify both complainant and respondent and then publishes its decision. The HQ intake team has remained in constant contact with the intake staff in the PECCs, reminding them of procedures and guiding them in filling in the spreadsheets correctly.

To ensure uniformity of the complaints management process from province to province, IEC finalised all the forms required for processing polling and counting complaints in time to allow PECCs familiarize themselves with, and internalize their usage. These included complaints form; triage form; investigative file custody form; investigative plan form; response to complaints; communication record; summary investigation; investigator recommended decision; PECC complaint decision record; PECC decision, notification record; appeal form; appeal decision; and provincial tallies. PECCs were also issued with several other guide documents such as reporting spreadsheets per province; intake manual; HQ intake contact list; instructions on scanner; specific instructions for large provinces; communication guidelines; guide on adjudication; polling and counting procedures; and ECC regulations.

To streamline assistance to ECC/PECCs, UNDP/ELECT formulated a framework of support to ECC/PECC, which was presented to donors for discussion, and was approved during the Project Board meeting held on 5 September. The framework realigned ELECT's support to ECC/PECCs by calibrating funding according to current operational realities. As a result, ECC/PECC budget within the ELECT basket fund was increased from USD 12.5M to USD 14.2M – but with a funding gap of USD 1.7M which donors committed themselves to provide. The increase in funding would enable ECC/PECC recruit more additional staff and improve its IT capabilities

Through the ELECT Chief Technical Advisor, UNDP provided strategic technical advice to the ECC Commissioners as required. At the request of ECC, dedicated ELECT technical advisors were embedded into critical ECC departments (Legal, Security, and Finance) to support national staff effectively carry out their respective functions. ELECT also provided logistical support to ECC/PECCs through the following activities.

(i) Facilitate ECC to recruit qualified staff to carry out its HQ and provincial office functions

During the previous quarter, 114 Provincial Commissioners and 399 Support Staff were appointed to implement ECC/PECC activities. As the ECC/PECC embarked on the complaints arbitration, it became apparent that more staff would be required to expedite the process. ECC Commissioners foreshadowed that 75 additional staffers would meet the shortfall and enable the institution meet the electoral timelines. The justification for increased staffing was presented to donors for discussion, and was approved by the Project Board.

The recruitment of these additional staff was completed accordingly. All salaries and other payments for ECC/PECC national and Advisory staff are paid out of the ELECT basket fund. ELECT also provided salaries for three national ECC Commissioners, while IFES met the salary wages for the two international commissioners.

A long-term agreement between UNDP and CTG for the provision of human resources support services to ECC is being reviewed - taking into account the higher number of staff contracts that CTG will manage over the 2010 electoral cycle compared with 2009.

(ii) Support the procurement and/or establishment of infrastructure, equipment, logistical supplies, IT and other facilities required for ECC functioning

Following the UNDP ELECT Board meeting on 5 September, where donors agreed to increase ECC budget, efforts were put in place to accelerate procurement of additional equipment and fully operationalise all PECC offices. Whereas these offices had been established in all provinces by PSS – a contracted entity responsible for managing PECC

office leases, PECC Commissioners expressed concern that some of the leased offices in insecure locations, or could not be easily accessed. Out of the 34 offices identified by PSS, only 17 met PECC's security and locational requirements. They thus demanded that all the unsatisfactory offices be relocated.

In this context, UNDP tasked PSS to identify alternative premises, giving priority the eight provinces whose offices were deemed insecure. This process slow-paced the process of operationalising field offices, with regard to installation of equipment, IT, and other facilities. It was decided that PECC Commissioners would henceforth take responsibility for pre-approving any proposed office locations before any lease arrangements could be finalised.

Gradually, assorted equipment; facilities; and IT systems were installed in PECCs to align them for their monumental complaints arbitration responsibilities. Each of PECC offices got a 20KVA generator and an assortment of furniture. Sixty-eight fully operational laptops and seventy desk-top computers were procured and delivered to PECCs through a long-term agreement with Dell Computers. Further, printers (43), scanners (43), toners, satellite dishes and TVs, water dispensers, first-aid kits, safe deposit boxes, and other electrical assets were delivered. These would complement equipment that already existed (procured for ECC's 2009 operations). Internet connectivity was prioritized for all provinces, but its functionality remained problematic in at least three provinces. By end of the quarter, only Nooristan provinces lacked internet access owing to security reasons that impaired the ability of the technicians to travel there and install it.

A special contract was concluded for procurement of Armored Vehicles and guards for ECC commissioners at Hqs. Furthermore, the tender for provision of transport to PECC staff was concluded, on the basis of which 33 pick-up trucks were provided to all field offices.

With an apparent deterioration of security and increase of threats levels, UNDP/ELECT procured and deployed Explosive Detection Sniffer dog services at ECC offices – starting 8 August.

(iii) Support ECC to undertake public outreach activities and events to improve public awareness about its functions, powers, and procedures

UNDP/ELECT provided procurement assistance to enable ECC develop specific public outreach messaging and engage various outlets to reach the intended audiences. Radio and TV Public Service Announcements (PSAs) were broadcast on a network of local and national stations. An assortment of printed materials (factsheets, posters, and flipcharts) augmented outreach.

At least five different factsheets on the ECC, PECCs, and the complaints process were disseminated directly to the public and through the ECC website. On 16 September 2010, the ECC held a press conference to provide update on disqualified candidates in which it confirmed that 91 candidates have been disqualified since the publication of the final list of candidates. Press conferences were also held on 22 and 23 September to outline complaints procedures and the most recent complaints-related figures.

Effective 6 September, ECC convened a series of public seminars for candidates and candidates' agents at Kabul Serena, to appraise them about the complaints process. In response to increased activity tempo and public demand for timely updates, ECC intensified their media conferences in the lead to, and after the polling

The ECC website (www.ecc.org.af) was improved to better accommodate the changing nature of its activities. Complaints statistics were made available in a regularly-updated spreadsheet format; and PECC/ECC decisions on complaints were being uploaded with complainants' identities concealed.

(iv) Support ECC to train its temporary staff

Several training sessions were organised for different categories of staff. In a two-day session held on 30 and 31 August, 147 participants from headquarters and provincial offices were trained about polling and counting complaints, procedures, investigation; types of fraud and irregularities; procedures for addressing complaints; internal and external communications; codes of conduct; security; and cascade training methods.

A training of ECC Investigators and Adjudicators was organised at the Serena Hotel, Kabul to prepare them to lead and facilitate cascade sessions. The cascade training sessions took place at provincial level, and were closely monitored by the three national ECC Commissioners. Additional trainings sessions were conducted for Intake staff at both Hqs and the PECCs. These trainings took place on 17 September for all provinces before polling day. Hqs Field Operations unit staff received specific training on information flows and documentation.

A plan for follow-up advisory visits to selected PECCs adopted by the Commission was implemented towards the end of September. PECCs selected for advisory visits were those expected to receive large volumes of complaints. The aim was to verify that the complaints procedures had been correctly understood by all staff and to supervise the processing of complaints in the first days after the elections. The one to four day visits focused on intake, triage and ballot-box auditing processes.

(v) Support ECC to establish security measures for its staff and facilities:

UNDP/ELECT embedded a Security Analyst to assist the ECC undertake a risk assessment for the period leading up to, and after the elections, and put in place mitigation measures. The Security Analysis also helped to coordinate with Ministry of Interior and Regional Police Commanders with a view to ensuring appropriate police protection for PECC staff and structures. As a result, guard levels were increased at 18 of the 34 PECC offices.

With an apparent deterioration of security and increase of threats levels, UNDP/ELECT procured and deployed Explosive Detection Sniffer dog services at ECC offices – starting 8 August. A special contract was concluded for procurement of Armored Vehicles and guards for ECC commissioners at Hqs.

A rapid reporting communication network tested and adopted for all PECCs. Extra airtime for Dari and Pashtu speaking Security Coordinators was provided to ensure round-the-clock communication; access to advice and assistance; awareness about emergency responses. Security staff contact with all 35 ECC locations in Afghanistan became a mandatory daily event.

To enhance the level of security awareness among PECC staff, representative PECC staff received security training focusing on generic security measures; emergency actions; execution of mini-risk assessments at the local PECC offices; as well as administrative and procedural ways of dealing with ANP guards deployed at PECC offices.

Output 3: Long-term electoral reform and IEC capacity building

Long-term electoral reform - as the term suggests, is perceived to be a long term political process. It will require marshalling consensus among high-level stakeholders, possibly including the Executive, the Legislature, and of course, electoral bodies. Being a political process, electoral reform ought to be Afghan-led and owned. UN's mandate with regard to electoral reform agenda is stipulated under article 67 of Security Council Resolution 1917, which calls on the mission to provide "technical support" to the electoral reform process. Yet it is clear that what will be required from UNAMA is *political* support, which is in agreement with the nature of the mission. Technical support from the UN side will be provided, in close coordination with UNAMA, by UNDP. Because of the complexity of the electoral reform process, it is appreciated that even though UNDP were to take a lead on providing technical support to the process, this support can – and should – be jointly delivered, and carefully coordinated with a network of other implementing agencies such as EU, IFES, UNDP, OSCE, and others.

During formulation of the ELECT Project Document, it was foreshadowed that elaboration of the roadmap for electoral reform would begin after completion of the various milestones of the *Wolesi Jirga* elections. This approach was meant to allow maximum concentration on electoral timelines by IEC. Initial discussions were initiated just before polling, when the post-election agenda that could comprise electoral reforms and long-term capacity consolidation of the IEC, was presented to, and discussed by donors during the ELECT Project Board held on 5 September.

After polling, discussions continued, on both ELECT activities until its closure on 31 March 2011 and the post-ELECT international electoral support to the IEC. Major donors have already stated that they would continue supporting the IEC through a UNDP-managed basket fund, with a UNDP electoral assistance project, focusing on long-term capacity consolidation. UNDP/ELECT has positioned itself to provide technical advice if requested, and already has recruited a Legal Specialist to participate in the process. A generic concept-paper will be prepared for discussion, at the next ELECT Board meeting, scheduled for 8 November.

With regard to IEC Capacity building, ELECT Technical Advisors continued mentoring IEC staff about the various aspects of election planning and management. Technical Advisors remained embedded in critical IEC departments such as Field Operations, Logistics, IT, External Relations, Planning and Procedures, Finance, and Training. Additional technical assistance was provided through International Organization for Migration, UNOPS and IFES. A dedicated Chief Technical Advisor remained engaged with supporting and advising IEC Commissioners as well senior management within the IEC Secretariat. This enabled IEC to organise the *Wolesi Jirga* election in a manner that a broad spectrum of stakeholders have described as better than last year, from both a procedural and administrative point of view.

As a manifestation of IEC's institutional independence and growth, IEC leadership vigorously implemented the fraud measures, resulting into an electoral process that was broadly perceived to be procedurally and administratively better organised than the previous elections.

The IEC leadership also provided an enabling environment in which the Media Commission conducted and discharged its functions without undue influence. These manifest IEC's institutional maturity and commitment to more credible electoral process.

Project Management and Technical Assistance

(i) Staffing

The staffing level within the Project was lower compared with last Quarter. While there were 80 internationals and 277 nationals engaged with ELECT over the previous quarter, this number was reduced to 214 and 58 national and international staff respectively, as of 30 September (see table 8). Most of the international staff were embedded in the IEC to provide mentoring to national staff. Few staff were based in the Project Management Unit to support procurement, HR, and project management functions.

Table 8: UNDP/ELECT Staff Statistics

Staff	# at Sept 30	# at Nov 1	# at Dec 1	# at Mar 31
National	214	135	74	57
International-UNDP	58	48	22	12
International-UNOPS	21	21	-	-
TOTAL	293	204	96	69

At the request of ECC, dedicated ELECT technical advisors were embedded into critical ECC departments (Legal, Security, and Finance) to support national staff effectively carry out their respective functions.

As UNDP/ELECT tends towards its operational closure date of March 31 2011, significant staff down-sizing will be eminent, with most staff contracts expiring in November and December. As table 7 shows, less than 70 staff, including 12 internationals, will remain on board until March 2011 to ensure an orderly project closure and hand-over.

(ii) Security

The security of UNDP/ELECT personnel, their office, and accommodation facilities retained high priority. The deteriorating security situation around the country necessitated a heightening of security measures. Improvements were made within the UNDP/ELECT compound with regard to deploying of additional Gurkha guards and Explosive Detection Sniffer dogs. Numerous coordination meetings were held between UNDP and incident responders (primarily internal armed guard management and ANSF) to ensure a well harmonised response to an incident.

Upgrades on Guest Houses for UNDP/ELECT staff in Kunduz, and Mazar were completed to allow international staff deployment. UNDP/ELECT also maintained international staff presence in Gardez, Bamyán, and Kandahar, where security upgrades were completed during the last quarter. UNAMA offered bed spaces for ELECT staff in Herat and Jalalabad – where staff could not be previously for lack of suitable accommodation.

The UNDP/ELECT Security team was beefed up by the deployment of a Security Analyst from the UNDP Regional Centre in Bratislava. The Analyst came on a short detail assignment over the election period, and was instrumental in setting up and coordinating the UNDP/ELECT Security Plan over the election period. In this context, the security team maintained close liaison with Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) and ISAF Joint Command (IJC), through weekly electoral security planning meetings of the Joint Operations Planning Group (JOPG).

III. Challenges

Risks

Insecurity

In the lead to the *Wolesi Jirga* election, Anti-Government Elements (AGEs) heightened their anti-election propaganda, and consistently vowed to disrupt the electoral process; and unleashed various forms of terror and intimidation to individuals and institutions engaged in the electoral process. IEC faced significant security challenges with distribution of election materials in Nooristan, Nangahar, Takhar, Badakshan, Uruzgan, Khost and Kunduz. The first attack on an IEC convoy occurred on 15 September in Helmand province, Marja district. Fortunately there were neither injuries to the staff nor damage to the material and the convoy proceeded under heavy escort. On the same day, two IEC polling staff were executed by AGEs in Balk province, Charbolak district. Three other IEC staff were kidnapped in the Chemtal district of Balkh province prior to elections and later executed.

Anti-Government Elements also abducted two District Field Coordinators from Nooristan and Baghlan provinces respectively; kidnapped seven polling staff in Chack district of Wardak province on Election Day; shot dead the Chairperson of the Boghawi Uzbaki Polling Centre in Sare Pul Province on 25 September; and kidnapped one IEC polling staff of Mejer Polling Centre of Sare Pul on 24 September. In total, IEC had by end of September 2010, recorded 93 direct attacks on its staff and/or facilities.

Reports received by IEC confirmed that Election Day was marred by rocket attacks and bombings at polling stations. At least 21 civilians and nine police officers were killed during the voting. The Taliban claimed responsibility for some of the violence, stating through an emailed statement, that they had attacked 150 polling stations across the country. About 290 of the polling centres scheduled to open for polling couldn't, or closed prematurely. This was in addition to nearly 1000 polling centres that IEC had removed from the polling centre list before Election Day, also for security reasons. According to NATO, the level of terrorist violence on Election Day was higher with 396 incidents compared to 281 on the 2009 Election Day.

Powerbroker Attacks

Election observers noted a higher level of violence and intimidation perpetrated by local powerbrokers and war-lords compared with the 2009 elections. According to FEFA's preliminary election observation statement, powerbrokers and their supporters carried out 157 serious acts of violence in 28 provinces with the highest number of incidents reported in Badghis, Daikundi, Faryab, Ghazni, Ghor, some district of Kabul, Maidan Wardak, Paktia, Paktika, Takhar, and Zabul. In some districts of Daikundi, Ghor, Herat, and Nangarhar, gunmen disrupted voting and seized ballot boxes and assaulted pooling officials. Such increased violence could imply a higher stake in election outcomes for the local power brokers, or the inadequacy of the candidate vetting mechanism that left war lords and members of Illegal Armed Groups to contest *Wolesi Jirga* election seats.

Electoral Fraud and Irregularities

Various forms of fraud and irregularities occurred during the *Wolesi Jirga* election. Based on reports and complaints of fraud/irregularities received from candidates, candidates' agents, and

election observers; and based also on IEC’s own suspicion of fraud, IEC thoroughly investigated the results in question, to determine whether they had been indeed fraudulently or irregularly cast or not. Further, robust fraud detection triggers which IEC had embedded in the tally centre procedures also helped to isolate suspicious ballots – which quarantined and investigated through audits and/or recounts. Approximately half of the audits and/or recounts were conducted because of the tally centre fraud detection triggers, while the other half was catalysed by field reports or suspicion of fraud. Consequently, 1,330,782 fraudulently cast votes were excluded during the tally process.

Moreover, IEC referred to the ECC for further investigation, more than 250 candidates suspected of misconduct during the elections. It also referred nearly 300 candidates to the ECC for failing to declare their financial expenditure reports; while it caused the arrest of one Provincial Electoral Officer (Khost) for his alleged participation in electoral fraud.

Issues

Procurement and transportation of electoral materials

While all electoral goods and services were procured as requested by the electoral authorities, deliveries of some materials were late – causing considerable operational anxiety within the IEC. For instance, the supply of 20,000 pieces of plastic furniture for use at polling centres and stations was associated with serious delays precipitated by late issuance of a Certificate of Exception by the Afghan Government authorities.

Further, some of the electoral materials – especially the hole-punchers were reported defective on Election Day, prompting polling officials to use scissors to mark voter cards that had been used. There were also reports of indelible ink being easily washed off, although both laboratory and physical tests on the ink, prior and after the election, demonstrated the ink was of a high quality. In this context, it’s likely that polling officials did not clearly understand how to use it.

The movement of materials in some provinces, including Nuristan, was seriously hampered by security concerns. It was difficult to get materials into many districts. ANSF and ISAF assisted to move polling materials into Waygal and Nurgram districts to allow a sufficient number of polling centers to be opened. Ghazni also posed considerable distributional problems to the IEC due to the difficulty of reaching Ajristan districts where security forces repeatedly tried to fly into but failed due to bad weather. The retrieval of electoral materials from some provinces such as Laghman, Wardak, Nooristan, Ghazni, Baghlan and Badghis was delayed by security threats as many flights were shot at by insurgents while trying to land in some districts.

IEC Female Staffing

The IEC struggled in some provinces, in particular in the South East, to recruit sufficient staff for various electoral activities. IEC could not meet its planned staffing level for females; particularly those required for polling day activities. As a result, IEC identified and deployed respectable elders to serve in female polling stations. Election observers pointed out that this could have contributed to the low female voter turnout that was witnessed in locations in the south and south-east.

Payment of IEC Staff Salaries

The receivership of Kabul Bank created significant challenges with regard to timely payment of IEC staff salaries. More than USD 1.5 million was trapped in Kabul Bank at the time its assets were

attached. IEC, with high-level political support from UNAMA and the SRSG, requested support from the Afghan Central Bank to ensure that the cash was immediately made available, to avoid paying staff after elections as this would cause substantial logistical and security challenges for IEC. But as it turned out, Kabul Bank could not release all the funds for all the provinces ahead of the September 18 poll. As a consequence, IEC was forced to effect payments for at least two provinces (Nuristan and Badghis) only after the elections.

As a remedial measure, UNDP resorted to use of local “money dealers” (*Hawala*) to transfer funds to provinces. The huge amount of funds involved seemed to have overwhelmed the capacity of the *Hawala* system though, causing some occasional hold-ups in the transfer process.

Misconduct of IEC Polling Officials

Despite existence of a strict code of conduct which IEC staff swore to abide by, several cases were reported, of IEC involved in, or conspiring to commit electoral offences. Following the investigation of suspicious election results, IEC concluded that in a number of polling centres and stations, the elections were not conducted according to its procedures. More than 100 District Field Coordinators got dismissed for various forms of misconduct before the election.

Electoral timeline

Due to IEC leadership’s commitment to a transparent process for identifying fraudulent votes, hundreds of polling centres were subjected to audit or recounts. The unexpectedly high number of results isolated for audit or recount necessitated that the timeline for announcing preliminary results could not be met. Eventually, preliminary results for all the 35 constituencies were announced almost two weeks late, on 20 October.

To achieve this, IEC reorganized human resources within the tally center to reinforce the processes that were creating bottle necks. Four additional clearance teams and multiple extra scanners were installed in the tally centre to expedite the process. The adjustments that the IEC made in terms of adding staff and equipment fastened the process. The clearance process is still slowing down the data entry, but this step was inevitable and the IEC expressed satisfaction for the changes applied this year to the procedures. Despite these delays, there was consensus among different stakeholders that the tally process is more organized than it was last year.

Payment of Female Searchers

The payment of female searchers for female polling centres and stations is one of those elements that were supported by ELECT, although falling outside the confines of the ELECT Project Document. The responsibility for recruitment, training, and payment of female searchers was a subject of a protracted debate, with IEC firmly insisting that Mol should take responsibility; and Mol arguing that it lacked capacity to pay them. Realizing lack of progress on this critical issue, some donors in August 2010, expressed their willingness to support this activity, provided an accepted fund disbursement mechanism was agreed upon, with the ELECT basket serving as a conduit.

An intensive negotiation process involving Mol, IDLG and UNDP culminated in a joint directive; which specified that IDLG would recruit and pay female searchers, while Mol would provide training. UNDP on the other hand, would transfer funds to IDLG and ensure that accountability was provided. IDLG seems to have encountered problems with recruitment, and as a result submitted the list of female searchers very late. Moreover, the list was fraught with duplicates and other inaccuracies/inconsistencies which had to be sorted out.

After UNDP/ELECT had transferred payments to IDLG based on the final list of searchers, at least four provinces claimed to have deployed more female searchers than was on the list; and therefore demanded more money than UNDP had transferred. The transfer of funds to IDLG/provinces was itself done through the *Hawala* system which caused occasional delays. IDLG had not yet provided accountabilities at the end of the reporting period.

Relationship between IEC and ECC

While the relationship between IEC and ECC was uneasy during the various stages of the Wolesi Jirga operation, it was, by many accounts better than last year. Inter ECC-IEC communication was problematic – notably with regard to information access by PECC officials from their IEC colleagues at the provincial level. The referral services within the IEC call centre requiring call centre operators to refer callers with ECC-specific questions to relevant ECC authorities were not properly dealt with.

The signing of a Memorandum of Understanding between the IEC and IECC on 22 August, regarding coordination of investigation and audit activities created a platform for harmonizing relations between the two electoral authorities. As a result, several coordination meetings between the IEC and ECC commissioners, with presence of the IEC Secretariat ensued; to exchange information. The two electoral bodies have also been sharing daily updates on IEC decisions on disqualifications, recounts and audit. This has proved an effective tool to maintain good coordination between the two commissions, and has increased the mutual trust between the bodies.

Establishment and Operationalisation of PECC Offices

PECC offices were established during the previous quarter, by PSS - a contracted entity responsible for managing PECC office leases. In August, PECC Commissioners expressed concern that some of the leased offices were in insecure locations, or could not be easily accessed. Out of the 34 offices identified by PSS, only 17 met PECC's security and locational requirements. They thus demanded that all the unsatisfactory offices be relocated.

In this context, UNDP tasked PSS to identify alternative premises, giving priority the eight provinces whose offices were deemed insecure. However, this relocation process slow-paced the process of operationalising PECC field offices, with regard to installation of equipment, IT, and other facilities.

PECC Decisions

ECC needed to determine how best it could review decisions made by PECCs. According to the provision of ECC Regulations Section 7.7, PECC decisions to impose sanctions⁵ must be reviewed by the ECC before their enforcement. ECC therefore needed to develop and adopt a dynamic communications strategy to facilitate an expeditious information transfer and exchange mechanism. Internet connectivity was prioritized for all provinces, but its functionality remained problematic in at least three provinces. At the end of the quarter, only Nooristan provinces lacked

⁵ Not all the sanctions imposed by PECCs trigger review by ECC – only when imposing another sanction than a warning, corrective order or a fine below 1,000 Afg. See wording of 7.7 of ECC Regulations: “7.7 Where a PECC imposes a fine in excess of 100,000 Afghanis, strikes a candidate from the candidate list, orders a recount or repeat of polling or issues a prohibition against an individual from serving as an electoral officer, such decision shall not be enforced until reviewed by the ECC. [Originally read as: Where a PECC imposes a fine, strikes a candidate from the candidate list, orders a recount or repeat of polling or issues a prohibition against an individual from serving as an electoral officer, such decision shall not be enforced until reviewed by the ECC, amended on 15 August 2010]”

internet access owing to security reasons that impaired the ability of the technicians to travel there and install it.

ECC Commissioners decided that a complaints tracking computer software would improve the process, and therefore requested technical support to have such software designed and installed. Unfortunately, the request was made late, and although IOM and ELECT specialists worked hard to design it, test it, and train its users as fast as they could, the complaints tracking software became operational one week after the elections. Its users were trained on 27 September. Until then, statistical reports on complaints receipt and processing were compiled manually.

CTG Contract Management

The recruitment and routine administration of ECC staff is done in accordance with a long-term agreement between UNDP and CTG. This agreement was signed in 2009, when 160 staff were engaged to perform ECC functions. The Electoral Law of February 2010 created, in addition to a Hq ECC structure, PECCs, with primary complaints adjudication responsibilities. The ECC/PECC staffing therefore had to be increased accordingly, to 516 personnel, in conformance with this new structure. Inevitably then, the long-term agreement between UNDP and CTG for the recruitment and routine administration of ECC staff needed to be amended to reflect this increased staffing level.

It ought to be recalled that the ECC was established on 18 April 2010 – only two days before the commencement of candidate nomination process. Given the primary role of PECCs in the investigation and arbitration of complaints related with the process, it was a matter of urgency to expedite recruitment of PECC Commissioners and other support/administrative staff. Otherwise, the entire complaints process would have been paralysed. With this perspective, ECC Commissioners, in consultation with UNDP, requested CTG to urgently proceed with the recruitment of national staff in May 2010, even though the CTG/UNDP contract had not yet been amended. UNDP/ELECT agreed that it would take the retroactive element into account. The process of amending this long-term agreement was however challenging and not as straight forward as ELECT had hoped. A detailed justification for such a retroactive amendment had to be developed and submitted to Hqs in New York, for perusal and endorsement. This caused delays in payment of CTG fees.

Additional ECC Staffing

As the reality of a bigger influx of *Wolesi Jirga* challenges and complaints became more apparent, ECC commissioners foreshadowed that its 516 workforce would not ably cope with the associated work-load, and that additional staff (75) would be required to help expedite the process. This request was approved by the Project Board on 5 September – barely two weeks to the September 18 election. The recruitment process therefore had to be rushed to ensure that the required staff would be on board and trained a head of the election.

The increased staffing level had implications for procurement and logistical, because UNDP/ELECT had to ensure all new staff had access to facilities and equipment to enable them perform their functions. This exerted considerable pressure on the ELECT Procurement, Logistics, and Asset Management teams.

I. Lessons Learned

Various lessons were learnt during UNDP/ELECT support to the various processes of the Wolesi Jiga electoral operation. As part of the systematic planning for the post election strategy, the Project was in the process of organizing a comprehensive lessons learnt exercise to be conducted jointly with Afghan electoral authorities and other relevant stakeholders/implementation agencies. A detailed Lessons Learnt Report will be circulated after the exercise.

II. Future Plans

There is a need to continue discussions on various issues related to the post-electoral period, and to agree on an agenda so that a detailed plan of activities can be developed. Three major issues have been identified, each distinct from the other but ultimately related: a) the closure of ELECT; b) post-ELECT international electoral support; and c) the electoral reform agenda. It has been agreed that ELECT will be closed following support to the *Wolesi Jirga* elections, and the project document identified 31 March 2011 as the operational closure date. A detailed plan for closure, including but not limited to asset management needs to be developed in close coordination with the IEC and the ECC. Because the IEC is almost exclusively financed by international funds, mostly channeled through UNDP ELECT, it is important to determine mechanisms that will sustain IEC's operations.

In the immediate term, the tally process which already is in advanced stages needs to be completed to allow IEC announce provisional as per its updated timeline. ECC and PECCs will continue investigating and rendering decisions, with a primary focus on complaints that have been triaged as Category A. Arbitration of these complaints remains a cardinal pre-requisite for declaration of final certified results.

Financial Section (See external tables)

Table 1: Funding Status - Overview – (attached as external Table 1)

Table 2: Expenditure Status by Budget Category (attached as external Table 2)

Table 3: Expenditure Status by donor (attached as external Table 3)

Table 4: Funding Gap (attached as external Table 4)

Annex I: Performance Tracking Matrix, 2010

ELECT OUTPUT # 1: VR and *Wolesi Jirga* elections conducted...

Hierarchy of Results	Progress Indicators	Base-Line Information	Performance Benchmarks/Targets	Implementation Progress (July-Sept 2010)
<p>Output 1</p> <p>Support the IEC to conduct a limited voter registration top up as required for the 2010 election; and capacity-building through the provision of technical and operational assistance for the 2010 election.</p>	<p>a) Number of eligible voters (disaggregated by sex and geographical location) issued with new voter registration cards;</p> <p>b) IEC ability to manage the VR and the election process with reduced international support;</p> <p>c) Proportion of the Afghan population (disaggregated by sex and geographical location) who view the 2010 elections as better than 2009 elections.</p>	<p>a) 4,566,623 Afghans received new voter registration cards between October 2008 and February 2009. Those registered included 1,809,194 females, representing 40% of the total registered voters. Nearly 150,000 Kuchis were also registered across the country. An additional 95,709 voters were registered during follow-on mobile voter registration that ended in June 2009.</p> <p>b) The management of the 2009 electoral process was fraught with operational and technical shortcomings;</p> <p>c) But according to the IRI survey, 55% of Afghan public felt IEC organised the 2009 elections well.</p>	<p>a) IEC has access to materials, equipment, logistical supplies and personnel required to register at least 600,000 new eligible voters;</p> <p>b) All electoral benchmarks--- voter registration, candidate nomination; staffing; delivery and retrieval of polling materials; polling; processing and announcing of election results, etc---are achieved in accordance with standards and timelines prescribed by IEC;</p> <p>c) A bigger proportion of the Afghan public perceives the 2010 election as better organised by IEC, compared with 2009;</p> <p>d) Increased confidence is exhibited by IEC staff in planning and conduct of 2010 electoral activities;</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Between 12 June and 12 August, IEC registered 377,197 voters in all provinces. These included 207,014 male (55%); 152,147 female (40%); and 16,920 (5%) Kuchis. The IEC conducted the <i>Wolesi Jirga</i> elections as scheduled, on 18 September 2010. On polling day, 5,497 or 95% of polling centres that had been ear-marked for opening actually opened; The criticality and need for thorough scrutiny of results; accuracy; and transparency of tally process caused delays in announcement of provisional election results; Domestic and international observers stated that <i>Wolesi Jirga</i> electoral activities were better organised from a procedural and administrative point of view, compared with last year.
<p>Activities:</p> <p>1.1 Facilitate IEC to deploy temporary staff to carry out VR and <i>Wolesi Jirga</i> elections by providing salaries and other staff payments</p>	<p>a) Number of temporary staff recruited for voter registration and <i>Wolesi Jirga</i> elections;</p> <p>b) Timeliness of temporary staff payments;</p> <p>c) Proportion of female staff recruited and attending on polling day;</p>	<p>a) Approximately 27,000 voter registration staff comprising of 38% female were engaged by IEC.</p> <p>b) About 120,462 temporary election staff were recruited of which approximately 39% (47,056) were female. All the temporary staff were trained on polling and counting procedures through a cascade training system.</p> <p>c) Approximately 1/3 of all female temporary polling day staff positions were taken by men in the 2009 elections</p>	<p>a) 296 temporary voter registration staff recruited by the IEC (74 teamsx4per).</p> <p>b) The IEC employs 3000 District Field Coordinators, 1500 Voter Educators, 100,000 polling staff, and 150 tally center staff.</p> <p>c) At least 50% of the IEC temporary staff recruited are female;</p> <p>d) Payments for temporary staff are processed in a timely manner in accordance with LoA between UNDP and IEC.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 85 VR teams comprising of 340 staff (four staff per team) deployed to all provinces conducted voter registration. 1,513 Voter Educators were recruited and deployed throughout the country on 2nd August: 936 males (62%); 475 females (31%), and 102 Kuchis (7%) 3,020 District Field Coordinators (DFCs) were recruited and deployed throughout the country: 2,272 (75%) male; 572 (19%) female; and 176 (6%) Kuchis 86,575 polling staff and 2,240 contingency staff were recruited for polling day.

		<p>d) Payments for temporary staff were often times behind schedule.</p>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The receivership of Kabul Bank created delays in disbursement of staff salaries to the provinces.
<p>1.2 Procure, and support IEC to deliver and retrieve assets, materials, and logistical supplies for the VR top-up process and Wolesi Jirga elections</p>	<p>a) Availability of Movement and Procurement Plans approved by IEC and UNDP respectively; b) Type and quantity of equipment and materials procured; c) Percent of polling centers that receive required supply of electoral materials as specified in the Procurement and Movement Plans. d) Percent of polling centers that retrieve polling materials within time lines specified in the movement plan.</p>	<p>a) Movement plans were approved by IEC a head of 2008/2009 VR and presidential/provincial council election; b) Distribution of the voter registration materials such as voter registration kits, car batteries and camera kits, training materials, etc was completed although slightly behind schedule in 2008-09. Minor to significant delays were experienced in some insecure areas; c) All election materials were procured and delivered to all polling locations ahead of the 2009 elections despite the slow customs clearance procedures; d) Three UNDP/ELECT helicopters, 35 chartered fixed wing flights, 3,039 trucks, and 3,171 donkeys were used to deliver polling materials in 2009. Very few PCs and PSs reported shortages of polling materials but this was quickly addressed by the IEC provincial offices; e) The retrieval of material took place in an efficient manner with a few minor delays, but those from 6 polling centres were presumed either lost or destroyed as they never reached the Tally Centre.</p>	<p>a) Movement Plans for VR and <i>Wolesi Jirga</i> elections are formulated and approved by IEC before end of May 2010. b) The Procurement Plan for VR and <i>Wolesi Jirga</i> election is approved by UNDP Country Office by April 2010; c) Procurement of assorted VR and election materials is concluded within timelines specified in the Procurement Plan; d) At least 85% of the polling centers receive electoral materials on or ahead of schedule, and are able to retrieve polling results to the Tally Centre in accordance with the movement plan; e) An inventory of existing assets and election materials (at Hqs, regional and provincial levels) completed by June, 2010</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Procurement, intake and delivery of all electoral materials for the Wolesi Jirga were completed with some delays. The movement of materials in some provinces was seriously hampered by security threats. On Election Day, 255 polling centers received contingency sensitive electoral materials to meet shortfalls of sensitive materials. Retrieval of electoral materials from districts to provincial warehouses, and from provinces to the national tally centre proceeded reasonably well except in Laghman, Wardak, Nooristan, Ghazni, Baghlan and Badghis Asset inventories have been concluded in Kabul and at IEC Hqs; underway in other provinces. UNDP has handed over owner of assorted assets to IEC, worth USD 7.4million.

<p>1.3 Support IEC to design and deliver appropriate training to VR and Wolesi Jirga election workers.</p>	<p>a) Number and type of training courses delivered; b) Number of staff (disaggregated by sex) trained; c) Level of IEC staff compliance with guidelines and procedures.</p>	<p>a) During 2008/2009, IEC organized and conducted more than 200 training sessions for 952 District Field Coordinators (DFCs); 110 Provincial Public Outreach Officers (PPOOs); and 1,600 civic educators, of which 26% and 5% were female and Kuchi respectively; b) No post-training evaluations were carried in 2008/2009; c) Reports from domestic and international observers revealed widespread disregard for electoral guidelines, procedures and regulations by IEC VR and election workers. IEC sanctioned 6000 election workers for misconduct.</p>	<p>a) The VR and <i>Wolesi Jirga</i> elections Training Plans are formulated and approved by June 2010; b) Training modules and materials reflect the 2009 lessons learnt, and are produced within timelines specified in the IEC Training and UNDP Procurement Plans; c) 74 VR teams (296 staff), 3000 District Field Coordinators, 1500 Voter Educators, 100,000 polling staff, and 150 tally center staff are trained as per approved Training Plans; d) At least 85% of all female staff are trained; e) There are fewer incidences of transgressions by VR and <i>Wolesi Jirga</i> election workers compared with 2009 elections.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Three briefing sessions were organised for IEC provincial & regional staff in July and August; • Two, five-day training sessions were held between 27 July and 6 August for 190 IEC provincial trainers; • Training of 3,020 DFCs by Provincial Trainers was conducted between 15 and 25 August 2010; • Cascade training for 86,575 polling officials was undertaken in two phases: 2 and 11 September, and 16 and 17 September; • 2,240 Contingence polling staff were trained between 12 and 15 September. • 1,513 Voter Educators received training on various public outreach and education methods before their deployment on 2nd August; • Gender sensitisation sessions for all staff at Hqs; • 114 District Field Coordinators were dismissed due to misconduct.
<p>1.4 Provide technical and operational assistance to enable IEC upgrade its Data Centre IT and software systems and capacity.</p>	<p>a) Number and type of Data Centre software upgrade modules and other facilities installed; b) Number of VR records scanned and entered; c) Timeliness and quality of the processing of VR, candidate nomination, and tallying of election results.</p>	<p>a) The 2009 Data Centre was furnished with 550 computers and 12 sets of data scanning equipment. 292 data entry clerks were trained and engaged to perform data entry. b) Only 3.5, out of 4.5 VR records (forms) for 2008/2009 were scanned by end of 2009, while data entry had been completed for approximately 1.5 million scanned forms. c) The biometric and automatic fingerprint identification technology was operationalised in 2009, but its effectiveness was not systematically assessed. d) Tallying of the 2009 presidential election results was completed on schedule, but anti-fraud triggers which had been embedded therein were disregarded.</p>	<p>a) IEC Data Centre is upgraded as per technical specifications by June 2010; b) All the remaining 2008/2009, as well as the 2010 VR records are processed through the biometric scanning system by end of August 2010; c) Processing of VR, candidate nomination, and tallying of election results is completed within timelines prescribed in the IEC Operations Plan; and in accordance with standards set by the relevant regulations, procedures and guidelines.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The data centre was upgraded with three new voter registration database applications, namely 1) delimitation module; 2) quality control module; and 3) Voter Registration management module; • Cumulatively, 4,733,961 voter registry forms (of which 195,222 are from the 2010 voter registry update) were processed; • The data centre was reconfigured into a national tally centre in August: 109 workstations for data entry clerks, and up to 10 workstations for reconciliation and audit teams; 300 staff were hired for the tally process. • SQL and Application server for the tally process and their backups were installed and test-run on tally databases and applications;

				<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 93% of the tamper evident bags had gone through the “intake” process at the IEC national tally center.
1.5 Support IEC to plan and implement awareness-raising public outreach campaign for VR and Wolesi Jirga elections	<p>a) Category and quantity of public outreach events and materials used by IEC;</p> <p>b) Proportion of voters (disaggregated by sex) who cast their votes properly.</p>	<p>a) In 2008/2009, public outreach involved 1,700 flipcharts; 250,000 posters; 500,000 leaflets; 300,000 booklets; and more than 55,000,000 mobile phone text messages (SMSs). 10-minute video documentaries; TV and radio spots about voter registration procedures and other educational themes were disseminated on more than 30 stations. 400 billboards with five different messages were erected around the country. On average, the IEC toll-free data centre received more than 100,000 calls every month from the public.</p> <p>b) About 3% of the votes cast on polling day were invalid.</p>	<p>a) Multi-media public outreach materials and events are procured and disseminated in quantities and within timelines specified by IEC Public Outreach Strategy:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 500,000 posters, 2,200,000 leaflets, 100,000 mock ballots, 200,000 sample ballots, 400 billboards, 1,100,000 brochures, 1,500,000 fact sheets, 1800 flip charts, 340 banners, 26 Radio and TV PSAs, 26 Film documentaries, 30 soap opera episodes, Etc. <p>b) Public outreach materials and events that specifically target women are procured and disseminated in quantities and within timelines specified in the Gender Strategy of the POD;</p> <p>c) At least 95% of the votes cast on Election Day are valid.</p>	<p>Assorted public outreach messaging was activated as follows:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 26 types (13 Dari/13 Pashto) of 1 minute TV PSAs—delivered through 10 TV stations an estimated broadcast time of 168,000 seconds; 26 types (13 Dari/13 Pashto) of 1 minute radio PSAs—delivered through 30 national and local radio stations for an estimated broadcast time of 1,740,000 seconds; Two, 10 minute TV film documentary of election procedures—broadcast 150 times on 7 TV channels; 30 episodes of radio soap operas specifically targeting women broadcast 480 times through 10 national and local radio stations; Approximately 6,000,000 outreach materials comprising of leaflets, brochures, sample ballots, stickers, etc; Mobile theatre; 400 billboards; 5000 sign posts; Toll-free Call Centre
1.6 Support implementation of security safeguards for personnel and sensitive electoral materials	<p>a) Level and quality of security investments/measures at electoral offices and staff accommodation facilities;</p> <p>b) Adequacy and timeliness of information sharing between IEC/ELECT and ANSFs/ISAF; and between IEC HQs and the field.</p>	<p>a) In 2009, electoral offices and staff accommodation facilities were targeted by terrorist elements. A commercial guest house housing mostly UN electoral workers was attacked resulting in the killing of 5 UN international staff members;</p> <p>b) IEC shared polling centre locational information with ANSFs as planned,</p>	<p>a) Security is beefed up at Electoral offices and staff accommodation facilities at Hqs and field levels in compliance with latest UN security standards;</p> <p>b) IEC and UNDP/ELECT are involved in the formulation of a VR/<i>Wolesi Jirga</i> elections joint security coordination strategy with Mol, MoD, NDS, and ISAF;</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Security upgrades at all IEC offices were completed. The security aspect of the National Movement Plan. A regular Election Security Risk Analysis to better understand the nature and magnitude of threats, vulnerabilities and risks associated with the electoral

		but feedback delayed. In general, information sharing mechanisms were not very effective during 2009 elections.	c) IEC and ELECT security personnel provide relevant information (movement plans for personnel and sensitive materials, polling centre locations, etc) to ANSFs and ISAF in a timely and coordinated manner.	process; <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A security concept of operations and plan was reviewed and endorsed by the Joint Command as a framework for electoral security assistance; • Two ISAF Officers were embedded into the IEC to serve as direct links between the IEC and ANSF/ISAF Joint Command.
1.7 Support IEC to provide salaries for Media Commission Temporary staff	Number of temporary Media Commission Staff receiving payment from the UNDP/ELECT basket fund	14 staff were facilitated by UNDP/ELECT in 2009 (5 Commissioners, 9 staff members)	Payments for temporary Media Commission staff are processed in a timely manner in accordance with LoA between UNDP and IEC;	Commission activities were executed by four IEC National Staff (1 Officer, 2 Assistants and 1 Photographer), supported by an IFES Audio Visual Consultant (international) and under the leadership of five Media Commissioners (all national)
1.8 Support IEC to plan and conduct external relations events about the electoral process	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a) Availability of External Relations Strategy and plan; b) Number and category of External Relations events undertaken; c) Timeliness of IEC regulations on accreditation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a) Information and communications on the 2009 elections were guided by an External Relations plan. b) Press conferences were held on a weekly, bi-weekly, daily, bi-daily, and every second day basis---depending on the tempo of public information demand; c) Various election observer and candidate liaison meetings were held; d) More than 280,000 observers comprising 22% female (61,951) were accredited to participate in the 2009 elections e) Regulations on accreditation for the 2009 elections were timely. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a) Formulation of the IEC External Relations strategy is undertaken in consultation with key stakeholders and completed by end, June 2010; b) Accreditations, stakeholder fora, media conferences, and other external relations events are implemented as planned; c) IEC develops and passes regulations on accreditation of observers, candidates' agents and media in a timely manner. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The IEC Information Dissemination Plan was revised and finalized on 25 August; • Regular meetings with observers; candidates and their agents; media conferences and press interviews; • An on-site Media Centre constructed and equipped; • IEC reviewed, updated, and translated into local languages, nearly 30 documents – which it burned for distribution, on 4000 CDs; • Nearly 400,000 individuals and 2000 entities obtained accreditation to observe <i>Wolesi Jirga</i> process

ELECT OUTPUT # 2: ECC Supported to Fill its Mandated Role...

Hierarchy of Results	Progress Indicators	Base-Line Information	Performance Benchmarks/Targets	Implementation Progress (July-Sept 2010)
<p>Output #2:</p> <p>Capacity-building, through technical and operational support to the ECC, to manage their responsibilities in the conduct of the 2010 election</p>	<p>a) Ability of the ECC to adjudicate electoral complaints;</p> <p>b) Level of professional independence of the ECC.</p>	<p>a) ECC structures in 2009 were established at province level too late for the candidate nomination process; the complaints arbitration was slow – resulting into a 6-week’s delay in the certification of election results;</p> <p>b) ECC received 302 challenges related with candidate nominations; and more than 2,854 allegations of widespread electoral fraud and irregularities during the 2009 elections. All complaints received were assessed and adjudicated or dismissed for lacking merit;</p> <p>c) All decisions of the ECC concerning the 2009 elections were independently taken</p>	<p>The ECC is able to receive and arbitrate electoral complaints associated with candidates’ nomination, political campaign, polling, and processing of election results without any biases and within prescribed timelines.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ECC successfully challenged and disqualified 91 candidates since the publication of the final list of candidates; • ECC and PECCs received 1,268 campaign complaints before polling day; all complaints had been adjudicated before polling day except 137. • ECC and PECCs had received 4,169 post-election complaints, of which 4,000 (96%) had been triaged: 2,213 (55%) as A (where the allegation if proved may affect the election result), 1,157 (29%) as B (where the allegation even if proved cannot affect the election result) and 630 (16%) as C (where the complaint does not merit further investigation). • Decisions on some of these complaints were already made at both ECC and PECC levels.
<p>2.1 Facilitate ECC to recruit qualified staff to carry out its HQ and provincial office functions</p>	<p>a. Number of staff (disaggregated by sex) recruited by ECC ;</p> <p>b. Timeliness of the recruitment process</p>	<p>In 2009, ECC recruited 40 staff members at HQ, while about 200 ECC provincial posts were filled by CTG (the company contracted to handle all ECC staffing issues at sub-national level)</p>	<p>a) Core ECC Secretariat staff are onboard in time to arbitrating candidate nomination complaints;</p> <p>b) Flexible contracting arrangements with an HR service provider are approved by UNDP to ensure timely staff recruitment;</p> <p>c) All planned ECC staffing positions are filled in time for training to commence ahead of the campaign period.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Core ECC staff in provinces were not hired in time for candidate nomination challenges, but ECC Head Office was staffed early enough to arbitrate challenges; • The recruitment of 114 Provincial Commissioners and 399 Support Staff was completed in July • ECC Commissioners created 75 additional posts, which were filled in September. • A long-term agreement between UNDP and CTG for the provision of human resources support services to ECC is being reviewed

<p>2.2 Support the procurement and/or establishment of infrastructure, equipment, logistical supplies, IT and other facilities required for ECC functioning</p>	<p>a) Type, quantity, and timeliness of procurements; b) Number of provinces with functional ECC facilities and structures;</p>	<p>a) Assorted equipment, IT, vehicles, and other facilities were procured for ECC during 2009; b) 34 Provincial offices implemented ECC activities</p>	<p>a) ECC logistical and infrastructural requirements are integrated within the UNDP/ELECT Procurement Plan by April, 2010; b) ECC facilities and structures are established, equipped, and operationalised in all (34) provinces at least 60 days before the 2010 elections; c) All procurements for ECC are concluded within timelines specified in the UNDP/ELECT Procurement Plan</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Assorted goods and services were procured for ECC – including generators for ECC field offices, IT and other office equipment, vehicular maintenance, rentals for ECC offices; All 34 PECC offices were operationalised, albeit with major delays for half of those.
<p>2.3 Support ECC to undertake public outreach activities and events to improve public awareness about its functions, powers, and procedures</p>	<p>a) Category and quantity of public outreach events and materials used by ECC; b) Level of public awareness about ECC, its functions and procedures</p>	<p>ECC remained relatively unknown to the general public with regards to what the institution does; its responsibilities and powers; and how it receives and processes electoral complaints – largely because it did not have adequate time for its public outreach.</p>	<p>Multi-media public outreach materials and events are procured and disseminated in quantities and within timelines specified by ECC Public Outreach Strategy:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 180,000 fact sheets, 100,000 brochures, 250,000 posters, 340 bill boards, 3154 TV PSAs, 10,602 radio PSAs, Etc. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Radio and TV Public Service Announcements (PSAs) were broadcast on a network of local and national stations; At least five different factsheets were disseminated directly to the public and through ECC website; A series of public seminars for candidates and candidates’ agents; ECC intensified their media conferences in the lead to, and after the polling.
<p>2.4 Support ECC to train to its temporary staff</p>	<p>a) Number and type of training courses delivered; b) Number of staff (disaggregated by sex) trained.</p>	<p>All ECC staff received intensive training about the complaints procedure ahead of the campaign period.</p>	<p>All ECC staff involved in the complaints process are trained about the complaints procedure through a three-phased ECC training plan</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> A two-day session on complaints arbitration procedures was held on 30 and 31 August for 147 ECC Hq and PECC representatives; A training of ECC Investigators and Adjudicators was organised at Serena Hotel, Kabul ahead of cascade training; Cascade trainings took place at provincial level, closely monitored by ECC national commissioners; Training for Intake staff at both Hqs and the PECCs took place on 17 September.

<p>2.5 Support ECC to establish security measures for its staff and facilities</p>	<p>Type of security measures put in place</p>	<p>Security guards, anti-blast doors, armoured vehicles, and other physical enhancements are some of the security measures implemented by ECC in 2009.</p>	<p>All ECC offices are equipped with security measures.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A Security Analyst was embedded within ECC to help undertake a risk assessment for the period leading up to, and after the elections, and the mitigation measures; • Explosive Detection Sniffer dogs were deployed at ECC offices – starting 8 August; • A rapid reporting communication network tested and adopted for all PECCs; • Representative PECC staff received security training.
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UNDP/ELECT Output #3: Support to long-term reform and capacity-building...

Hierarchy of Results	Progress Indicators	Base-Line Information	Performance Benchmarks/Targets	Implementation Progress (July-Sep 2010)
Output #3: Support to long-term electoral reform and capacity-building of the electoral management bodies	Willingness and capacity of IEC to contribute to the long-term electoral reform and institutional strengthening process	Electoral management bodies are facing considerable planning and management constraints/challenges;	IEC is able to contribute to electoral reform, if required, based on the experience of the 2009 and 2010 electoral processes, exposure to international experience and participation in capacity-building programmes..	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Discussions were initiated before polling, when possible elements of the post-election agenda were discussed during the ELECT Project Board meeting on 5 September; Major donors have already stated that they would continue supporting the IEC through a UNDP-managed basket fund; A generic concept-paper will be prepared for discussion, at the next ELECT Board meeting, scheduled for 8 November
3.1 Advise IEC Commissioners and Secretariat on electoral policy development, issues analysis, and ethical (evidence-based) decision making	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a) Availability of a Chief Technical Advisor to support the IEC Board of Commissioners if required; b) Level of professional independence of the IEC and the Media Commission; c) Willingness of the IEC to formulate and enforce anti-fraud measures; 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a) There were no mechanisms for policy support to IEC commissioners in 2009; b) The independence of the IEC during the 2009 elections was cast in doubt after the Commissioners decided to disregard antifraud triggers embedded in the National Tally Centre; c) The Media Commission performed its functions independently in 2009, but could not enforce compliance with the media code of conduct owing to lack of institutional and political support. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a) A Chief Technical Advisor provides high-level policy guidance to IEC Commissioners as required; b) Regulations, guidelines, and fraud mitigation strategies are passed by the IEC Board of Commissioners in a timely manner, and are enforced without fear or favour to ensure a better election compared with 2009; c) The IEC Board of Commissioners encourages and actively supports the Media Commission to dispense its functions independently and rationally. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Technical Advisors remained embedded in critical IEC Secretariat departments to support the conduct of the <i>Wolesi Jirga</i> process; Fraud detection measures embedded in the tally centre were vigorously implemented by IEC leadership. Using those triggers, IEC has hitherto ordered audit and recount of 1063 polling centres - approximately one fifth of the polling centres that opened on polling day The IEC Media Commission vibrantly discharged its functions, conducting regular media monitoring, and arbitrating media complaints.
Activities: 3.2 Provide technical assistance to review the legal and institutional framework for Afghan elections and inform a long-term electoral reform agenda	Presence of a functional Electoral Reform Task Force;	No electoral reform process and Task Force in 2009;	Electoral Reform Task Force is established by UNAMA by July 2010, and facilitates the review modalities for improving the legal and institutional framework for Afghan elections;	The recruitment of a Legal Advisor to the IEC was completed.
3.3 Support IEC to undertake	Outline of the post-2010 agenda for	IEC produced Concept of Operations and	a) The Post-2010 operational and	

<p>a strategic planning process to inform the post-2010 Concept of Operations</p>	<p>the IEC</p>	<p>Operational Plans for 2009 and 2010, but did not engage in institutional development planning.</p>	<p>institutional development priorities are identified by IEC Management before end, December 2010; b) Institutional development plan addresses issues of marginalisation based on gender, ethnicity, disability etc</p>	<p>Donors initiated discussions on post-electoral agenda, and requested a concept note to guide further discussion.</p>
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Project Management and Technical Assistance

Hierarchy of Results	Progress Indicators	Base-Line Information	Performance Benchmarks/Targets	Implementation Progress (Jan-June 2010)
Output: Technical and Operational support is provided to IEC and other electoral institutions as required.	Level of IEC staff confidence to plan implement and manage the electoral cycle.	IEC staff heavily relied on international technical advisors during the 2009 electoral cycle.	IEC demonstrates improved confidence in planning and implementation of VR and the election process.	The general perception among domestic and international observers was that <i>Wolesi Jirga</i> electoral activities were better organised from a procedural and administrative point of view, compared with last year's elections.
Activities: Recruit and deploy PMU national staff.	Number of national staff providing operational and management support to the electoral process;	Almost 250 national staff were involved in supporting the 2009 electoral process;	About 200 national staff are engaged in supporting the 2010 electoral process	214 national staff are engaged
Recruit and deploy PMU international staff.	Number of national staff providing operational and management support to the electoral process;	20 international ELECT PMU staff were involved in supporting the 2009 electoral process;	12 PMU international staff are engaged in supporting the 2010 electoral process	About 10 international staff and UN Volunteers supported project implementation based in the PMU
Support implementation of security safeguards for UNDP/ELECT PMU personnel, office, and international staff residences	Level and quality of security investments/measures at electoral offices and staff accommodation facilities;	In 2009, security measures were implemented in accordance with Minimum Operating Security Standards of the UN	Security measures are upgraded to "Category A" standard set by UNDP	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Additional Gurkha guards and Explosive Detection Sniffer dogs were deployed at ELECT PMU; • A Security Analysis from the UNDP Regional Centre in Bratislava on a "detailed assignment"
Support implementation of security safeguards for the Technical Assistance Team	Level and quality of security investments/measures at electoral offices and staff accommodation facilities;	In 2009, security measures were implemented in accordance with Minimum Operating Security Standards of the UN	Security measures are upgraded to "Category A" standard set by UNDP	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Upgrades on Guest Houses for UNDP/ELECT staff in Kunduz, and Mazar were completed to allow international staff deployment. • UNAMA offered bed spaces for ELECT staff in Herat and Jalalabad
Provide Technical and operational support – with a focus on core activities – to enable IEC implement the 2010 electoral programme	Number of international technical advisors embedded in IEC structures to mentor and guide their national counterparts (department heads);	Almost 140 international staff, and 250 national staff were involved in supporting the 2009 electoral process;	The 2010 electoral process is supported by 85 international advisors, UN volunteers and specialists; and 250 national staff;	About 60 ELECT and UNOPS international advisors and UN Volunteers provided technical and logistical support to IEC